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I. INTRODUCTION

J

apan is a country whose present legal system dates to only
the late Nineteenth Century. In this relatively short period, Japan’s legal system has undergone dramatic changes and
has been influenced by both the civil law and common law sys1
tems of Europe and the United States (“U.S.”). The modern
Japanese legal system started as a civil law system based on
2
French and German models; however, before World War II, the
nation modified its legal system in order to strengthen govern3
ment control at the expense of individual rights. After the war,
during the U.S. occupation of the nation, Japan modified its
4
system to accommodate American common law notions.
Throughout this period of legal adaptation, the Japanese
tended to avoid using the legal system to resolve disputes, and
instead used more traditional models of alternative dispute
resolution, which are characterized by conciliation, compromise
5
and mediation. This Japanese anti-litigation preference seems
consistent with norms existing prior to Japan’s adoption of its
6
modern legal system in the late Nineteenth Century. More
recently, the Japanese government has adopted a policy of
7
strengthening the “Rule of Law” in Japanese society. The

1. HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 7–9 (2d ed. 1999).
2. Id. at 29–31.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Tetsuya Obuchi, Role of the Court in the Process of Informal Dispute
Resolution in Japan: Traditional and Modern Aspects, with Special Emphasis
on In-Court Compromise, 20 LAW IN JAPAN 74, 75 (1987).
6. Id. at 78.
7. The “Rule of Law” concept is not easily defined. Stated attributes of
Westernized Rule of Law systems include: utilizing the legal system as a primary means of ordering society; governing in a manner that adheres to the
law; resolving disputes based on the application of preexisting, general, abstract and depersonalized rules to a given set of facts; and resolving disputes
in terms of a winner and loser. RUDOLF B. SCHLESIGNER ET AL., COMPARATIVE
LAW 320–22 (6th ed. 1998); U.S. Justice Sandra Day O’Connor has recently
defined the Rule of Law to mean: “that laws should be enacted by democratically elected bodies and enforced by independent judiciaries.” SANDRA DAY
O’CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW 33 (2003) [hereinafter O’CONNOR]. Inherent in these definitions are two basic underpinnings of the Rule of Law
idea: (1) an independent judicial system to resolve disputes through enforcement and application; and (2) laws adopted by the society that are not so
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Japanese Diet rewrote Japan’s Civil Procedure Code in 1996
(“New Code”), to make litigation more readily available as part
of the nation’s policy to strengthen the Rule of Law in Japan.
In 2003, the Author undertook a study, involving interviews
8
with bengoshi (licensed practicing lawyers) and statistical
analyses, to determine whether the New Code had made litigation the official dispute resolution mechanism of a Rule of Law
society — a more favored method of resolving disputes. This
Article sets forth the results of that study.
Following this introduction, Part II offers a short synopsis of
the recent legal changes made in Japan and discusses the Civil
Procedure system in Japan and the research project underlying
this Article’s study. This Part deals with some of the major
changes brought about in the New Code and discusses the reasoning behind those changes.
flexible as to lack either understanding by the public or meaning sufficient to
control both public (governmental) and private action.
8. Legal professionals in Japan fall into various categories. At the top of
the list are the bengoshi, or licensed lawyers, who are authorized to represent
parties in litigation before the courts and to generally give legal advice. However, there are other legal professionals in Japan, some of whom perform
functions that are typically undertaken by lawyers in the U.S. Thus, legal
scriveners prepare documents, such as wills, and assist in the drafting of
pleadings although they are not licensed lawyers. In addition, patent attorneys give advice on patent law matters, but they are not licensed lawyers.
Most Japanese law departments of major companies are not staffed with bengoshi but are staffed with highly trained and knowledgeable graduates of
hogakubu law faculties at Japanese Universities that provide four-year undergraduate law programs. Bengoshi are licensed under the “Bengoshi Ho” or
Practicing Attorney’s Act (1949 c. 205, art. 4) (Japan). To become a bengoshi a
candidate must pass a difficult Bar examination, attend the Legal Training
and Research Institute, pass another exam after completing the Institute and
be registered with the local Bar Association. See HIDEO TANAKA, THE
JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 563 (University of Tokyo Press, 1976) [hereinafter
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM]. “Admission to the Japanese Bar is a
prerequisite for practicing law, and admission to the Bar is accomplished by
registering on the Lawyer’s List (Bengoshi Kaiim Meibo) maintained by the
Japan Federation of Bar Associations.” TAKAAKI HATTORI & DAN FENNO
HENDERSON, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED § 2.04(1) (Yasuhei Taniguchi
et al. eds., Juris Publishing 2d ed. 2002) [hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE IN
JAPAN REVISED]. “Bengoshi, a translation of the English word ‘barrister’ is in
use today. The term first appeared in an occupation title in the draft of the
Lawyers Law which was prepared for submission to the Diet in 1890. The
term daigennin had currency before 1890.” Richard W. Rabinowitz, The Historical Development of the Japanese Bar, 70 HARV. L. REV. 61, 64 n.5 (1956).
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Part III then moves on to the effect that these changes have
had on litigation as a means of resolving disputes. Specifically,
Part III.A. considers the effect of the legal changes on the pace
of litigation in both the Trial Court (District Court) (III.A.1.)
and Appeals Courts levels (High Court and Supreme Court)
(III.A.2.). Part III.A.4. explores potential reasons why the accelerated pace of litigation has not resulted in an increase in the
use of litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism. Part III.B.
discusses the effect of the changes made in the procedures dealing with production of evidence. Part III.B.1. then analyzes the
new inquiry procedures and links the system’s malfunction to
procedural inadequacy stemming from the lack of sanctions for
failing to respond to inquiries. Part III.B.2. examines the New
Code’s effect on document production and the consequences of
the Japanese legal system’s “self-use” document exception,
which serves to effectively restrict the meaningful production of
evidence. Part III.C. deals with the New Code’s outcome on
Japanese litigation and its effect on the Commercial Code as
applied to stockholder derivative suits in Japan.
Part III.D. deals with the Japanese alternative to the class
action — the Representative Action — and explores whether the
New Code’s changes, designed to enhance the use of such actions, has had the desired effect. Part III.E. considers the rela9
tively new phenomenon in Japan of the “Complicated Case”
and the anticipated future modifications and adaptations of
provisions in the New Code that can be expected to deal with
“Complicated Cases.” Part III.F. discusses the relations between the Japanese Bench and Bar and how the legal changes
set to increase the size of the legal profession by approximately
threefold, could enhance the Rule of Law in Japan.
The conclusion, in Part IV, makes some suggestions for future
changes and areas deserving of further study if the objective of
strengthening the judicial system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism is to be realized in Japan.

9. Shozo Ota, Reform of Civil Procedure in Japan, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 561,
565 (2001).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM
A. Japan’s Legislative Reforms
In 1996, the Japanese legislature completely rewrote the na10
tion’s Civil Procedure Code. The rewriting of the New Code
took five years to complete; however, lengthy discussion and
debates regarding the need for such a fundamental change in
Japan’s Civil Procedure Code long preceded the rewriting ef11
fort. The New Code was an amalgam of the old Japanese Civil
Procedure Code (“Old Code”) and reforms designed to speed-up
the pace of Japanese litigation and create reliable means of re12
solving disputes. Some heralded the New Code as ushering in
major change for Japan’s civil procedure for the Twenty-first
13
Century. Others wondered whether the New Code would actually result in major change or would simply serve as a set of
“baby steps,” having little impact on how litigation in Japan
14
would be handled in the future. Several English language articles have explained the changes in the New Code at its incep15
tion.
16
In the
The New Code went into effect on April 1, 1998.
summer of 2003, as a response to the continued negative perception of litigation in Japan, the Japanese Diet (Japan’s Par17
liament) enacted legislation requiring the completion of cases
10. Yasuhei Taniguchi, The 1996 Code of Civil Procedure of Japan – A
Procedure for the Coming Century?, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 767 (1997).
11. Id.
12. Ota, supra note 9, at 564–66.
13. See, e.g., Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 790–1.
14. Toshiro M. Mochizuki, Baby Step or Giant Leap?: Parties Expanded
Access to Documentary Evidence Under the New Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 285 (1999).
15. See generally Taniguchi, supra note 10; Mochizuki, supra note 14 (detailing changes in access to document production); Takeshi Kojima, Japanese
Civil Procedure in Comparative Law Perspective, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 687
(1998); Ota, supra note 9, 568–72; Carl F. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant: Japan’s Changing View Towards Civil Litigation, 32 LAW &
POL’Y INT’L BUS. 769 (2001) [hereinafter Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant].
16. Ota, supra note 9, at 561.
17. Article 41 of Japan’s Constitution provides that “the Diet shall be the
highest organ of the State Power and shall be the sole law-making organ of
the State.” KENPŌ [Japanese Constitution], art. 41. The Diet consists of two
Houses: the House of Representatives and the House of Councilors. KENPŌ,
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18

at the trial court level within two-years of initiation. This legislation, as well as the New Code and the 2001 Report of the
Judicial Reform Council are considered part of Japan’s ongoing
effort to strengthen the concept of the Rule of Law in Japanese
19
society.
One of the main characteristics of a society governed by the
concept of the Rule of Law is that the legal system’s dispute
resolution mechanism (i.e., the judicial system) provides a reli20
able means of resolving legal disputes within a nation. A reliable judicial system must in turn provide its litigation participants with a reasonable opportunity to obtain reasonable relief
when warranted, and a reasonable opportunity to defend
against unwarranted, specious, or malicious claims. Although a
art. 42. A bill becomes a law when passed by both Houses or, if rejected by the
House of Councilors, is again passed by a two-thirds vote of the House of Representatives. KENPŌ, art. 59.
18. 15 Heisei [Act to Accelerate Court Procedures] Statute No. 107, art. 2.
(2003) (Japan). See also Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation,
JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, May 13, 2003, available at LEXIS, News & Business
Library, Japan Economic Newswire File. The Asahi Shinbun reported that a
unanimous lower House of the Japanese Diet approved a bill “to limit lower
court trials to less than two years” in an effort to speed up the justice system.
Id. The Asahi Shinbun described the Japanese judicial system as operating
“snail-like.” See id. As the statistics referred to infra show, this description
appears to unduly criticize the pace of litigation in the Japanese court system,
at least as it applies to average dispositions of civil cases handled after passage of the New Code. The Japanese Diet enacted the two-year law on July 9,
2003. According to the Japan Times, the law applies to both civil and criminal cases at the District Court, Summary Court and Family Court. Trials to
be Expedited as Judicial Reform Bills Pass, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, July 10,
2003, available at http://japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030710
b1.htm [hereinafter Trials to be Expedited]. For a discussion of how such legislation may adversely affect the Rule of Law concept in Japan, see infra notes
209, 210, 212 and Part III.A.4.
19. See The Justice System Reform Council, Recommendations of the Justice System Reform — For a Justice System to Support Japan in the 21st Century, (proposed June 12, 2001), available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/
judiciary/2001/0612report.html [hereinafter Recommendations of the Judicial
Reform Council]. See also Major Legal Reform Handed to Koizumi, JAPAN
TIMES ONLINE, June 13, 2001, available at http://japantimes.co.jp.cgibin/g
etarticle.pl5?nn20010613a1.htm. For a discussion of recommendations made
by the Justice System Reform Council, see CARL GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW
IN JAPAN — A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 265–67 (2003) [hereinafter GOODMAN,
THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN].
20. SCHLESIGNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 11; O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 65–
79.
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Rule of Law judicial system requires the fair treatment of all its
participants, reality reveals that defendants are usually unwilling or at least non-initiating participants to litigation. In the
criminal law arena, the State, typically through the prosecutor’s
21
In a criminal case, the judicial sysoffice, initiates litigation.
tem in carrying out a Rule of Law mandate must provide the
accused defendant with a reasonable opportunity to defend him
22
or herself in a timely proceeding, e.g., a fair trial. Both the
Japanese and U.S. legal systems attempt to implement these
ideals through Constitutional provisions guaranteeing the ac23
cused defendant in criminal cases the right to counsel, the
24
privilege against self-incrimination, and a right to a speedy
25
How well these systems
trial before an impartial tribunal.
work to make these legal provisions a reality is not the subject
21. In Japan, the prosecutor’s office retains responsibility for bringing
forward criminal prosecutions. However, Japanese law does permit limited
civilian review of prosecutor decisions not to prosecute. For a discussion of
prosecution review commissions, see GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN,
supra note 19, at 293 and Mark D. West, Prosecution Review Commissions:
Japan’s Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial Discretion, 92 COLUM. L. REV.
684, 693 (1992).
22. See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes, J. dissenting); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S.
86 (1923); Vacher v. France, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. 482 (1996) (setting aside a
French criminal conviction because the defendant was not given a fair hearing
when his appeal was denied without receiving warning regarding any time
limits for his response to the government’s assertions on appeal nor did the
law specify any such time limits).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“to have the assistance of counsel for his defense”). KENPŌ, art. 37 para. 3 (“At all times the accused shall have the assistance of competent counsel who shall, if the accused is unable to secure the
same by his own efforts, be assigned to his use by the State.”).
24. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself”); KENPŌ, art. 38 (“No person shall be compelled
to testify against himself.”); X and 5 Others v. State, 1993 (O) No. 1189, 53
MINSHU No. 3 at 514 (Sup. Ct., Grand Bench, Mar. 24, 1999) (Japan) (“In order to exercise investigative power, there may be instances where it is necessary to hold the suspect in custody and interrogate the suspect.”). See generally Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1991) (discussing the historical and current importance
of confessions in the Japanese criminal system). See also GOODMAN, THE RULE
OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 312–14.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial”); KENPŌ, art. 37 (“In all criminal cases the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial tribunal.”).
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of this Article or the study behind it, which solely focuses on
26
civil non-administrative law adjudication.
In a civil justice system, the allegedly aggrieved plaintiff initiates litigation. In order to carry out a Rule of Law mandate, a
civil justice system must not only provide plaintiffs with a reliable, speedy and useable system, but it must also guarantee the
defendant’s right to defend him or herself in order to ensure
that both plaintiffs and defendants feel sufficiently confident
27
with the legal system. In the case of Japan, because of structural impediments, some potential plaintiffs may not feel such
necessary confidence in the Japanese legal system.
In fact, many aggrieved Japanese potential litigants reject
the existing judicial system in favor of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (“ADRs”) due to its unfavorable reputation.
In fact, many Japanese citizens perceive the nation’s judicial
system as failing to offer timely and adequate relief, and/or they
believe that the Japanese judicial system is an unreliable or
inefficient mechanism for resolving disputes. For this reason,
28
many Japanese litigants turn to ADR. As a result, Japanese

26. The Judicial Reform Council in Japan has made a number of suggestions in the criminal law area, including the creation of a public defender system, reform of the interrogation of suspects system, and lay participation in
criminal trials. For a discussion of the Japanese criminal justice system and
the Judicial Reform Council’s recommendations, see GOODMAN, THE RULE OF
LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at ch.13 (elaborating on Japan’s criminal law
system).
27. See Nelson v. Adams, 529 U.S. 460 (2000); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877); Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948) (holding that due process requires notice and an opportunity to be heard); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE,
ALI/UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES AND RULES OF TRANSNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE,
COUNCIL DRAFT NO. 2 (Sept. 29, 2003) (Principle 5: “Due Notice and Right to
be Heard”) (formerly Transnational Rules of Civil Procedure), available at
http://www.ali.org/ali/TransCP-CD2.pdf [hereinafter ALI/UNIDROIT Principles].
28. HIDEO TANAKA, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF POSITIVE LAW (3d ed.
1974), quoted in TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 492–
500 (University of Tokyo Press, 1976). Tanaka explains:
[C]onciliation has been widely used as a means of settling disputes,
while regular adjudicative procedures have not been used very frequently…the primary reason why a great number of people choose
conciliation rather than the formal adjudication process seems to
be…to avoid the time and expense required to go through the formal
legal process.
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society’s acceptance of the Rule of Law model may be subject to
29
question. This Article does not wish to challenge the utility of
ADR as an adjunct to the national legal system, or as part of a
Rule of Law judicial system — far from it. ADR, as an adjunct
to a judicial system, is in fact a characteristic of a Rule of Law
30
society, but the “A” must represent a true “alternative” and
not an adequate forum replacement.
In order for a judicial system to serve as a reliable means of
resolving legal disputes, it must: (1) be reasonably quick (justice
31
inordinately delayed is in fact justice denied); (2) be reasonably available (a system that taxes the complaining party so
much as to make the cost benefit analysis weigh in favor of not
using the system does not provide a Rule of Law solution to leId. See also John O. Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant, 4 J. JAPANESE
STUD. 359 (1978) [hereinafter Haley, The Myth of the Reluctant Litigant]; Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Samuel J. Cohen, Understanding the Incidence of Litigation in Japan: A Structural Analysis, 24 INT’L L. 443 (1991); Harold See,
Dispute Resolution in Japan: A Survey, 10 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 339 (1982).
29. See Kanako Takahara, Calls for Overhaul of Judge System Mount,
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 20, 1999, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/
cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn19991220b8.htm (“Discontent with the judicial system
among lawyers, politicians and business people has prompted a Cabinet advisory panel to launch discussions aimed at giving the system its first overhaul
of the postwar era…”). It is suggested that it is precisely because of such discontent that the Judicial Reform Council has made recommendations designed to make the Rule of Law a more integral part of Japanese society.
30. For example, the U.S. is a Rule of Law society where ADR plays both
the role of an alternative and adjunct to the nation’s judicial system. The
Federal Arbitration Act permits arbitration (a form of ADR) regardless of
whether state law prohibits it. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16
(2003). In addition, the Federal Arbitration Act requires that it must be interpreted as an effort by Congress to fully utilize its authority under the Interstate Commerce Clause in a manner that is consistent with the Congressional intent to override any pre-existing legal biases against arbitration. See
Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995). See
also Mitsubishi Motors v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985)
(specifying that federal law favors arbitration).
31. See Prompt Justice, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. ONLINE EDITION (June 12, 2002),
at http://www.reviewjournal.com/lvrj_home/2002/June-12-Wed-2002/opinion/1
893674.html (commenting on the “Short Trial Pilot Program” in Clark County
Nevada, which has as its goal reducing the inordinate delay in civil proceedings before the court). “[I]n the current civil context no one really wins when
justice lies a decade down the road…creating frustrations which can only encourage some to take the law into their own hands…or give up on [the] Justice
System entirely.” Id.
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gal problems); (3) provide a neutral judicious decision-maker;
and (4) offer a procedure for resolving disputes that gives a virtuous plaintiff a reasonable opportunity to be made whole.
These factors, however, are not absolutes and different Rule of
33
Law societies may properly draw different boundaries, making
their systems: (1) work faster or slower; (2) more or less expensive; or (3) more or less plaintiff friendly when it comes to obtaining and admitting evidence — all within a zone of reason34
ableness.
B. A Comparison of the U.S. and Japanese Legal Systems
1. The U.S. Civil Judicial System
In the U.S., the nation expects its civil judicial system to perform law enforcement and social policy functions, which other
35
societies delegate to the elected branches and bureaucracies.
32. Marshall v. Jerrico Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980); Withrow v. Larkin,
421 U.S. 35, 46–47 (1975); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271 (1970).
33. See generally ALI/UNIDROIT Principles, supra note 27.
34. While a neutral decision-maker is a sine qua non of a Rule of Law judicial system, the mechanisms for decision-making may properly vary. Thus,
the American preference for a jury system is clearly not a Rule of Law requirement although the early English law alternatives — trial by combat or
by ordeal — would not be consistent with a Rule of Law society as understood
in the Twenty-first Century. Civil law societies do not provide for trial by jury
in either criminal or civil cases, although in some civil law countries a panel of
judges and laypersons may decide criminal cases. See NORMAN DORSEN ET AL.,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 1058–59 (West Group 2003).
In countries where French or German approaches to procedure prevail, many criminal trials are conducted by a single judge or by a
panel of judges without a jury. Where there is a panel of judges, the
panel often comprises a mixture of professional and lay judges, who
work together at all stages of the case.
Id. Prior to World War II, Japan experimented with a modified form of jurytrial in criminal cases. This form of jury-trial was suspended during the war
and remains suspended. YOSIYUKI NODA, INTRODUCTION TO JAPANESE LAW
137–38 (Anthony H. Angelo trans., Univ. of Tokyo Press 1976).
35. Richard L. Marcus, Reining in the U.S. Litigator: The New Role of U.S.
Judges, Speech at the Chuo-o University Symposium on Multiple Roles and
Interaction of Judges and Attorneys in Modern Civil Litigation (June 1, 2003),
quoting R. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM 47 (2001) (“Whereas European polities generally rely on hierarchically organized national bureaucracies to hold
local officials accountable to national policies, the U.S. congress mobilized a
distinctly U.S. army of enforcers — a decentralized, ideologically motivated
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Within the U.S. civil judicial system, the legal system draws its
boundaries in such a way as to favor plaintiffs. Filing fees remain low as a consequence, and do not increase with the
amount of damages sought. Similarly, the U.S. licenses a substantial number of lawyers assuring an ample supply of professional legal talent available for plaintiffs while allowing lay ju36
The collateral
ries to determine the quantum of damages.
judgment rule, under which a plaintiff may recover damages
from a defendant even after a third person has made the plain37
tiff whole, also serves as a boundary that favors plaintiffs.
As the size of jury awards increase along with the number of
available attorneys, lawyers are willing to assume cases on a
contingent fee basis. The contingency fee arrangement works
38
as judges leniently grant high fees, which then guarantees a
39
ready pool of attorneys. The “American Rule” for attorneys’
40
fees, where unsuccessful plaintiffs need not concern themselves with the expenses of reimbursing successful defendants’
attorneys, limits a potential plaintiff’s “costs” when thinking
about litigation in terms of a cost-benefit analysis. Together
with fee-shifting statutes that require some unsuccessful defendants to pay plaintiffs’ attorney fees but not visa versa, the U.S.
41
rule tilts the playing field in favor of initiating litigation.
42
Once in court, the U.S. notice of claim pleading and liberal
43
44
discovery rules similarly assist plaintiffs. The U.S. jury’s au-

army of private advocacy groups and lawyers.”). Japan similarly relies on the
bureaucracy to enforce the law. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant
Litigant, supra note 15, at 772–79.
36. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
791.
37. See, e.g., Halek v. United States, 178 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999).
38. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
792.
39. Id. at 793.
40. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 247
(1975).
41. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
792.
42. FED. R. CIV. P. 8. (stating that a plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient
to prove his or her case but must simply notify the other side of the basis for
the claim).
43. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26–37 (stating that evidence can be obtained from the defendant during the course of the litigation).
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thority to determine the award amount of compensatory and
45
punitive damages with some but limited judicial supervision
has led to a fear of “runaway” juries that has now become such
a part of American folklore that it has inspired the subject of a
46
film based on a best selling novel on this matter.
The “pro-plaintiff” U.S. judicial system has recently come un47
der challenge as failing to serve the “public interest.” Naturally most opponents of this system are those who typically represent deep-pocket defendants, who are required to pay damage
48
awards, such as insurers and hospitals. Meanwhile, plaintiffs
44. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
789.
45. The problem of excessive damages is particularly felt in the punitive
damage arena. In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, the U.S. Supreme
Court attempted to limit the amount of punitive damages that may be
awarded by “federalizing” and “constitutionalizing” the issue of grossly excessive punitive damage awards. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517
U.S. 559, 574–75 (1996). The Court set aside a punitive damage award as
excessive and set forth guideposts for lower courts to use in assessing the
reasonableness of jury punitive damage awards. Id. at 573. In another case,
the Court was much more specific than in Gore in setting the permissible limits on punitive damage awards. See generally State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003). But see Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 367, 113 Cal. App. 4th 1137 (2d Dist. 2003) & Henly v.
Phillip Morris, 5 Cal. Rptr. 3d 42, 112 Cal. App. 4th 198 (1st Dist. 2003).
46. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE RUNAWAY JURY (DOUBLEDAY 1996). See also
Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and
the Jury, 16 J. OF L., ECON. AND ORG. 306 (2000).
47. Cf. PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS
SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1994) (arguing that the litigious nature of U.S. society
and the availability of damages in questionable circumstances is having an
adverse effect on American society). See also Lawsuit Hell, How Fear of Litigation is Paralyzing Our Professions, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 15, 2003, at 43.
48. See, e.g., Lloyd’s Chairman Calls for Action to Tackle Compensation
Culture, INS. J., Sept. 16, 2003, available at http://www.insurancejournal.com/
news/newswire/west/2003/09/16/32323.htm (“[Lloyd’s Chairman] said that tort
reform was urgently needed to combat growing litigiousness in the U.S.,
which ultimately resulted in skyrocketing premiums for policy holders.”);
AAHP Board of Directors Statement on Medical Malpractice Reform, AM.
ASS’N HEALTH PLANS, June 11, 2001 (“[L]awyers have effectively tipped the
balance in health care creating serious consequences that threaten purchasers’ ability to offer insurance….”), at http://www.aahp.org/Content/Navigation
Menu/About_AAHP/WhatWe_Stand_For/Board_Of_Directors_Statements/Me
dicalMalpracticeReform.pdf; Press Release, American Benefits Council, Kennedy-McCain “Cap” on Punitive Damages Does Not Limit Excessive Liability
for Employers or Health Plans, Feb. 7, 2001, at http://www.americanbenefits
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and their representatives, who are trial lawyers for the most
49
part, respond that defendants who commit wrongs should not
escape liability and that punitive damages serve to rehabilitate
and deter “bad” actors and adequately compensate plaintiffs for
their injuries. The parties, however, greatly differ on what
compensation is adequate. The general public has begun to become involved in this debate as labor stoppages by physicians
complaining about the high cost of malpractice insurance have
50
made national headlines. In addition, political parties in the
U.S. have lined up along traditional partisan grounds — the
51
Democratic Party supporting plaintiffs and the trial lawyers,
52
and the Republican Party supporting big companies and their
council.org/newsroom/pr02-07htm; DIVISION OF ADVOCACY AND HEALTH POLICY,
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF SURGEONS, Why Americans Needs Medical Liability
Reform, at http://www.facs.org/ahp/whyamerica.html (last visited Oct. 19,
2003).
49. Tim Hyland, Group to Fight Doctor Tort Reform, BALT. BUS. J., Sept.
15, 2002, available at http://ww.bizjournals.com/Baltimore/stories/2003/09/15/
story6.html (“Maryland lawyers and victims of malpractice have formed a
group to oppose caps on malpractice awards.…The new group, backed by the
Maryland Trial Lawyers Association…”).
50. See, e.g., Sandra G. Boodman, What Crisis?; GAO: Malpractice Premium Spikes Don’t Force Out Docs, WASH. POST, Sept. 16, 2003, at F1, available at 2003 WL 62215778; Texas Voters Back Limits on Malpractice Awards;
Amendments Would Let Legislators Cap Noneconomic Damages in Lawsuits,
WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62215336; NJ Doctors
Threaten State-Side Malpractice Strike, FACTIVA GLOBAL INS. NEWS DIG., Feb.
3, 2003, available at 2003 WL 4438287; West Virginia Surgeons Strike Against
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, FOXNEWS.COM, Jan. 1, 2003, at http://www.
foxnews.com/story/0,2933,74369,00.html.
51. Jennifer Loven, Bush Urges Legal Reforms, Pushes Global-Trade Efforts, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 21, 2003, at A22, available at 2003 WL
63280768 (“Democrats see the issue as partisan, with Republicans targeting
trial attorneys, traditional major sources of campaign donations for Democrats…”).
52. Id. The Republican Party, both through the President and its Representatives in Congress, has supported limiting the size of damage awards:
In his weekly radio address, Bush pushed for Congress to limit damage awards in medical malpractice cases…“We need to address the
broader problems of frivolous litigation,” Bush said. “We need effective legal reforms that will make sure that settlement money from
class actions and other litigation goes to those harmed and not to
trial lawyers.” The White House backs pending GOP legislation that
would sharply curtail lawyers’ contingency fees in lawsuit awards
topping $100 Million.
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insurers, both sets of litigants ultimately providing their re53
spective political party with campaign funding.
The U.S. judicial system also has been hard pressed to join
this political debate. The system has responded to this pressure
in a measured and judicious way by refusing to resolve the
problems created by politically contentious litigation, such as
54
the asbestos litigation mess. Instead, the U.S. judicial system
urges the political branches to take up their constitutionally
mandated role of serving the public interest by legislating reso55
lutions to problems such as the asbestos mess while the court
steps in and attempts to control “run-away” punitive damage
56
awards.
57
Whatever the merits or demerits of U.S. boundary drawing,
defendants and their representatives have not yet argued that
the U.S. judicial system is inconsistent with the Rule of Law,
because, for example, it denies defendants a reasonable opportunity to defend themselves. Rather, while the conflicting sides
differ as to where boundaries are properly drawn, all sides seem
to agree that the American legal system, whatever its faults,
58
supports a Rule of Law society. This mutual agreement, however, is not the case in Japan.
Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, No. 01–963, 2003
U.S. Lexis 1956, at *55–56 (Mar. 10, 2003) (refusing to reconfigure liability
rules in asbestos litigation).
55. Id.
56. Federal judges who are appointed for life can afford to remain impartial in the political debate. However, impartiality is difficult to achieve in
states that require the election of judges. The lure of campaign financing
from one side or the other may taint the public’s view of the judicial system.
See COMM’N ON THE 21ST CENTURY JUDICIARY, AM. B. ASS’N, JUSTICE IN
JEOPARDY 1–2 (2003).
57. For a discussion of whether appellate judges harbor a bias against
plaintiffs who succeed at the trial level, see Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore
Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L.
ECON. REV. 125 (2001). See also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg,
Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128 (2000).
But see Harry T. Edwards & Linda Elliott, Beware of Numbers (and Unsupported Claims of Judicial Bias), 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 128 (2000).
58. The author is unaware of any due process or Rule of Law challenges to
the American litigation system. Indeed, Justice O’Connor has impliedly suggested that easy access to the courts by plaintiffs seeking relief is a component
of the Rule of Law in the U.S.: “In our system — and our experience has
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2. The Japanese Civil Judicial System
As an historic matter, Japan requires its judicial system to
59
perform a more limited function than the U.S. judicial system.
As a consequence, the Japanese judicial system has drawn its
60
boundaries in a manner less favorable to plaintiffs. In addition, the shortage of lawyers in Japan makes a contingent fee
61
system unworkable, even if technically lawful. The Japanese
legal system’s requirement of paying a substantial part of law62
The Japanese
yer’s fee “up front” also inhibits litigation.
courts’ filing fee system, which for most cases has a graduated
fee that increases with the size of damages sought, increases
63
the cost of getting one’s case before the court. The Japanese
legal system has a fact-pleading requirement that obliges a
plaintiff to plead facts sufficient to be successful at the start of
64
the case. Meanwhile, the system provides no means for com65
To
pelling the production of facts before a case’s initiation.
make matters worst, plaintiffs also have little opportunity to
obtain meaningful factual discovery even after the case has begun. In addition, credible plaintiffs that are willing to underproved its efficacy — it is the citizens themselves, through the courts, who
enforce their rights…ready access to independent courts allows any citizen to
press his or her claim.” O’CONNER, supra note 7.
59. See generally Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra
note 15.
60. See id. at 789 (discussing the barriers to litigation in Japan). See also
Ota, supra note 9, at 5 (describing the process of litigation in Japan as slow,
complex and expensive).
61. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
793 (noting that given the relatively small number of licensed lawyers permitted to handle litigation, few attorneys desire a contingent fee system). See
also Ota, supra note 9, at 563 (discussing the shortage of lawyers in Japan).
62. Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 4.
63. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
791–92 (“In Japan…filing fees are typically based on the amount at issue in a
case and can be quite high.”).
64. MINSOHŌ [Japanese Code of Civil Procedure], art. 133, sec. 2.2 [hereinafter MINSOHŌ]. See also MINJI SOSH-O KISOHU [Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure], art. 53(1) (on file with author). Under Rule 133 of the Japanese Code
of Civil Procedure, the complaint must assert “the gist and ground of” of a
claim. Id. If deemed inadequate by the court, the court may reject the claim
and, if not amended to satisfy the court the complaint will be dismissed. Id. at
art. 137.
65. Japan has no pre-trial discovery. See MINSOHŌ, art. 163; see also Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 3.
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take the cost of litigation and have evidence supporting their
allegations are frequently deterred from doing so by the Japa66
nese system’s low damage awards and the difficulties in exe67
cuting a favorable judgment. In addition to the problems described above, the Japanese general public views the nation’s
68
judicial system as being too slow to resolve disputes. Faced
with all of these obstacles, many potential plaintiffs in Japan
are reluctant to litigate, and instead find ADR to be the more
appropriate means for resolving disputes, whereas potential
plaintiffs in other societies would find similar disputes more
69
easily resolved by their nation’s court system. Many critics of

66. See generally JOSEPH W.S. DAVIS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN JAPAN 279
(1996).
67. See Shunko Muto, Concerning Trial Leadership in Civil Litigation:
Focusing on the Judge’s Inquiry and Compromise, 12 LAW IN JAPAN 23, 24
(1979) (suggesting that one basis for successful compromise of litigation is a
provision under which a plaintiff actually gets paid damages rather than having to undergo the difficulties of execution after judgment). See also Mark D.
West, Information, Institutions, and Extortion in Japan and the United
States, Making Sense of Sokaiya Racketeers, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 767, 787 (1999)
(“[C]ompanies can hire Yakuza to enforce judgments, a skill at which gangs
appear to be more adept than the legal system.”) [hereinafter West, Information]. A bengoshi interviewed in Nagoya supported settlement of litigation by
compromise by noting both that: (1) it is easy for the losing defendant in litigation to hide assets; and (2) there are high costs to obtaining execution. Interview with bengoshi (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author). As a consequence, it is “better for the plaintiff to get quick money.” Id. The settlement
may result in the plaintiff getting less money, but at least the plaintiff gets
the settlement money. Id. As used throughout this article the terms bengoshi
and lawyer are used interchangeably. For a discussion of the varying legal
professionals in Japan, see notes 8, 21 & 76–78.
68. Kojima, supra note 15, at 687 (explaining that grave concerns about
the delay and cost of litigation have diverted the Japanese people from the
justice system). See also John O. Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at
the Problem, 10 WILLAMETTE J. OF INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 121, 134 (2002) (discussing the decrease in litigation time in Japan from 17.3 months in 1973 to
9.3 months in 1997 and tying such decrease in delay to the increased use of
litigation in the 1970’s) [hereinafter Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look
at the Problem].
69. See Obuchi, supra note 5, at 88. See also Sato Yasunobu, Cultural
Conflict in Dispute Processing Under Globalization: International Cooperation
for Legal Aid, at http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp (last visited Oct. 30, 2003).
Yasunobu argues that one purpose of supporting ADR over litigation is the
advancement of Japanese industry over the rights of Japanese citizens:
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the Japanese judicial system have even suggested that plaintiffs’ growing reliance on “extra-legal” means of resolution, such
70
as resort to organized crime organizations, controlled violence
71
and Sokaiya have stemmed from the system’s inability, or at
least the perceived inability, to obtain adequate relief for plain72
tiffs within a reasonably time. As a result, one of the Judicial
Reform Council’s prime recommendations was aimed at reduc73
ing the amount of time required to resolve civil litigations.
Thus, Japan’s civil litigation system may be seen as defendantoriented while the U.S. civil litigation system may be seen as
plaintiff-oriented.

It cannot be denied that the Japanese people prefer conciliation to
litigation.…even though litigation is initiated, it is not uncommon
that a judge mediates for settlement in private in his/her chamber.
Thus, the judiciary has long been left small and ineffective. This
seems to have been part of a tacit industrial policy in order to discourage the promotion of human rights and the development of individual’s legal consciousness in exchange for the rapid national economic growth measured by GNP or GDP.
Id.
70. See Frank K. Upham, Litigation and Moral Consciousness in Japan:
An Interpretive Analysis of Four Japanese Pollution Suits, 10 LAW AND SOC’Y
REV. 579, 595–97 (1976). See FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
POSTWAR JAPAN 78–123 (1987) (discussing the Buraku Liberation League’s use
of “denunciation struggle” to persuade bureaucrats by the threat of limited
physical force) [hereinafter UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR
JAPAN].
71. Sokaiya are generally seen as corporate troublemakers who, for an
extortionist price, will either remain mute themselves or will cause other
shareholders to remain quiet at corporate annual meetings. Professor West
defines Sokaiya as follows: “A Sokaiya (literally ‘general meeting operator’) is
usually a nominal shareholder who either attempts to extort money from a
company’s managers by threatening to disrupt its annual shareholders’ meeting with embarrassing or hostile questions or who works for a company’s
management to suppress dissent at the meeting.” Mark D. West, Why Shareholders Sue: The Evidence from Japan, 30 J. OF L. STUD. 351, 374 (2001) [hereinafter West, Why Shareholders Sue]. See also Mark D. West, The Puzzling
Divergence of Corporate Law: Evidence and Explanations from Japan and the
United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 527, 564 (2001) [hereinafter West, The Puzzling Divergence of Corporate Law].
72. See generally West, Information, supra note 67, at 770 (examining extortion by Sokaiya racketeers in a corporate context).
73. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at
ch. II, pt. 1, § 1 (“Reinforcement and Speeding Up of Civil Justice”).
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Unlike in the U.S., where the public does not feel that the judicial system’s pro-plaintiff orientation creates a Rule of Law
society issue, the people of Japan have raised such a concern
74
with respect to the capability of their nation’s judicial system.
In response, the Judicial Reform Council (the “Council”) made
recommendations for liberalizing the judicial system, to make
the judicial system’s relief more readily obtainable. The Council’s proposals were grounded in the public’s general Rule of
Law concerns and were designed to carry out the Council’s view
that the Rule of Law should more fully infiltrate Japanese soci75
To this end, the Council has suggested, among other
ety.
things, increasing the number of licensed bengoshi authorized
to represent parties in court by more than three times the num76
ber annually admitted at the time the Council began its work.
The Council also urged for the expansion of the roles of other
77
Japanese legal professionals, such as judicial scriveners and
74. The public’s concern is reflected in the Diet’s recent legislative action in
creating the Law Reform Council and mandating it to examine and make
recommendations concerning Japan’s legal system. See Judicial Reform
Council, Points at Issue in the Judicial Reform, at http://www.kantei.go.jp/
foreign/judiciary/0620reform.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2003). The Council
noted that the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in the
Diet directed it to consider such questions as the judicial appointments system, quality and quantity of legal professionals, public participation in the
judicial system, etc. Id.
75. See generally Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra
note 19.
76. At the time the Council started its work, approximately 1,000 new
lawyers were admitted each year. This figure was twice the previous total of
only 500 newly admitted lawyers as late as the late 1980s. See LEGAL
TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN 8–9 (S. Ct. of Japan 1977). The
Council recommends that 3,000 new lawyers be admitted each year beginning
in 2010. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19,
at ch. 1, pt. 3, § 2(2) (“How the Legal Profession Supporting the Justice System Should Be”). See also Major Legal Reform Handed to Koizumi, supra note
19 (“When the current bar exam is phased out in 2010, the number of those
who pass the new bar exam should reach 3,000 a year, up from the current
1,000.”). Of these lawyers, a certain number become judges and prosecutors
and it has been recommended that at least some of the additional lawyers be
allocated to the judges’ pool in order to increase the number of judges.
77. TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 563. Professor
Tanaka sets forth the functions of judicial scriveners as follows:
The functions of judicial scriveners are (a) to draft documents to be
filed in courts, public prosecutors’ offices or local offices of the Minis-
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78

patent attorneys, in order for them to play a more active role
79
in litigation. In addition, the Council recommended increasing
the pool of judges so as to reduce the backlog of cases and free
judges from their tight schedules to work on more recently filed
80
cases. Further, the Council proposes to speed up the pace of
litigation by enhancing the legal workforce’s lawyering skills by
suggesting a new and hopefully better educational system with
81
innovative teaching methods for lawyers. The Japanese government has already accepted these recommendations and by
2006 and 2007 the first of the new crop of newly trained bengo82
shi will enter the field. Similarly, efforts are under way to re83
cruit practicing lawyers to become judges.
try of Justice on behalf of other persons, and (b) to take the necessary
steps relating to the registration of transfers of title to land or other
transactions in a registration office.…In connection with (a) above,
judicial scriveners often give legal advice to laymen in the course of
drafting legal documents.
Id.
78. The function of patent attorneys is “to act on behalf of other persons in
matters related to patents, ‘utility models’…designs and trademarks.” Id. at
564.
79. In the case of scriveners, the Council has suggested that they be allowed to represent parties in Summary Court proceedings and that the law be
amended to allow for Summary Court jurisdiction in damage actions seeking
amounts which take into account economic trends. Recommendations of the
Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. III, pt. 3, § 7 & ch. II, pt. 1, § 5(3)
(“Utilization of Specialists in Fields Adjoining the Law” & “Expansion of the
Jurisdiction of Summary Courts & Substantial Increase in the Upper Limit on
Amount in Controversy in Procedures for Small-Claims Litigation”).
80. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch.
III, pt. 1, § 2(1) (section entitled: “Judges”).
81. Id. at pt. 2.
82. In April 2004, Japan will usher in a new era of legal training with the
opening of the new law schools recommended by the Law Reform Council.
These schools will be graduate level schools and the first class of graduates
will graduate in two years time. Under the new curriculum, graduates of a
hogakubu faculty who are admitted to the new law school may graduate after
a two-year class while graduates of other faculties will require three years of
legal education. As a consequence the first crop of new graduates — most of
whom will hopefully pass the new Bar Examination — will graduate in 2006
and the next class of three year students in 2007. See Major Legal Reform
Handed to Koizumi, supra note 19 (“To nurture high-quality lawyers, the report calls for establishment of law schools by April 2004 that require two or
three years of study….Starting in 2006, when the first graduates of the new
schools are expected, a new bar exam should be established…”). In November
of 2003, the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology
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The Council’s work does not stand-alone; the New Code preceded it. One of the New Code’s main objectives is to modify the
Japanese Civil Procedure so as to alleviate some of the problems that are at the core of the Rule of Law debate and ultimately, which weaken the judicial system as a means of dispute
84
resolution. The New Code made procedural, and some have
suggested substantive, changes in the method by which cases
are tried and also altered many evidence-gathering procedures
85
during the trial. By limiting the right of appeal to Japan’s Supreme Court, the New Code attempts to speed up the date of
“final judgment” by making the nation’s High Court decision
final, at least in most cases, which, at the same time, frees the
Supreme Court to devote its time and effort to more important
86
legal issues. As counter-currents exists to the Judicial Reform
Council’s work (such as strengthening ADR to make it at least
an equal partner with the Judicial system in resolving disputes
and scrapping the “American Rule” on attorney’s fees in favor of

licensed sixty-six new American style law schools. 66 Institutions Win Approval to Open U.S.-style Law Schools, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Nov. 22, 2003,
available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20031122a6.
htm.
83. As explained in Part III.F. of this Article, such efforts are not likely to
be successful absent substantial additional changes that do not appear to be
forthcoming.
84. Kojima, supra note 15, at 687–88. Professor Kojima pinpoints making
civil trials understandable and the judicial system accessible as goals of the
New Code:
The reasons for the adoption of the new code can be summarized in
three points…Second, civil trials today have raised grave concerns
over the considerable delay and high costs of litigation, and this has
diverted the Japanese people from the Justice System — the so-called
“departure from justice symptom” (shihobanare). Unless civil trials
are made easily understandable and accessible, the social functions of
the civil justice system would be seriously undermined.
Id.
85. Mochizuki, supra note 14, at 286–87; Kojima, supra note 15, at 701–04;
Koichi Miki, Roles of Judges and Attorneys under the Non-Sanction Scheme
in Japanese Civil Procedure, Speech at the Chuo-o University Symposium on
Multiple Roles and Interaction of Judges and Attorneys in Modern Civil Litigation (June 1, 2003) (transcript on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
86. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 779–80; Kojima, supra note 15, at 715–17.
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a “loser pays” system), the “pro-plaintiff orientation” debate
also comes out in favor of altering Japan’s Civil Procedure Code.
These forces of the status quo are accommodated, at least to
some extent, in the New Code through such obstacles to effec88
tive discovery as the self-use document exception to production
89
and the failure to provide for sanctions in the new “inquiry
90
process.”
C. The Study on Japanese Litigation
91

A 2001 study, about the changing Japanese legal system,
concluded that the New Code’s concentrated evidence gathering
92
procedures had a positive effect on speeding up the litigation
93
process. The study found that statistical evidence showed that
the judicial system achieved dispositions at a higher absolute
number than prior to the New Code; however, since the number
of cases filed has changed, the ratio of dispositions to new cases
filed may not be substantially different than before. The study
94
further found that the new “inquiries procedure” was not as
95
helpful as originally thought would be the case.
This Article’s research purpose was to determine through interviews with Japanese bengoshi and through discussions with
Japanese professors of law whether the New Code has in fact
significantly improved litigation and made it a preferable tool
for dispute resolution. In this regard, the present study primar87. Japan follows the “American Rule” on attorney’s fees.
CIVIL
PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 2.04(3). The Council recommends the abolishment of the “American Rule” as a means of fostering litigation. See generally Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra
note 19. Modification of the Rule to permit successful plaintiffs to obtain
counsel fees while not shifting the burden of litigation costs to unsuccessful
plaintiffs, would foster litigation but abolition of the rule would not. Abolition
would change the risk/reward and cost/benefit analysis for a plaintiff — especially a small plaintiff that could not afford to pay a winning defendant’s
council fees — and result in less litigation.
88. See infra notes 255–71 and accompanying text.
89. See infra Part IV.B.1.
90. See generally Mochizuki, supra note 14, at 286–87; see also Taniguchi,
supra note 10, at 772–91.
91. See Ota, supra note 9, at 569–70.
92. MINSOHŌ, art. 182.
93. Ota, supra note 9, at 577.
94. MINSOHŌ, art. 163.
95. See generally Ota, supra note 9.
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ily concentrated on new litigation rates than on disposition
rates. Further, this Article’s study focused on trial practice and
lawyer attitudes towards the judicial system and their advice to
clients concerning litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism.
For this purpose, this Article’s study utilized a detailed questionnaire to structure interviews and in some cases interview
subjects answered the questionnaire in writing before their oral
interview. A copy of the questionnaire follows this Article in
Appendix A.
These interviews took place in various parts of Japan in order
to assure that the results would not be skewed toward the major litigation centers of Tokyo and Osaka. In this regard, bengoshi were interviewed in Hiroshima, Fukuoka, Kobe, Kyoto, Nagoya, Osaka, Saitama, Sapporo, Sendai, and Tokyo. Similarly,
law professors from various localities were interviewed and a
High Court Judge was interviewed outside of Tokyo. Judges of
the Tokyo District Court and officials of the Judicial Secretariat
were interviewed in Tokyo. This Article’s study reviewed the
resulting statistical data, including the Judicial Secretariat’s
information, in an attempt to determine whether the New Code
has had an effect on litigation rates, disposition rates and liti96
gation in general. In addition, all interviewed bengoshi were
requested to recommend one change in the nation’s civil procedure law that they felt would provide a significant solution to
the present problems facing Japan’s litigation system.
The results of this Article’s study are presented below. In
summary, the study concluded that while the New Code represents a major change in procedure on its face, the New Code’s
actual effect in areas other than the speed of disposition proved
96. Statistical information referred to herein and all statistical information
compiled in the charts set out herein come from two sources: (a) Hosoh Jiho
[compilation of annual statistics] for the years involved, and (b) statistics
compiled by and provided by the Japanese Supreme Court’s Secretariat. In
the case of overlapping statistics, there were slight but insignificant differences. In most cases, the statistics were identical. In some situations, only
one set of statistics was available, such as the Secretariat’s provisional 2002
data. Appreciation is extended to Professor M. Tanabe of Hiroshima University Faculty of Law who assisted locating and translating the Hosoh Jiho statistical data. All 2002 data reported herein is provisional. (Statistical information is on file with the Brooklyn Journal of International Law). [The Article’s use of this statistical data is hereinafter referred to as “The Japanese
Court System’s Statistics.”].

File: GoodmanMacro.doc

534

Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM

[Vol. 29:2

disappointing. Litigation appears to be moving faster, although
the trend to faster resolution was started prior to the New
Code’s amendment. Many Japanese lawyers expressed the
view that the present trend is not significantly different or
faster than the trend prior to the New Code. However, when
the average time of disposition was evaluated, it appeared that
the present trend appears to be significantly different from and
faster than the trend prior to the New Code’s enactment.
Nevertheless, most Japanese lawyers see the New Code as
having little, if any, effect on the speed of litigation, as compared to the trend started prior to the New Code, although most
agree that cases do move quicker today than prior to the New
97
Code. There also appears to be agreement among Japanese
lawyers that the New Code complements and carries forward
the trend to faster litigation initiated prior to the New Code.
The courts’ and lawyers’ attitudes toward moving litigation
98
faster are most significant in this regard. Nonetheless, while
it would seem that quicker resolution of litigation would lead to
greater use of litigation to resolve disputes, this does not appear
to be the case in Japan. This phenomenon requires explanation
and further study, and this Article presents some thoughts on
this issue.
Similarly, as Japanese litigation procedures improved, such
as by the use of consolidated evidence gathering procedures, the
expectation was that lawyers and litigants would have greater
confidence in the judicial system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism. This too does not appear to be the case, even
though the courts implemented consolidation procedures in
more cases and at an even higher percentage in cases involving
testimony by two or more witnesses. Moreover, the New Code’s
procedural devices, which are designed to make it easier for
parties to obtain factual information, appear to have some, but
little effect on the quality of information received. In fact, most
lawyers interviewed were not more inclined to recommend liti-

97. Ota, supra note 9, at 577.
98. See generally Interview notes with Japanese legal professionals (on file
with the author).
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gation to their clients today than they were prior to the New
99
Code’s adoption.
Japan’s reform of its Civil Procedure Code is an ongoing process and it is anticipated that further amendments will be
adopted to address issues that have come to light recently un100
der the new procedure. Thus, in July 2003, the Japanese government adopted changes to assist the nation’s court system in
dealing with complicated cases involving expertise that the
judges simply do not possess, such as an in-depth understanding of medical malpractice, intellectual property, and construc101
tion engineering cases.
In addition, the Japanese government enacted changes that
allowed prospective litigants to obtain information prior to the
actual filing of a lawsuit. However, it remains to be seen
whether the new provisions will make more evidence available

99. A lawyer in Hokkaido noted that he would be prepared to recommend
litigation more frequently if he noticed a change in aid to plaintiffs, but he has
not seen such a change. Interview with lawyer (K) in Hokkaido, Japan (on file
with author). Another lawyer in Sapporo, who primarily represents corporate
clients, noted that he would not recommend litigation more frequently and
that his clients were not being sued more frequently under the New Code than
under the Old Code. Interview with lawyer (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with
author). A lawyer in Hiroshima specifically tied the self-use document production exception (MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c–d)) to his willingness to recommend litigation, noting that he would recommend litigation more often if
documents normally withheld by the defendant under this exception were
produced. Interview with lawyer (M) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). See MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(c–d) (defining the self-use document
production exception). For a discussion of self-use documents, see infra notes
251–67. A lawyer in Sendai noted that in the past he informed clients that
civil cases were decided faster, but this fact did not change his attitude and he
does not recommend litigation any more frequently today than he did under
the Old Code. Interview with lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with author). A lawyer in Tokyo stated that he was not prepared to recommend litigation more frequently under the New Code because there was still no discovery and possession of evidence was necessary before the suit was filed in order
to prove a case. Interview with bengoshi (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with
author). A bengoshi in Hiroshima based his unwillingness to recommend
litigation on the difficulties of executing on a successful judgment. Interview
with bengoshi (V) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author).
100. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 790 (noting that we need to “keep a
close eye on the practices developing under the New Code and initiate necessary legislation promptly”).
101. See Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.

File: GoodmanMacro.doc

536

Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM

[Vol. 29:2
102

This
or will simply change the timing of evidence gathering.
Article will discuss these recent changes. In addition to discussing the results of the research, this Article attempts to
make some small suggestions as to changes that may more
closely align Japan’s civil procedure with the Rule of Law soci103
ety proposed by the Council’s 2001 Report.
III. JAPAN’S 1996 REFORMS IN PRACTICE
The New Code’s major reforms relate to procedures geared to
speed up the pace of litigation and procedures to make evidence
104
more freely available to parties. In a sense, the two ideas run
together in the hope that providing evidence earlier in the process can have an effect on the speed of the litigation process
overall. Thus, providing evidence at the earliest stages of issue
identification may serve to resolve issues or at least shorten a
trial’s duration. In addition to evidence changes, the New
Code’s major structural reforms were: (1) to add a new semipublic procedure through which the parties and their counsel
could, at an early stage, both define the issues and facts relating to those issues and discuss settlement, all outside the glare
of a public proceeding; and (2) to consolidate evidence gathering
105
at the trial stage.
In Japan, unlike in the U.S., trials do not take place on a
daily basis with witnesses appearing one after the other until
106
U.S.
all evidence has been presented to the trier of fact.
courts designed such trial practices to meet the needs of its citi102. The mechanism adopted is a kind of pre-complaint adoption of the current inquiry system. As discussed infra at Part III.B.1 and notes 199–225, the
current system does not appear to provide parties with much additional information, raising questions as to why a pre-complaint version would succeed.
The answer appears to be that it is seen as a “first step” reform with later
steps to include a sanctions regime for failure to truthfully respond to an inquiry. For a discussion of the inquiry system, see infra Part III.B.1.
103. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19.
104. See Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70. See generally Mochizuki, supra note
14; Taniguchi, supra note 10; Kojima, supra note 15.
105. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 771. See Ota, supra note 9, at 564.
106. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 769. Japanese trials are similar to trials
in most Civil Law countries. Professional career service judges meet with
counsel and receive evidence on widely dispersed dates. Thus, trial dates may
be separated by a week, month or more. For a discussion of trial procedures
in Japan see infra notes 108–38 and accompanying text.
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zen jurors. Jurors, who having taken time out of their daily
lives to perform their civic duty, need to get back to their daily
107
For this reason, the U.S. court
lives as quickly as possible.
system cannot expect its citizen jurors to remember testimony
heard weeks before they are called on to make their decision.
The existence of a jury trial right in all cases at common law in
108
which the matter in dispute exceeds twenty dollars requires a
procedure that condenses the time for trial to as small a capsule
109
of time as is possible. To achieve this goal, American lawyers
— who in the U.S. are in charge of a case’s investigation stage
and also play a major role in the trial stage — must be well
prepared. U.S. attorneys also have to prepare their witnesses
in advance in order for testimony to go quickly and succinctly at
110
U.S. pre-trial procedure involves extensive discovery
trial.
and taking the testimony of witnesses and potential witnesses
outside of court and before trial, all of which serve to prepare
111
By avoiding
the lawyers, parties and witnesses for the trial.
surprise, the U.S. pre-trial discovery procedures also serve to
shorten the length of the trial, which in turn serves the time
112
Thus, while U.S. trials are relaconcerns of citizen jurors.
tively quick affairs, pre-trial procedures may take several years.
107. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE, chs. 2, 24, available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family_legal_guide/cha
pter_2.pdf (How the Legal System Works) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE].
108. U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any court
of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.”).
109. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FAMILY LEGAL GUIDE, supra note
107, at chs. 2, 24.
110. See Craig P. Wagnild, Civil Law Discovery in Japan: A Comparison of
Japanese and U.S. Methods of Evidence Collection in Civil Litigation, 3 ASIANPAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 17 (2002).
111. American Bar Association, How the Courts Work: Steps in the Trial,
available at http://www.abanet.org/publiced/courts/discovery.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2003).
112. See Wagnild, supra note 110, at 17. Prior to World War II, Japan experimented with a form of jury trial in criminal cases. ODA, supra note 1, at
66–68. This system permitted a defendant, in certain categories of cases, to
ask for a jury trial. Id. at 77–79. However, the determination of the jury was
not binding on the court, and if the court disagreed with the jury, it would
order a new trial. Id. On the other hand, if the judge supported the jury verdict, the defendant would lose the right to appeal the verdict. Id. Not surpris-
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In civil law countries, such as Japan, a right to a trial by jury
113
As a consequence, a professional judge (or
does not exist.
114
panel of judges) try cases on a full time occupational basis.
Such a judge may be expected to keep detailed records of pro115
ceedings and to refer to those records when working on a case.
For this reason, there is no need to have as compact a trial as in
the U.S.; the “trial” in Japan consists of the proceedings before
the court that occur after the filing and serving of the com116
plaint. Under Japanese law, the trial is a public event and all
117
While open court
trial proceedings are held in open court.
may serve a significant public interest in allowing the public to
118
see how the court system operates, open court is not the best
ingly, most defendants opted not to have jury trial. The jury trial law was
suspended and remains in suspension. Id. at 77–79.
113. Id. The Judicial Reform Council has suggested a form of lay participation in major crime cases in Japan, although it has rejected the U.S. style
jury. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19. The
likelihood is that Japan will experiment with a more German form of lay participation in some major criminal cases in the future. See also Major Legal
Reform Handed to Koizumi, supra note 19 (“The report recommends the introduction of jurors in serious criminal trials. They would be randomly selected from registered voters to serve throughout a case and to consult with
judges before handing out a verdict and sentence.”). A recent proposal calls
for a panel of three professionals and six lay judges in cases where the death
penalty or life imprisonment may be implicated. Hiroshi Matsubara, Citizen
Judge System Close to Reality, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, available at http://www.
apantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20040129b2.htm (last visited Feb. 11,
2004).
114. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 769–70.
115. Id.
116. The trial stage is also referred to as the “Plenary” or “Oral” Hearing.
117. KENPŌ, art. 82. The Japanese Constitution in Article 82 states:
Trials shall be conducted and judgment declared publicly.…Where a
court unanimously determines publicity to be dangerous to public order or morals, a trial may be conducted privately, but trials of political offenses, offenses involving the press or cases wherein the rights
of people as guaranteed in Chapter III of this Constitution are in
question shall always be conducted publicly.
Id.
118. In the U.S., one of the functions of the jury trial is to educate the public
as to how the justice system operates by making the public a part of the actual
operation of the system through service on the jury. AKHIL REED AMAR &
ALAN HIRSH, FOR THE PEOPLE: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION REALLY SAYS ABOUT
YOUR RIGHTS 54 (1998). This same function is part of the reason for suggestions for more lay participation in criminal judicial proceedings in Japan. See
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place for discussions of procedural nuances and settlement conferences. The New Code seeks to avoid this problem by institutionalizing a new procedural device called the “Preparatory Pro119
ceeding for Oral Argument,” where the court, parties, and invited persons with an interest in the matter can meet outside
the public glare and discuss both the issues and the potential
120
This procedural device was not actusettlement of the case.
ally created by the New Code but had been used on an experimental basis in some courts prior to adoption of the New
121
Code. However, the New Code does provide a lawful basis for
122
this procedure.
In practice, the Japanese pre-trial procedure
appears to work as follows: first, the plaintiff files its case in
court; second, the court conducts a first public Preliminary Oral
123
Hearing; and, third, the court follows up this Preliminary
Oral Hearing with a more informal proceeding to try to better
define the issues and the evidence necessary to resolve the is124
sues in the case.
Public Weight to Balance Scales of Justice, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 4, 2003
(public participation will “raise the public’s understanding of judicial procedures and their confidence in justice”), available at http://japantimes.co.jp/cgibin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030604 b6.htm.
119. Kojima, supra note 15, at 690.
120. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 168–74 (setting out the procedures for the “Preparatory Proceeding” for oral argument).
121. Miki, supra note 85, at 4–5. A Preparatory Procedure prior to the formal trial was common in pre World War II civil procedure. See Kohji Tanabe,
The Processes of Litigation: An Experiment with the Adversary System, in
TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 507 (“under the prewar
code, after an action was commenced by filing a complaint, the judge either
conducted ‘preparatory procedure’…usually of several hearings, or one or several sessions of ‘formal oral proceedings’…preliminary in nature. In these, he
attempted to fix the issues of fact and law.…”).
122. See Ota, supra note 9, at 570. Professor Ota notes:
As a way to legally authorize the new procedure, the New Code introduced the “oral argument preparation procedure” and abolished the
preparation proceeding. The oral argument procedure is open to people with interests. The Benron-ken-Wakai was basically a settlement
procedure with a color of oral argument, while the new oral argument
preparation procedure is structured as a preparation procedure with
a color of oral argument. Under this scheme, the most important factor (settlement negotiation) retreats behind a facade.
Id.
123. MINSOHŌ, arts. 164–67.
124. Kojima, supra note 15, at 705.
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These informal or Preparatory Proceedings for Oral Argument may be held in an informal setting with a roundtable at
125
Counsel from a
which all participants are at the same level.
distant location may appear by telephone and in some cases
126
At these proceedings, the court
may even appear by video.
may suggest, after hearing the views and concerns of the counsel for the parties, the production of documents or the response
to inquiries, and will attempt to expedite the case by narrowing
the issues to be tried and the witnesses and documents neces127
At some point, settlement discussions may be
sary for trial.
broached. The end result of such informal sessions (if settlement is not achieved) will be a kind of pre-trial order prepared
128
by the court, which provides a road map for the trial itself.
Unlike U.S. pre-trial orders, the Japanese roadmap does not
have any preclusive effect and the parties may attempt (and
probably would be successful in such attempt) to introduce new
or different issues and facts at the actual trial or Oral Proceed129
Prior to the preparation of such an order, a Japanese
ing.
125. Even in a “closed” (non-public) proceeding, the court may permit parties, persons invited by parties, or others to attend these closed sessions.
Miki, supra note 85, at 5.
126. Interview with Judicial Secretariat at the Supreme Court of Japan (on
file with author). The Supreme Court of Japan Judicial Secretariat (the
branch of the Court responsible for administration of the Justice System) has
openly accepted new technology. The Court has also worked hard to introduce
such technology into judicial proceedings both to speed up the process of litigation and to enable litigants and bengoshi located far from the courthouse to
participate without undo cost in both time and money. A lawyer in Sapporo
noted that as a result of the use of telephone and video meetings facilities, he
did not have to make the long trip to Tokyo to handle many matters that did
not require a personal appearance in the court. Interview with lawyer (C) in
Sapporo, Hokkaido (on file with author).
127. Kojima, supra note 15, at 705–06.
128. Miki, supra note 85, at 6. Article 173 of the Japanese Code of Civil
Procedure requires that the parties state the results of the preparatory proceedings in oral argument. MINSOHŌ, art. 173. Oral argument is a public
proceeding and hence the results must be stated in a public proceeding. Id.
129. Under Article 157 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure, the court
has (and had) the power to preclude a party from introducing evidence and
arguments not addressed at the proper time. MINSOHŌ, art. 157. Under Article 167, a party wishing to introduce facts or arguments not disclosed at the
preparatory proceeding must advise the other party of the reason that such
facts or arguments were not originally disclosed. MINSOHŌ, art. 167. Due to
the paternalistic attitude of Japanese judges and the view that the appropri-
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court may attempt to bring about a settlement of the case as
130
If settlement is not achieved
part of the informal discussion.
during the Preparatory Proceeding for Oral Argument stage,
the court will announce, in open court, the results of the procedural issues (the defining and limiting of evidence), thus pre131
serving the fiction of public hearings.
After such informal procedures and the “pre-trial” order, the
132
These
formal procedures called the “Oral Hearings” begin.
formal procedures involve the receipt of evidence, and if the
133
In
court deems necessary, the taking of testimony as well.
complicated cases involving two or more witnesses, the court
will typically utilize the new “consolidated” hearing method in
which testimony is consolidated so that the examination and
cross-examination of a single witness is completed on the same
day and in which all witnesses are heard on the same day or
134
This procedure is substanwithin a short time of each other.
tially different from the old Japanese court procedure where
witness testimony — even the testimony of a single witness —
135
To aid parties
could be spaced over months and even years.
and attorneys located far from the courthouse, Japanese courts
may now utilize video systems to take oral testimony; such a

ate party is supposed to win, it is unlikely that preclusion would be ordered
except in extraordinary situations evidencing bad faith. Id. arts. 157 & 167.
See also Miki, supra note 85, at 17 (“Japanese Judges are already equipped
with a power which allows them to dismiss allegations and evidence produced
after appropriate stage of procedure has passed, under the existing Article
157(1), although they are extremely reluctant to exercise this power.”). But
see Tanabe, supra note 121, at 514, 520.
130. Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 771.
131. See MINSOHŌ, art. 173.
132. A lawyer in Tokyo described the “public trial” aspects of the new procedure as follows: One or two public hearings; then a non-public preparatory
hearing with parties (this non-public hearing stage can last several months
and seeks to narrow the issues; at this stage, documents are presented and all
issues are discussed); the court then prepares a statement describing the issues to be tried; the case is finally tried in a public procedure. Interview with
lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).
133. See Kojima, supra note 15, at 706.
134. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 773.
135. See id.
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system is even connected to medical facilities in order to enable
136
those who are ill to testify.
At the conclusion of the Oral Proceedings (the trial’s conclusion) the court announces the date when it will issue its deci137
Japanese courts issue these decisions in public, opension.
court proceedings. Prior to preparing and issuing the final decision, the court may advise the parties of its imminent holding in
138
an effort to obtain a settlement.
A. The Pace of Dispositions
As one of the primary aims of the New Code was to speed up
the civil litigation process, the first issue considered in the
study underlying this Article was the speed with which civil
litigation was handled after enactment of the New Code.
1. The Japanese District Courts

139

The average time of litigation from filing to resolution at the
District Court level has declined. This speedier pace appears,

136. Interview with officials of the Judicial Secretariat in Tokyo, Japan (on
file with author).
137. Kojima, supra note 15, at 699.
138. Advantages exist for everyone in a pre-decision settlement. From the
plaintiff’s perspective, a settlement in which the plaintiff gets monetary damages may warrant a “discount” from the anticipated judgment, rather than
having to face appeal and the problems of execution. From the defendant’s
perspective, a sufficient discount may make it worthwhile to settle and not
continue proceedings. From the court’s perspective, settlement means that
the judge does not have to write an opinion, thus saving time and obviating
the need to make a win-lose decision. Moreover, by obviating appeal and execution proceedings, settlement frees up valuable judicial time and relieves a
burden from an already overloaded judicial system. Some of the lawyers interviewed expressed opinions regarding the judicial system’s inclination towards settlements. A lawyer in Tokyo commented that judges strongly advocate for settlements because the parties’ burdens of litigation are great, and if
there is a compromise, judges do not have to write an opinion (even at the
appeal stage). Interview with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).
Additionally, a lawyer in Nagoya stated that settlements save judicial time at
both the District Court and High Court level — an important factor since
judges have no clerks and must write opinions themselves. Interview with
lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author).
139. This section discusses cases filed at the District Court as a first level
court. The District Court also acts as an appellate court for cases started in
the Summary Court.
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at least in part, to have been achieved through the adoption of
140
and utilization of the procedures contained in the New Code.
In this regard, practitioners were asked: “Have the new preliminary procedure provisions speeded up the pace of litigation?” Although the majority of bengoshi interviewees were of
the view that litigation moved faster under the New Code than
had been the case prior to amendment, most bengoshi accredited the accelerated pace of litigation to the legal community’s
change in attitude rather than to changes brought forth by the
141
These interviewees specifically noted that
New Code itself.
the pace of litigation had already been speeded up prior to the
New Code’s adoption. The statistical data discussed infra,
though, supports the view that the New Code’s procedures are
responsible, at least in part, for the accelerated pace of decisions, although the attitude of judges and lawyers, for example,
clearly does have some impact on the quickened pace of litigation.
The accelerated pace of litigation does not, however, appear
to have had a positive effect on the use of litigation as a dispute
142
resolution mechanism — at least at the District Court level.
140. Miki, supra note 85, at 16–17. Professor Miki concludes that the New
Code has been successful in speeding up the pace of civil litigation.
The average length of civil litigation cases has shortened over the
past decade and currently almost 90% of civil cases at first instance
are concluded within two years, by either judgment or settlement.
This must be a result of not a few judges and attorneys pushing
themselves to improve their traditional way of practice. While, as already mentioned, the embryonic movement of this change had started
before the reform of the Code of Civil Procedure, the New Code has
provided the movement with a firm foundation. In this aspect, the
1996 reform has proven successful.
Id.
141. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (H) in Sendai City, Japan (on file with
author). The interview subject noted that long before the change in the New
Code, the Court and the Bar made efforts to accelerate the pace of litigation
and that such efforts had been very effective. Id. Note that while crediting
the Code reform with placing the speedier procedures on a “firm foundation,”
Professor Miki also credits the attitude of judges and lawyers for the speedier
resolution of civil cases. Miki, supra note 85.
142. This Article concerns itself only with District Court litigation since
Summary Courts limit damages available to 1,200,000 yen — and this sum is
a new increase from the prior 900,000 yen limit. Recommendations of the
Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. II, pt. 1, § 5(3). Statistical evi-
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Thus, most (but not all) lawyers interviewed indicated that they
were not suggesting litigation to clients at any higher rate than
had been the case prior to the New Code’s adoption. Statistical
evidence supports the view that the New Code has not resulted
in litigation being adopted more frequently to resolve disputes
than was previously the case. An analysis of statistical data
shows that the number of new “ordinary civil cases” filed since
the New Code came into effect is not significantly greater than
the number of such cases filed prior to the New Code’s applicability. The data on the number of ordinary civil cases from 1996
143
to 2002 exhibits the following increase:

dence shows that the new Summary Court procedures have had a positive but
minimal effect on the use of the judicial system as a dispute resolution
mechanism. See generally The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note
96. Thus, there was an increase in new cases filed in Summary Court of approximately 10%, from 276,120 cases in 1997 to 306,169 cases in 1998. Id.
However, the number fell back in 1999 and 2000, and the provisional data for
2002 shows that 312,952 cases were filed in Summary Court in that year — a
relatively small increase from 1998. Id. Perhaps, the soon-to-be instituted
ability of judicial scriveners to represent parties before the Summary Court
will make Summary Court cases less intimidating for potential litigants than
is currently the case. This change would further increase the use of the
Summary Court to resolve relatively small legal damage issues.
143. The data shown herein is not consistent with the data used in Professor Ota’s paper. See Ota, supra note 9, at 580. Professor Ota’s data appears
to show a dramatic increase in new cases between 1997 and 1998 and a continuation of this new higher rate of filings after 1998. See id. However, Professor Ota’s data includes appeals filed in the District Court under a new procedure and under new data reporting procedures adopted in 1998. When
these cases — which do not represent new litigation filed but rather are appeals of cases previously filed in the District Court — are factored out, the
data is consistent. The data is not exact since Professor Ota’s study includes
filings of new administrative cases and certain other cases such as expedited
bills and notes cases, whereas the data herein deals solely with ordinary civil
cases. The data reported herein is consistent with data contained in Judge
Michiharu Hayashi’s work. J. Michiharu Hayashi, Actual Situations and
Problems After the New Code of Civil Procedure was Enacted in 1998, 181
MINJIHO JOHO 2–13 (2001). See also The Japanese Court System’s Statistics,
supra note 96.
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1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

545

Cases From 1996-2002
Number of New
Cases Filed
142,959
146,588
152,678
150,952
156,850
155,541
153,960 (provisional date)

The data makes clear that the courts are disposing of cases at
a faster rate than before the New Code, reducing the court
backlog; however, this reduction is at least partly due to the fact
that new cases are not being filed at an accelerated pace to
144
match the speed of dispositions. The data indicates that such
145
a distinction does exist:

144. The data cannot be explained away by the suggestion that raising the
jurisdictional limit for Summary Court cases has taken away cases from the
District Court and placed them in Summary Court. For example, the total
number of newly filed cases in Summary Court and District Court in 1998 was
468,157; in 1999, 473,669; in 2000, 466,264; and in 2001, 475,000. These statistics indicate a small increase of only 6,500 cases from 1998 through 2001
and an increase of less than 2,000 cases from 1999 through 2001. See The
Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. Yet, in this period, the
new “small claims” one-day trial procedure was adopted. See Ota, supra note
9, at 570–71. This procedure should have resulted in cases that would never
have reached the judicial system being filed in Summary Court and, thus,
could well account for the slight increase noted. In fact, the number of small
claim cases has been steadily on the rise, this is one of the great successes of
the New Code. Thus, the number of small claims cases beginning in 1998
when introduced is as follows: 1998: 8,348; 1999: 10,027; 2000: 11,128; 2001:
13,504. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. If these
cases are factored out of the total remaining cases filed in the District Court
and Summary Court together, the statistics indicate an increase from 459,809
in 1998 to 462, 119 in 2001, or an increase of only .5%. Id.
145. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
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District Court Cases
Completed District
Pending District
Court Cases
Court Cases
145,858
110,396
147,373
109,611
156,683
105,606
154,395
102,163
158,781
100,232
157,451
98,322
155,755 (provisional data)
Unavailable

Moreover, since the New Code’s adoption, the average speed
at which cases are disposed of by the District Court has accelerated at a pace much faster than was true before the New Code.
146
The Judicial Secretariat’s data shows:
Average Number of Months from Filing Complaint to
Disposition — District Court
Year

All Cases Filed

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

10.9
10.1
9.8
10.1
10.2
10.0
9.3
9.2
8.8
8.5

Cases Involving Testimony of
Two or More Witnesses
21.8
21.2
20.9
21.1
21.3
20.8
20.8
20.5
19.7
19.2

As the New Code came into effect in 1998, the comparison of
pre-1998 rates and post-1998 dispositions is appropriate. Assuming that 1994’s reduction is an aberration and utilizing the
146. The General Secretariat of the Supreme Court is the internal department of the court system for judicial administration. See Court System of
Japan, An Overview of the Judicial System: The Supreme Court, at
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/soshikie_2.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2003).
See also The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
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1993 and 1995 data (almost identical and bracketing the 1994
data), it would seem that in the four years prior to the New
Code “all cases” proceeded at a relatively stable rate of decline
of about .1 per month or experienced virtually no change from
1993 to the end of 1997. However, from 1998 through 2001, the
rate of dispositions dramatically accelerated so that a full
month and a half decrease had been achieved. For more complicated cases the decline in the four years prior to the New
Code was approximately .4 of a month (again excluding 1994 as
aberrational and using 1993 figures — if 1994 were used the
decline was only .1 month) while in the four years after adoption the decline was from 20.8 months in 1997 to 19.2 months at
the end of 2001 or a decline of 1.6 months.
The actual figures are even more dramatic than the data’s
sharp decline because for all cases the figures include default
cases where the rate of decline cannot be significantly changed,
thus providing a stable base of about two months for many
cases. Moreover, there is surely a minimum amount of time
required to handle any case, which also applies to complicated
cases that expectedly take longer than relatively easy cases. As
the litigation time decreases, further time limitations become
more difficult to implement given that the judicial system still
needs to provide litigants with procedural justice and adequate
trial of the facts.
These statistics squarely contradict the expressed feelings of
bengoshi that the disposition rate under the New Code is simi147
Therefore, it is realar to the rate before the amendments.
sonable to conclude that the New Code is at least partially responsible for the accelerated rate of dispositions. Moreover, a
147. The data set out above shows that the disposition rate post-1998 is
much greater than the disposition rate pre-1998. The figure of 9.3 months in
the table above for 1998 corresponds to Professor Haley’s use of 9.3 months for
1997. See Haley, Litigation in Japan: A New Look at the Problem, supra note
68, at 134. The one-year difference may be accounted for by the date of the
publication involved or by having statistics reported one year after the actual
facts. In any event, although Professor Haley notes a correlation between
reducing the time of litigation and an increase in litigation in the 1970s, his
2002 article does not deal with the rate of litigation since the passage of the
New Code. See id. Professor Haley’s article does confirm that there is a perception in Japan that the judicial process takes too long. See id. at 127 (“Of
those polled, the primary reason for hesitating to bring suit were belief that a
lawsuit would take too much time (72%) and be too expensive (67.2%)”).
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broader statistical analysis shows that while in the 1970s the
pace of civil litigation in Japan could be considered to proceed at
148
a “snail’s pace” (with over 15,000 cases in 1970 pending for
more than 3 years and over 16,000 cases pending for over three
years in 1979), the same cannot be said today. By the end of
1998, the number of cases pending for more than three years
had declined to 7,614, but by the end of 2001 the number was
149
down to 4,853.
The problem with utilizing the average time to dispose of a
case as a measuring device is that averages are indeed averages. To an individual litigant the important data is how long
the individual’s case actually took to be resolved. And here,
practicing lawyers who most aggressively litigated their cases
150
The
to judgment take as long today as before the New Code.
analysis of the time taken in resolving cases by judgment bears
151
the following data:
Percentage of Judgment Cases Decided
in One and Two Years
Year

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Percentage of
Cases Decided
After One Year
15.1
15.0
14.2
14.4
14.4
14.8
15.4

Percentage of Cases
Decided After Two Years
13.1
13.4
12.8
13.3
14.0
14.7
14.7

148. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18. See
generally Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.
149. In the period from early 1994 to the end of 1997, the number of cases
pending for three years or more declined from 10,074 to 8,798, a decrease of
1,276 cases. By the end of 2001, the number had declined to 4,853, a decrease
of an additional 3,945 cases, triple the earlier rate of decline. It is reasonable
to believe that the intervening event — the effective date of the New Code —
had some effect on this accelerated pace of backlog disposition.
150. As the study’s results show, this observation especially holds true at
least at the District Court level.
151. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
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Thus, the percentage of litigated cases disposed of by judgment that took either one year or two years to be resolved actually increased in 2002. Nevertheless, the disposal of litigation
brought to judgment in one or two years is hardly a “snail’s
pace,” and may be viewed as quite fast, especially if complicated
cases are involved.
2. Appeals In Japan — The High Court and Supreme Court
Appeals from District Court dispositions (when acting as a
152
court of first instance) may be taken to the High Court. From
a time perspective, a plaintiff’s main concern, when seeking relief, is when their case, in its entirety, will be completed — not
simply when the court of first instance will complete its consid153
eration of the case. Thus, it is relevant to consider the pace of
litigation at the appellate level under the New Code. This is
especially relevant for Japan because, unlike in the U.S. where
appeals are taken “on the record” of the lower court’s or trial
court’s proceedings, in Japan it is possible to introduce new evi154
dence and even new theories in the High Court. One purpose
of the New Code was to limit the use of the High Court procedure as simply an extension of the trial, and indeed not just as
an extension but practically a new trial with new issues and
155
Thus, part of the function of the District
new witnesses.
Court’s new preliminary procedure was to finally determine the
issues in a matter, rather than leave the relevant issues open at
156
both the trial and appeals level. The statistical evidence supports the view that, in at least this regard, the New Code has
had a great deal of success — not in eliminating all the de novo
trial aspects of appeal but in substantially reducing the use of
the High Court as a new trial court. The following data shows
152. See MINSOHŌ, art. 281.
153. See, e.g., Ota, supra note 9, at 571 (discussing the use of a special procedure in order to resolve minor issues in one day).
154. Under Article 297 of the Japanese Civil Procedure Code, the provisions
of Chapters one through six of the Code (governing such things as introduction of evidence, trial, oral argument proceedings, etc.) are applicable to appeals. MINSOHŌ, art. 297.
155. See Ota, supra note 9, at 572.
156. To carry out this function, Article 298 of the Japanese Civil Procedure
Code specifically makes Article 167 applicable to appeals. MINSOHŌ, art. 298.
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the steady decline of de novo matters on appeal in Japanese
157
courts:
Percentage of Cases Where the High Court Received
New Evidence
158
in Normal Civil Cases on Appeal
Year

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Third
Person
Witness
19.0
16.3
15.4
13.8
11.4
10.0

Party
Witness

Court
Expert

Other

18.0
15.8
14.9
12.6
9.7
9.7

1.4
1.4
1.4
1.3
1.2
0.9

0.6
0.4
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.2

Percentage of Cases Where the High Court Received
New Evidence in Administrative Cases
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Third Person
Witness
19.4
25.5
16.1
15.6
10.0
13.7

Party
Witness
10.1
10.6
7.2
5.1
3.6
3.2

Court
Expert
—
0.2
—
0.4
0.4
0.5

Other
0.9
0.5
2.0
—
0.1
0.5

In addition, the time taken to handle appeals at the High
159
Court level has also declined:

157. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
158. A similar pattern exists where the District Court sits as an Appellate
Court for Summary Court cases. Here, the witnesses (both party and third
persons) per one hundred cases at the District Court and appeal level are as
follows: (1996:37); (1997:34.5); (1998:27.4); (1999:26.9); (2000:26.1); and
(2001:20.2). See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
159. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
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Average Disposition Time (Months)
at District Court and High Court
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

District Court
10.9
10.1
9.8
10.1
10.2
10.0
9.3
9.2
8.8
8.5

High Court
11.3
11.2
10.9
10.6
9.9
9.9
9.8
9.0
8.4
7.9

Of course, litigants do not appeal all cases to the High Court.
Nevertheless, the virtuous potential plaintiff can realistically
expect, on average, that their case will be decided on average in
16.4 months (using 2001 figures) from filing with the District
Court even if the case is appealed. This time frame is far more
satisfying than the average 19.9 months prior to the New
Code’s applicability.
However, as in the case of judgments in the District Court,
the problem with averages remains. Thus, it is worthwhile to
explore the percentage of judgment cases taking one or two or
even three years to resolve after appeal has been filed. In such
circumstances, although a litigant may find the percentages
comforting, the absolute numbers remain relatively high — this
difference is accounted for by the increased number of High
Court appeals filed in 2002, for example, in comparison to 1997,
the last pre-New Code year. The statistics expose this distinc160
tion:

160. See id.
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Judgment Cases Appealed to High Court
Number and Percentage of Cases Resolved in One, Two
and Three Years
Year

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

Total
Cases
Appealed
8259
8588
9024
9376
9812
9724
9817

One Year
(Number/
Percent)
3402/41.2
3554/41.4
3531/39.1
3338/35.6
3114/31.7
2955/30.4
2973/30.3

Two Years
(Number/
Percent)
1764/21.4
1743/20.3
1784/19.7
1388/14.8
1357/13.8
1157/11.9
1043/10.6

Three Years
(Number/
Percent)
304/3.7
344/4.0
412/4.6
348/3.7
314/3.2
259/2.7
181/1.8

Thus, it appears that while the average case may be resolved
in only 16.4 months through appeal, cases litigated to judgment
and then appealed may take significantly longer. However, the
High Court has apparently significantly reduced appeal time in
judgment cases from the pre-New Code percentages to the 2002
projected percentages. Of course, as the number of appeals continue to rise — from a pre-New Code total of 8588 cases appealed to a 2002 total of 9817 appeals filed — so too will the
number of cases taking longer to resolve.
As asserted previously, averages may not tell the entire story.
For the potential litigant the “worst case” scenario may have
greater impact than the average. Since cases that take longer
on appeal are likely to be the more difficult cases which may
take longer at the District Court level, it is possible that such
cases distort the potential average litigant’s view of the litigation process’ duration in general. Accordingly data was sought
as to how long it actually took for cases to work themselves
from filing to judgment in the High Court. Apparently such
data is not currently available. It is suggested that in the future such data should be compiled so that a more meaningful
analysis than the simple average can be made as to how long it
actually takes for cases to go to judgment — at least in complicated cases that are appealed. This Article will also discuss
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161

For now, it is
other issues surrounding complicated cases.
sufficient to note that a legal system that is perceived to be incapable of rendering timely relief in complicated cases is not
likely to be seen as supporting a strong Rule of Law system
even if the average time to resolve cases is quite reasonable or
even low.
Working backwards from the High Court’s 2002 provisional
data, the public’s scrutiny of these litigation issues comes to
light. In 2002, the High Court decided 1043 cases that had
been pending in the court for two years. Accordingly, these
cases had been decided in the District Court in the year 2000.
In that year, the District Court decided by judgment 1,679 cases
that had been pending for four years and an additional 1600
cases that had been pending for five years or more. If all 1043
appeal cases had been pending in the District Court for four or
five years (a distinct possibility since the longer the case pended
in the District Court, the longer its appeal would likely take),
then all 1043 cases had been pending for six or seven years.
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that any of the above mentioned
1043 High Court appeals cases decided in 2002 were decided by
the District Court in less time than they were pending on appeal. Yet in 2000, of the 80,542 judgment cases decided, 61,454
were decided in one year or less and approximately 70,000 of
the judgment cases were decided in two years or less. Of the
cases decided in the District Court that took more than two
years and were then appealed, it is clear that the average numbers distort the picture of how long it took to decide these cases.
Perception of how long it takes to resolve a case affects the
public ideas as to whether the judicial system is a reasonable
162
The public press, of course, inplace to bring legal disputes.
fluences public perception. The press, in turn, typically does
161. See infra Part III.E.
162. Ota, supra note 9, at 565 (noting that public frustration with the justice system leads some to use disreputable alternatives, such as yakuza (organized crime) or sokaiya (extortion), to resolve disputes). See id. See also
Docs Who Removed Wombs from Healthy Women Lose Appeal, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, May 29, 2003 (noting that the appeal filed by several doctors in a suit
initiated in 1980s by several women who had their uterus and ovaries removed in a medical scam to overcharge the national medical insurance program was denied and the doctors were ordered to pay 510 million yen in damages), available at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200305/29/index.ht
ml.
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not report on “average” cases. Rather, reported cases tend to be
either more complicated or cases that are perceived to be note163
It is precisely these cases that are likely to take
worthy.
longer at both the District and High Court levels. These high
profile cases do, in fact, move at a “snail’s pace” in many in164
stances. Moreover, the press rarely distinguishes between

163. See, e.g., Highway Boss Eyes Court Battle, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Oct.
18, 2003, available at http://mdn.mainichi.co.jp/news/archive/200310/18/20031
018p2a00m0dm023000c.html.
164. At the time this Article’s underlying research was conducted in Japan,
the Japan Times reported that the Tokyo Police had lost (at the District Court
level) a significant HIV employment discrimination case. Tokyo Loses Lawsuit Over Illegal HIV Test, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, May 30, 2003, available at
http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030530a8.htm.
The
Japan Times reported that the unlawful act (as found by the Court) — compelling the HIV applicant to withdraw his application for employment — occurred in July 1998, almost five years before the decision. Id. The article
reported that the police intend to appeal. Id. If an appeal is filed, it is
unlikely that a decision will be rendered earlier than six or seven years from
the filing of the case. Whether an appeal to the Supreme Court would be
taken remains to be seen. From a U.S. legal perspective, the case appears (at
least from the news report) to be uncomplicated. The fact issues are relatively
simple — did the authorities perform an HIV test and did they then compel
the plaintiff to withdraw his application upon discovering he was HIV positive? In fact, soon after the decision, the Metropolitan Police announced that
they would postpone a previously scheduled weekend of HIV tests for new
recruits. MPD Agree to Ditch HIV Tests for Recruits, MAINICHI DAILY NEWS,
June 6, 2003, available at http://www12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/searchnews/892127/HIV20tests-0-2.html. Thus, it appears that there was no serious
factual question as to whether the test was performed. Id. The legal question, while interesting and perhaps even novel, is not “difficult” in the sense
that it does not require a great deal of time for research and debate, etc. Similarly, just two days later, the Japan Times reported that the Osaka High
Court had reversed a District Court decision in a case seeking damages for a
vessel sinking in 1945, which contained South Korean laborers who were returning to Korea after the war. South Koreans Appeal Ship Case, JAPAN
TIMES ONLINE, June 14, 2003, available at http://japantimes.com/cgibin/getarticle.pl5?n20030614 a9.htm. The case had been pending in the District Court for nine years and the appeal was pending for almost two years,
totaling eleven years. Id. Almost half of the plaintiffs died while the case was
pending, and the matter is not yet resolved as the plaintiffs have appealed to
the Supreme Court which will likely take additional years during which additional plaintiffs will likely pass away. Id. The likelihood is that these cases
reported in the English language press were also extensively reported on in
the Japanese language press.
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165

Many high profile criminal cases
civil and criminal cases.
truly move at a “snail’s pace” — such as the Sarin poisoning
166
cases.
When the media lumps criminal cases with civil cases
and the high profile civil cases move slowly, the public perception is likely to be that the resolution of all civil cases linger in
167
the court system as well.
In any event, the question must be asked why any appeal at
the High Court takes two or more years to be resolved. Since,
the District Court has tried all of these cases on appeal already,
165. See, e.g., Crippled Car Racer Wins Massive Payout, MAINICHI DAILY
NEWS, Oct. 29, 2003 (reporting that a race car driver severely injured five
years ago won a 90 million yen award against race organizers, whom he
blamed for the injuries he sustained in the crash), available at http://www
12.mainichi.co.jp/news/mdn/searchnews/896962/Crippled20Car2Racer20Wins
20Massive20Payout-0-1.html; Nary a Whimper; Guru’s Trial Ends, ASAHI
SHINBUN, Nov. 1, 2003 (the founder of Aum Shinrikyo made no statement at
the conclusion of his seven-year trial for murder and assault that is likely to
result in a death sentence), available at http://www.asahi.com/english/nation/TKY200311010151.html.
166. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18; Hiroshi
Matsubara, Speedier Trials, Limited Jury System; Public Weight to Balance
Scales of Justice?, JAPAN TIMES, June 4, 2003, available at http://japantimes.
com.Jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030604b6.htm. The sarin cases refer to two
incidents in which sarin gas was purposefully released to kill opponents of the
Aum Shinrikyo cult or to cause massive panic. Aum Doctor Ordered to Die in
Sarin Cases, ASAHI SHINBUN, Oct. 30, 2003, available at http://www.asahi.
com/english/nation/TKY200310300125.html. In June 1994, cult members
killed seven and made approximately 140 people sick in the Nagano Prefecture. Id. In March 1995, cultists released sarin in the Tokyo subway system,
killing twelve and making almost 3800 sick. See id. See also Nary a Whimper; Guru’s Trial Ends, supra note 165.
167. Although the judicial branch has been successful in reducing both the
absolute number and percentage of cases pending for more than three years
and for each category (four years, five years, ten years and over ten years) of
pending cases, the fact remains that as of the end of 2000, there were 2,845
cases pending for five years or longer. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. While this represents a scant 2.8% of all cases, this
2.8% is likely to be picked up by the popular press and thus impressed on the
minds of the public. In addition to actually reducing time to decide cases, both
the judicial system and the practicing Bar may require greater public awareness of the improvements that have been made in the time it takes to bring a
case to resolution in the District Court. See also Haley, Litigation in Japan: A
New Look at the Problem, supra note 68, at 127 (discussing how the litigating
public in Japan responded to questions concerning their perception of the time
it took to resolve litigation in Japan and how 72% of the people polled believed
that litigation took too long to resolve).
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and the Japanese legislature specifically designed the New
Code in part to assure that all issues would be identified in
these trials’ early stages, there should be nothing to “try” at the
High Court level. Therefore, the High Court cases should theo168
However, the
retically resolve cases in a shorter time frame.
fact that over 1,000 cases in 2002 took two years or more for a
High Court decision indicates that the New Code’s reforms may
169
not yet be been fully realized at the High Court level.
Because the New Code reduced the types of cases that can be
170
appealed to the Supreme Court, it was hoped that most cases
would end at the High Court level. Although the Supreme
Court appears to be controlling its certiorari docket by denying
certiorari in most cases filed, the fact remains that cases filed in
the Supreme Court have been rising since adoption of the New
171
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s narrow and limited
Code.
caseload, Japan’s Supreme Court appears to be accepting more
172
The available statistics show that
certiorari cases each year.
the total number of cases in which certiorari, appeal, or both
were sought has been rising since the New Code’s adoption and,
168. See, e.g., Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 778–79.
169. See Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart.
170. Article 312 of the Japanese Code of Civil Procedure limits appeal as of
right. MINSOHŌ, art. 312. However, Article 312 also contains a broadly
worded catch-all provision generally allowing appeals when the judgment
appealed from omits the reasons for the decision or the reasons are inconsistent. Article 318 gives the Supreme Court a certiorari type jurisdiction, allowing the Court to accept appeals at its discretion. Id. at art. 318.
171. See Ota, supra note 9, at 579–80. See also Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart.
172. In Japan, determining whether the Supreme Court has the ability to
control its own docket is difficult because “appeal of right” cases still exist and
statistics concerning Supreme Court judgments do not distinguish between
meritorious appeals and those dismissed for improper filing. See MINSOHŌ,
art. 312 & 318. The Code permits the filing of a “jokoku appeal” with the Supreme Court for “jurisdictional reasons,” namely that the composition of the
deciding court was improper, one of its members was ineligible to participate
in the proceedings, or jurisdiction properly resided exclusively elsewhere. Id.
Jokuku appeals are also granted for other reasons, such as a defect in representation, an improper denial of an oral argument, or where there is a judicial
defect in reasoning, either because the court failed to give its rationale or did
so inconsistently. Id. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, which distinguishes
between a dismissal and a determination under denial of “certiorari,” dismissals of improperly filed claims in the Japanese courts are counted as judgments, making it difficult to determine whether appeals are determined on
their merits or on procedure. Id.
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further, that Japan’s Supreme Court is accepting more certio173
rari cases each year.
The statistical table below sets out the disposition rate of civil
cases in which litigants sought either appeal or certiorari and
the disposition of such cases from 1997 (immediately before the
174
Code went into effect) through 2001:
Certiori 1997-2001 Chart
Year

Filed Cases

Cert.
Granted

Appeal
Cert.

1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

2,741
2,542
2,160
2,418
2,323

—
768
1,770
2,106
2,314

—
1
12
26
53

Location of Termination of
Decision
Appeal
Cert.
Cert.
Granted
Denied

3,062
3,040
2,389
2,410
2,298

—
370
1,528
1,820
2,089

—
0
11
19
40

As the table above shows, it seems clear that attorneys are
filing more certiorari cases each year. While the Supreme
Court is denying more of these petitions, it is also accepting
more cases each year. Similarly, bengoshi are seeking certiorari
and filing appeals in more and more criminal cases each year.
Thus, the number of cases in which litigants have sought Supreme Court review has increased from 4,086 in 1997 to 5,277
in 2001. Even so, the average number of months that a case is
pending in the Supreme Court has been steadily falling since
175
the effective date of the New Code:

173. See Certiorari 1997-2001 Chart.
174. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
175. Id.
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Disposition of Civil Cases in the
Supreme Court — Number of Months
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Average Number of Months
Pending
7.6
9.3
7.7
7.0
8.7
9.5
8.1
6.6
5.4
5.3

Here again, average statistics can be misleading as cases in
which the Supreme Court denied certiorari should also be resolved relatively quickly, whereas some cases in the Supreme
Court have been pending for several years. Adding a case’s duration in the Supreme Court, High Court and to the District
Court creates a distorted picture of Japan’s entire judicial system. This distortion can, in turn, effect the public’s perception
of whether they can obtain timely justice from the nation’s judicial system. As a result, the public’s support for the judicial
system may waver even more significantly and also lead to a
diminution in support for the Rule of Law in general. With this
in mind, the judicial system may wish to explore the question of
how it can gain greater control over the appeal (as distinguished from the certiorari process) and whether further legislation limiting appeals to the Supreme Court and limiting evi176
dentiary proceedings at the High Court are warranted.
176. Justice O’Connor’s observation concerning the experience of the U.S.
Supreme Court may be instructional. Justice O’Connor writes:
When I arrived at the Court in 1981 we received about 4,000 applications a year to review particular lower-court decisions, but we accepted and decided with full opinion only about 150 a year. Recently,
the Court has been receiving about 7,000 petitions a year and has
been accepting fewer than 100. The number of petitions granted de-
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3. Summary of Findings
It is generally agreed that the pace at which cases are disposed of in Japan, either by judgment, settlement or otherwise,
177
has accelerated. Whether this change is due to the New Code
or to the altered procedures devised and put into practice prior
to the New Code’s adoption is debated, but hardly relevant.
Whether “invented” or simply adopted by the New Code, the
fact remains that the new practices have quickened the pace of
litigation in Japan. Moreover, the judicial branch has clearly
178
taken steps to reduce the trial disposition period.
Still, many high profile cases take several years at the District Court level to be resolved and some cases on appeal take
179
The New Code’s provieven two or more years to be resolve.
sions, designed to assure that all issues and evidentiary matters are discussed and thus defined or resolved “pre-trial,” (i.e.,
pre-Oral Argument), do not appear to have produced that de180
It is probably the case that the new
sired effect on litigation.
Preparatory Proceedings for Argument procedure has expedited
the pre-Oral Argument stage of cases and has probably limited
the scope of new arguments, issues, and facts brought up later
on appeal; however, this procedure has not completely preclined after Congress in 1988 made the Court’s appellate jurisdiction
discretionary.
O’CONNOR, supra note 7, at 9–11.
177. See, e.g., Supreme Court Report Illustrates Lengthy Process of Civil
Trial System, JAPAN TIMES, Apr. 6, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20010406a8.htm.
178. In addition, the number of judges available to try cases at the District
Court and High Court levels appears to have increased during the last few
years. Thus, the total number of judges available to handle cases — excluding
those of the Supreme Court and the Summary Court — has gone from 2121
judges in April of 1998 to 2296 in April of 2002, and to 2341 in April 2003. See
The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96 (specifically the data
provided by the Judicial Secretariat). This increase in the number of judges
available to try cases has also undoubtedly had a positive effect on the speed
with which cases are resolved. It is anticipated that the number of judges in
Japan will continue to increase as the new reforms take effect, increasing the
number of bengoshi to approximately 3,000. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch. III, pt. 1(1).
179. See, e.g., Docs Who Removed Wombs from Healthy Women Lose Appeal,
supra note 162 (noting the final appeal in this case began in 1999 and was not
concluded until May 2003).
180. See, e.g., Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70.
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vented new issues from being raised at a case’s Oral Argument
stage before the District Court, and it has not obviated new arguments, new issues and new evidence at the High Court ap181
peal level. This problem may be due to the fact that the New
Code does not contain a “preclusion order” procedure. In addition, the “paternalistic” judiciary’s general unwillingness to reject new arguments and evidence also hinders procedural pro182
gress, albeit substantively more thorough.
4. The Failure of the Average Accelerated Pace of Dispositions
to Lead to an Increased Use of the Judicial System
The speed of average dispositions at the District Court level
has not been without some potential damaging effects on litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism. Thus, speed, while
useful in making litigation a reasonable method of resolving a
dispute in a timely fashion, may negatively effect how potential
and actual litigants view Japan’s judicial system. To the extent
that litigants feel that they have not received an adequate hearing from the Japanese court system, its utility as an upholder of
183
Doubts about a hearthe Rule of Law concept is damaged.
ing’s adequacy may be raised when litigants feel that the system operates so quickly that they have been denied a fair opportunity to present their side of the issue. In addition, the procedures used to promote speed may raise questions as to the adequacy of the process to render what is perceived to be a “just”
decision. In this connection, statistical data concerning use of
witnesses in cases is consistent with the views expressed by
bengoshi interviewees that judges do not permit party or third
person witness testimony as frequently as they did a decade

181. Id. at 576–77.
182. See generally Miki, supra note 85. Masako Kamiya, Narrowing the
Avenues to Japan’s Supreme Court: The Policy Implications of Japan’s Code of
Civil Procedure Reforms, 4 AUSTRALIAN J. OF ASIAN L. 53, 56, 70 (2002) (noting
that Japanese courts tend to have a paternalistic attitude) (on file with author).
183. See, e.g., Press Release, Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Not
“Speedy Trials Bill,” but “Fair and Speedy Trials Bill” (Nov. 19, 2002) (public
survey showed that only 18.6% of respondents were satisfied with the current
civil trial system), at http://www.nichibenren.or.jp/en/activities/meetings/200
21119.html.
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184

Some bengoshi expressed the view that when judges do
ago.
not permit witness testimony and rely on written materials
rather than oral testimony, they either actually deny litigants
an adequate opportunity to present their, or the parties per185
ceive the system as denying them their “day in court.”
This perception issue is significant to a Rule of Law analysis
and has particular importance in Japan where judges serve as
186
Judges ultimately
the gatekeepers to evidentiary hearings.
determine whether or not witnesses, including party witnesses,
187
Therefore, litigants’ perceptions of an unfair or
will testify.
184. See, e.g., Interview with trial lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with
author) (noting that as early as ten years ago, the court permitted witnesses
to testify but that today such witness testimony is not freely permitted).
185. Some bengoshi noted that this reliance on written material also denied
them the right of cross-examination, thus creating procedural due process
issues. Under Rule 113 of the Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure, the order for
taking witness testimony is direct examination, followed by cross-examination
and the redirect. MINJI SOSH-O KISOKU, art. 113, para. 1. The Rule also permits examination by the court. Id. See also MINSOHŌ, art. 202 (setting the
order of examination as the offering party first, followed by the opposing
party, and then the court with judicial discretion to alter the order).
186. Although this paper is limited to civil non-administrative cases, it
should be noted that Japanese judges are also gatekeepers in criminal cases.
It has been reported that a Japanese District Court sentenced a British defendant to fourteen years in prison for illegal importation of drugs after a trial
in which the defense was that the defendant was duped by a traveling companion and was unaware that he was carrying drugs. Apparently, after being
released from Japanese custody, the traveling companion was later arrested
in Belgium for duping others to carry drugs. The defendant sought the assistance of the Japanese judge in obtaining records from a European court disclosing this duping incident, but the District Court as gatekeeper refused to
assist. Court Defies Outcry in Drug Case: Briton Handed 14-year Sentence,
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, June 13, 2003, available at http://www.japantimes.com/
cgi-bin/getarticle.p15?nn20030613a4.htm. The judge rejected efforts by the
defense “to enter evidence from a Belgium court, where [defendant’s] travel
companion [was] on trial for smuggling drugs under similar circumstances.”
Jake Adelstein, Drug Trial Highlights Gap Between UK-Japan Criminal Procedures, YOMIURI SHINBUN, July 1, 2003, available at 2003 WL 5138432.
187. See, e.g., MINSOHŌ, art. 207 (stating that courts require written summaries of proposed testimony, including the matters to be examined, prior to
determining whether to permit such oral testimony). See also id. art. 181
(noting that the court has the authority to refuse to examine evidence offered
by a party if the court finds such examination unnecessary); id. art. 205 (stating that the court has discretion, except when parties object, to require a witness to produce a document instead of giving oral testimony). But see Interview with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author) (noting that as a
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inadequate judicial system reflect badly on both the court system and its judges. If wide spread, such a perception can decrease the reputation of the Japanese judicial system as a
means for obtaining relief and thus can damage the use of the
courts as a means for carrying out the Rule of Law. The statistical data below shows the number of witnesses allowed to tes188
tify at the District Court level.
Witnesses at the
District Court Level (First Instance)189
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

Third Person
Witnesses
38.0
35.0
32.3
30.4
29.3
28.0

Party Witnesses
48.7
44.5
41.6
42.3
39.4
37.9

result of the hierarchical structure of the legal system, as well as the power of
the judge as ultimate decision-maker, party objections are unlikely to be successful if a judge requests a document in lieu of oral testimony); Interview
with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author) (noting that while parties bring in witnesses, the number of witnesses, as well as the number of
witnesses actually testifying, is determined by the court, and as there are too
few judges, they often do not have enough time to hear oral testimony). In the
U.S., however, courts cannot accept a proffer of proof in place of testimony,
although they may prohibit testimony that is cumulative or in violation of the
Rules of Evidence. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S.
579 (1993); Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (finding that U.S.
judges serve as gatekeepers where expert testimony is proposed and a party
objects on the grounds that the testimony is not based on generally accepted
scientific or otherwise applicable professional opinion). See also FED. R. EVID.
702.
188. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
189. Excluded from this table are District Court cases where the court acts
as an appeals court for Summary Court cases. In these cases, the number of
witnesses per 100 cases has declined at an even faster rate. Thus, third person witnesses have declined from 16.1 per 100 cases in 1996 to 15.0 in 1997;
11.7 in 1998; 10.4 in 1999; 10.3 in 2000; and 7.2 in 2001. The number of party
witnesses has similarly declined in such appeal cases from 20.9 in 1996 to
19.5 in 1997; to 15.7 in 1998; to 16.5 in 1999; to 15.8 in 2000; and to 13.0 in
2001. The decline in witness testimony at the appeals level is consistent with
the intent of the New Code to make the initial court the trial court and to
reduce “new trial” at the appeal level.
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Although the above data slightly differs from the data set out
in Professor Ota’s 2001 study, both data compilations disclose
that the District Courts are handling witness testimony more
quickly than in the past. The number of cases involving witness testimony has declined, as has the number of witnesses
per one hundred cases. Thus, in 2001, there were a total of only
sixty-six witnesses (including both third person witnesses and
party witnesses) per one hundred cases or less than one witness
per case. Since less than a witness cannot testify, this means
190
that there were no witnesses in at least one-third of the cases.
As some cases clearly involved testimony from two or more witnesses, the numerical assessment above displays that the percentage of cases with no witness testimony exceeded one-third.
The significance of limiting the use of witnesses may be highlighted by the realization that surely the complaining party has
a story to tell and, having taken the bold step of initiating litigation so as to elaborate, the plaintiff probably wants to convey
191
Further,
their account directly to the case’s decision-maker.
in many cases, the defending party would also equally like to
explain their side of the dispute to the decision-maker. If the
parties alone were to appear as witnesses, a case would require
the minimum of two witnesses — the plaintiff and the defendant. However, in Japan, cases involving two witnesses are
192
For this reason, a
viewed as “complicated” and are unusual.
losing party in Japan who wished to testify but was not permitted to in their case will find the case’s decision as unjust and
will consider the Japanese court system as unfair.
Research suggests that while Japanese litigants prefer the
adversary system to an inquisition system, “Japanese subjects
appear uncomfortable with presenting their views in a confron190. A bengoshi interviewed in Saitama (just outside Tokyo) stated in his
interview that the one change he would make in civil procedure would be to
permit more live witness testimony. Interview with bengoshi (E) in Saitama,
Japan (on file with author).
191. See, e.g., Interview with trial lawyer (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with
author) (noting that his clients wanted the chance to speak directly to the
court and that this practice was not permitted as freely as in the past).
192. Cf. Supreme Court Report Illustrates Lengthy Process of Civil Trial
System, supra note 177 (making special reference to trials that include the use
of witnesses (i.e., 25% of all trials), and the change in length from 1991 to
2001).
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193

Thus, Japanese litigants artation with the opposing party.”
guably do not wish to testify. While dealing with the abstract
issue of a Japanese litigant’s preference to avoid confrontation,
this research does not address the question of how a losing liti194
Here, the regant views the fact that they could not testify.
sults could be different as losing parties may resent such testimony procedures, despite any theoretical preconceptions of ap195
To complicate matters further, the failure to
parent fairness.
take witness testimony extends beyond mere refusal to hear the
parties themselves.
Indeed, the facts prove even starker than the above supposition. Figures kept by the Supreme Court Secretariat show that
the percentage of cases in which no witnesses testified increased, from an already high percentage of 80.9% in 1996 to
83.2% in 1998, the year the New Code went into effect, and has
196
continued to steadily rise:
Year

Percentage of Cases with No Witnesses

1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

83.2
84.3
85.0
85.5
86.4 (provisional data)

193. Yoshiyuki Matsumura, Procedural Justice in Dispute Resolution —
Japan and the West (June 26–29, 1991) (paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, University of Amsterdam) (on file with
the Brooklyn Journal of International Law).
194. Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with author).
195. Professor Matsumura’s study used students as questionnaire subjects.
See Matsumura, supra note 193. While the study showed that, in the abstract, the subjects preferred not to present their views in confrontational
situations, the study did not deal with actual parties to litigation. Id. Considering the Japanese aversion to litigation, a party who has filed suit may
well hold views different from the general population, represented by the students. Similarly, a party who has been sued may have attitudes altered by
the experience and, thus, may not be represented by the general population
view. Finally, a losing party may well have “after the event” views that differ
from the generally held opinions of the population. Therefore, while the study
is useful for the purposes for which it was undertaken, it does not necessarily
reflect the views of parties to litigation or the views that a losing party may
pass on to others about the litigation experience.
196. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.

File: GoodmanMacro.doc

2004]

Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM

JAPAN’S NEW CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE

565

While it is true that in default cases there is no need for witness testimony, and the data above includes a certain percentage of such cases, the declining number of witnesses in nondefault cases shows that the court’s role as gatekeeper has
steadily eroded the use of witness testimony. Thus, in cases
utilizing witness testimony, the number of such witnesses has
also steadily declined — except for cases where ten or more wit197
The chart below displays this change in
nesses were called.
witness testimony.
District Courts: Number of Witnesses and
Percentage of Cases
Year

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002

1
Witness /
Percentage of
Cases
14,564 / 10.0%
13,933 / 9.5%
13,570 / 8.7%
12,437 / 8.1%
11,993 / 7.6%
11,597 / 7.4%
10,854 / 7.0%

2–4
Witnesses /
Percentage
of Cases
11,647 / 8.0%
11,717 / 8.0%
11,340 / 7.2%
10,669 / 6.9%
10,618 / 6.7%
10,063 / 6.4%
9,433 / 6.1%

5–9
Witnesses /
Percentage
of Cases
1,424 / 1.0%
1,263 / 0.9%
1,288 / 0.8%
1,084 / 0.7%
1,150 / 0.7%
1,043 / 0.7%
816 / 0.5%

10+
Witnesses/
Percentage
of Cases
172 / 0.1%
63 / —
67 / —
81 / 0.1%
67 / —
77 / —
110 /0.1%

In view of this steadily declining willingness to use witness
testimony in civil cases, it is easy to understand why some
bengoshi responded that the most significant change that could
be made to Japanese Civil Procedure was for the courts to
permit more witness testimony. This view may also be the
reason why some bengoshi felt that their clients did not receive
198
The
a fair opportunity to present their case to the court.
courts’ exercise of their gatekeeper function to essentially
199
dispose of witness testimony may have a detrimental effect on
197. See id. The data in the above chart shows that only 0.1% of cases involve ten or more witnesses, and so this increase is not significant, except
perhaps to reflect the fact that the legal system is being used in some more
complicated situations. This point is discussed infra at Part III.E.
198. See supra notes 176, 187, 189–91 & accompanying text.
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199

testimony may have a detrimental effect on the public’s perception of the Japanese judicial system as a protector of the
200
Rule of Law and as an arm of such a system.
Similarly, the
courts’ limitation on expert witness testimony and crossexamination for technical matters, such as patent disputes may
also underlie the public’s perception that Judges are currently
201
Nonetheunable to handle technical legal expertise issues.
less, the judicial system faces a dual dilemma: on the one hand,
the political departments demand faster resolution of cases;
and, on the other, the same political forces fail to provide the
202
judiciary with the resources needed to handle cases faster.
The end result is that the Japanese courts must do what it can
to hustle the process — and this appears to mean less witness
199. As a bengoshi in Sendai succinctly stated: “Judges like documents more
than witnesses.” Interview with bengoshi (H) in Sendai, Japan (on file with
author). Additionally, a bengoshi in Hiroshima noted that judges are busy,
and so they are not willing to examine witnesses. Interview with bengoshi (L)
in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). A bengoshi in Sapporo criticized
the system under the New Code as being “too quick” and complained that
judges “restrict witnesses;” he advocated for judges to hear more witnesses.
Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with author).
200. The practice of avoiding witness testimony is also problematic in Japanese criminal trials. It has been suggested that notwithstanding changes in
the Constitution and the Code of Criminal Procedure for the creation of a
more adversarial system, present process in Japan comes close to the pre-war
system of “trial by dossier.” See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra
note 19, at 300–01. See generally Ryuichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current
Code of Criminal Procedure, 22 LAW IN JAPAN 129 (Daniel H. Foote trans.)
(1989).
201. This perception has led to an amendment to the New Code to create a
modified “expert Commissioner” system (July 2003). See infra Part III.E.
U.S. judges are capable of resolving highly technical expertise-laden cases
after hearing direct and cross-examination of opposing expert witnesses.
Japanese judges should be just as capable of resolving such questions if given
direct and cross-examination of experts in open court.
202. A bengoshi interviewed in Kyoto stated that if he could make one
change to the civil procedure system, he would greatly increase the number of
judges. Interview with bengoshi (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author). His
reasons related directly to Rule of Law concerns. Id. He noted that if a judge
takes the time necessary to hear a case, the lawyers are pleased, but the Judicial Secretariat is not because it causes a large backlog of cases for the judge.
Id. Thus, judges must act too quickly, leaving both parties unsatisfied. As
the lawyer noted “speed alone is not satisfactory.” Id. Furthermore, since
“the parties are not satisfied, they do not feel they have received procedural
justice.” Id.
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testimony with concomitant pressures on Rule of Law con203
cerns. Similarly, as cases have been handled more quickly on
average, the percentage of ordinary civil cases in which both
sides were represented by counsel at the District Court level
has declined as the number of cases in which neither side is
204
represented by counsel has increased. The data discloses:
First Instance District Court
Ordinary Civil Cases — Percentage of Cases
Year

Both Sides
Represented

Plaintiff Only
Represented

1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

42.2
42.5
40.9
41.2
41.3
39.4

35.5
35.1
34.7
34.0
32.9
34.8

Defendant
Only
Represented
3.3
3.3
3.6
4.0
4.4
4.7

Neither
Represented
19.0
19.1
30.8
20.7
21.4
21.1

Apparently, litigants take more notice of cases and the need
for professional assistance when an appeal has been filed to the
High Court from an initial District Court decision. Thus, from
1996 to 2001, the percentage of High Court cases in which neither side was represented by counsel remained remarkably sta205
The percentage of cases in which
ble in the 5% to 6% range.
both sides were represented at the appeal stage in the High
206
Court remained stable in the range of 75% to 78%.
203. Doctors Debate in Court as Part of New System, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE,
Jan. 8, 2003, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn
20030109b1.htm. In a medical malpractice case, the Court heard from a panel
of experts, who after giving their individual opinions on the matter, engaged
in a debate concerning the issue and was finally examined by the parties. Id.
This “conference debate” format holds great promise in cases such as medical
malpractice, where expert opinion is a critical element of the case. However,
lawyers interviewed had never been involved in such a process. Id. It is
likely that this format will be overshadowed by the new procedure adopted in
July 2003.
204. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
205. In 1997, the percentage of cases where neither side was represented
rose by 6.6% but fell back again in 1998 to 5.0%. See id. In 1996, the percentage was 5.9% and in 2001, the percentage was 5.8%. Id.
206. Summary Court jurisdiction is limited to cases seeking less than
900,000 yen (soon to be increased to 1,200,000 yen), and as is expected, a
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The declining use of counsel at the initial stage may or may
not represent the public’s perception of Japan’s Rule of Law and
judicial process issues. On its face, the declining use of legal
professionals appears to represent a decline in the Rule of Law,
since these professionals represent the technical expertise of
the law. The previous chart shows that while the percentage of
cases in which both sides are represented by counsel is declining, the percentage of cases in which only one side is so represented is increasing. Perhaps this change reflects the belief
that representation by one side, when the other side is not represented, constitutes an advantage; whereas, if neither side is
represented, the playing field is level for both. Or perhaps
these figures represent the view that it is the judge’s function to
discover and find the facts in order to assure that substantive
justice is achieved. Thus, professional lawyers, who may perform part of these functions in other societies, are simply not
required in Japanese litigation. Furthermore, these figures
may simply be a reflection of the limited availability of lawyers
207
Whatever
in Japan and/or the high cost of retaining counsel.
the reason, the facts are that in over 21% of all cases no lawyers
are involved at the trial court level and in over 60% of cases at
higher percentage of Summary Court cases are thus handled without counsel.
Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, ch. II, pt. 1, §
5(3) (“Expansion of the Jurisdiction of Summary Courts & Substantial Increase in the Upper Limit on Amount in Controversy in Procedures for SmallClaims Litigation”). However, a significant percentage of Summary Court
cases that are appealed to the District Court involve the use of counsel on the
appeal. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. But, here
too, the percentage of cases in which counsel is retained has been declining.
Id. The statistics show that the percentage of cases appealed from the Summary Court to the District Court in which neither party was represented on
the appeal are as follows: 1996: 26.1%; 1997: 29.3%; 1998: 27.5%; 1999: 30.8%;
2000: 30.4%; and 2001: 31.5%. Id. Interestingly, the percentage of cases in
which the appellant is represented by counsel has remained stable at a relatively high rate of approximately 52%. Id. Apparently, losing parties at both
the District Court and Summary Court level seek legal advice when they
move to a higher court. See id.
207. To the extent that the figures may reflect the paucity of lawyers in
Japan, these statistics may change over time as the Judicial Reform Council
recommended an increase of the annual admission of new lawyers from the
present total of approximately 1,200 to 3,000, which is a dramatic increase
from the previous annual 500 amount, a number that was constant for many
years. See Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at
ch. 1, pt. 3, § 2(2).
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least one party does not have counsel. These statistics appear
to be inconsistent with Professor Mattei’s view of the character208
Additionally,
istics of a “Rule of Professional Law” system.
these inconsistencies raise questions as to whether a Rule of
Law society can effectively operate without professional legal
representation in the organ responsible for dispute resolution
under the Rule of Law.
In any event, the time it takes to bring an average case to final resolution through appeal to the High Court has decreased.
However, this change may prove to be purchased at too high a
price if the cost of such time reduction is the opinion or belief
that the judicial system is not prepared or willing to hear one
litigant’s side of the story. To the extent that speed has been
bought at the price of third person witness and party witness
209
testimony, the price may be too high in Rule of Law terms. It
is suggested that the Japanese judicial system, including its
210
lawyers and professors, should explore this issue.
The Japanese Diet recently adopted legislation that will require both criminal and civil cases to be determined at the Dis211
While well
trict Court level within a two-year time frame.
intended, the legal community should carefully consider the
Rule of Law implications for such legislation. First, placing a
time limit on judicial activities raises issues of judicial independence. While many legal scholars hope that judges will act
208. Ugo A. Mattei, Three Patterns of Law: Taxonomy and Change in the
World’s Legal System, 45 AM. J COMP. L. 5, 16–42 (1997).
209. Since Japanese judges are viewed by many as both “paternalistic” and
protectors of the parties (whether or not represented by council), the consequences of judges acting as gatekeepers and denying parties the right to either tell their stories on the witness stand or to call witnesses may compound
the potential damage done to the judicial system as a Rule of Law decisionmaking organ, as witness testimony is not permitted in a high percentage of
cases. Tanabe, supra note 121, at 514, 520–22. See also Miki, supra note 85,
at 5.
210. One purpose of U.S. lawyers, who assisted in the revision of the Japanese civil and criminal procedure systems, was to replace the concept of “trial
by dossier” with an oral adversary system. This objective does not appear to
have been achieved in criminal adjudication and, with the decline in witness
testimony in civil cases, it would appear that the objective of the occupiers
was not achieved in the civil procedure arena either. Hirano, supra note 200,
at 129, 139.
211. Lower House Approves Speedy Trial Legislation, supra note 18. See
Trial to be Expedited, supra note 18.
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quickly and dispose of cases expeditiously, a judge should take
as much time as conscience requires in reaching a determination. Additionally, other branches of government should not
compel judges to ignore conscience considerations. Second, time
limits raise constitutional questions — the issue of judicial independence, which Japan’s constitution guarantees, and the
judicial branch’s management, which is placed in the judicial
branch itself. Third, in order to reach the legislatively mandated time-limit, courts may further restrict the rights of parties to testify or call witnesses — potentially further eroding
public confidence in the judiciary as a mechanism for obtaining
relief. Finally, such time limit legislation appears entirely hor212
tatory and provides no means of enforcement.
While the legislation will place pressure on the judicial
branch to quicken the pace of litigation, reality indicates that
judges will continue to take the time necessary to fairly resolve
cases — especially complicated ones. However, the judicial
branch’s failure to conform to legislative fiat then creates its
own legal paradox, as the court system itself will in a sense fail
to follow the law and its mandates. Instead, legislation that
significantly increases the pool of Japanese judges may better
serve the Rule of Law objectives of the Judicial Reform Council,
213
as opposed to limiting the time frame of judicial decisions.
212. The Japan Times reports that the new two-year legislation makes it
the clear “duty” of participants in the trial to conclude the case within two
years. Trials to be Expedited, supra note 18. Thus, the legislation itself appears to not be mandatory, but simply hortatory. Moreover, although the time
limits apply to both criminal and civil cases, it is impossible to believe that a
criminal case will be dismissed and an accused freed simply because the trial
extends past the time limit. With respect to civil cases, the general rule is
already that most cases take less than two years. Thus, it is not expected that
the new two-year legislation will be applied to civil cases. The reality is that
judges are already under great pressure to speed up the pace of litigation to
the point that criteria such as “whether the judge has managed to bring about
a court-mediated settlement in civil suits within a certain time frame” and
“the number of cases they have handled” are considered when deciding
whether to promote a judge or not. See Panel Seeks Transparent Career System for Judges, JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 13, 2000, available at http://www.
japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20000913b2.htm.
213. The number of judges in Japan (excluding Summary Court and Supreme Court judges) has risen from 2,121 in 1998 (when the New Code went
into effect) to a current total of 2,341 (for fiscal 2003 through March 2004),
increasing by 10%. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96
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B. Production of Evidence
1. Inquiry Procedure

214

Interviewees were also questioned as to the new procedural
devices for obtaining evidence and narrowing issues. The New
Code’s “inquiry procedure” had been designed to mirror the “interrogatory” procedure of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Proce215
Unlike the Federal Rules however, the New Code produre.
vides neither judicial oversight of the inquiry process nor sanctions when a party fails to answer or responds inaccurately to
216
questions. Moreover, the area of inquiry is more limited than
in the U.S. By relying on counsels’ obligations to each other as
professionals, the objective of the new procedure is to obtain
information that could assist in narrowing issues and thus ad217
vance trials without damaging confidence in the system.
In the U.S., interrogatories serve a dual purpose. First, they
are a means to clarifying the basis for the claims and defenses
218
Second, interrogatories act as a “first step” discovery
raised.
device typically used at the outset of a case to compel the other
(specifically the data provided by the Judicial Secretariat). Nonetheless, the
fact remains that the number of judges available to try cases in Japan is quite
small compared to other advanced countries. See ODA, supra note 1, at 403–
04 (2d ed. 1999).
214. MINSOHŌ, art. 163 (noting that a party may inquire on matters necessary for the proof of factual allegations from their opposing party). However,
the New Code does not require that the served party actually answer such
inquiries, nor does it necessitate that answers be truthful or made under oath.
Kojima, supra note 15, at 702–03. Additionally, the New Codes precludes
inquiries that are not particularized, or which insult, embarrass, or attempt to
cause undue expense to the other party and/or seek either an opinion or concern a privileged matter. MINSOHŌ, art. 163.
215. FED. R. CIV. P. 33.
216. See U.S. for General Electric Supply Corp. v. W.E. O’Neil Const. Co., 1
F.R.D. 529 (D. Mass. 1941) (proper remedy for failure to answer interrogatories is a motion by default, not a motion to require answers to the interrogatories); Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino 173 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1949)
(holding that if a party declines to answer interrogatories he may be precluded by the court from offering proof at trial).
217. See The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Article 14, at
http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/human/civil_rep4/article14.html (last visited Feb.
10, 2004).
218. See McElroy v. United Air Lines, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 100 (W.D.Mo. 1957)
(stating that one principle purpose of interrogatories is to ascertain contentions of adverse party).
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side to identify potential witnesses to important events and opponent documents that may contain or lead to evidence useful
219
As a clarifying mechanism, interrogato the inquiring party.
tories have not been very helpful since responses to such inquir220
ies are typically drafted by lawyers and signed by clients. The
“lawyering” of interrogatory responses provides insufficient information to clarify claims early in the process and leave open
potential for modification later. But, as a first step discovery
device, the interrogatory procedure has become a staple for liti221
gators and proven itself very useful in the U.S.
Some Japanese writers dealing with civil procedure argued
that the inquiry process was a form of “discovery” new to the
222
thus, interview subjects were asked
Japanese system;
whether the inquiry procedure had been previously used by
them or their opposing counsel to gather information about potential witnesses or documents. No bengoshi interviewed had
ever used the inquiry process for this purpose nor had it been
used against them for this purpose. Quite naturally, no one
interviewed found the inquiry process helpful in identifying
223
witnesses or documents.
The consistent theme of the responses was that the inquiry
process was rarely, if ever, used, and even when used was not
224
Varivery helpful in narrowing issues or obtaining evidence.
219. See Hercules Powder Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F.R.D. 328 (D. Del.
1944) (stating that one purpose of interrogatories under Rule 33 is to ascertain facts and to procure evidence as to where pertinent evidence exists and
can be obtained).
220. See McCormick-Morgan, Inc. v. Teledyne Indus., Inc., 134 F.R.D. 275,
287 (N.D. Cal. 1991), rev’d in part, 765 F. Supp. 611 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating
that interrogatories are not particularly useful because lawyers craft answers
to interrogatories to reveal as little information as possible).
221. See Joseph N. Hosteny, Using Interrogatories Saves Time and Money,
INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2001, at 28.
222. See, e.g., Miki supra note 85, at 6–7 (describing the inquiry process as a
“method of obtaining evidence…basically modeled on the interrogatory of the
United States”). See also Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 776–79; Kojima, supra
note 15, at 701, 702.
223. Reflecting the author’s U.S. litigation experience, inquiry subjects were
asked: “Has the procedure for inquiry resulted in the identification and production of documents detrimental to the position of the answering party and
helpful to the inquiring party?”
224. For example, an official of the Hiroshima Bar Association stated in his
interview that the New Code’s inquiry procedure was not much used despite
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ous explanations of this phenomenon were given, ranging from
the view that the court’s use, as an inquiring body, was preferable over the informal inquiry procedure to the belief that neither side was likely to provide damaging answers, especially as
there was no sanction for refusal to answer or refusal to answer
225
“at this time.” Additionally, interview subjects were asked for
their views on the conflict of ethical obligations inherent in a
non-compulsory inquiry process, i.e., the conflict between the
ethical duty to respond to opposing counsel and not to voluntar226
No interview subjects were
ily damage a client’s position.
227
willing to state that they had no obligation to respond nor
were they willing to admit that they might inaccurately respond
rather than damage their client’s interests. Still, the general
tenure of responses was that the obligation to the client out228
Hence, some raweighed the obligation to opposing counsel.

its usefulness in theory. Interview with Official (M), Hiroshima Bar Association, in Japan (on file with author). A lawyer in Kyoto stated that Japanese
lawyers do not use this procedure even after the reform — for example, he had
never used the procedure and opposing council had only once requested that
he do so. Interview with lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author). A
lawyer in Kobe stated that while the inquiry procedure was initially utilized,
attorneys’ stopped using it. Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file
with author). A lawyer in Hiroshima stated that the procedure is not used
very often. Interview with lawyer (W) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). These interview responses simply serve as illustrations of the multitude of responses portraying the majority view that the New Code’s procedure
was of little use and was accordingly used sparsely.
225. Typical was the response of a lawyer in Tokyo who noted that as there
was no sanction for failing to respond as this lawyer did not use the procedure
because he did not expect it would produce anything of value. Interview with
lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).
226. Inquiry subjects were asked, “As the attorney for a party to whom an
inquiry has been made, do you feel an obligation to provide an answer even if
the answer is harmful to your client’s position? If the answer could be harmful to your client’s position do you feel an ethical obligation to: a) answer or b)
refuse to answer the inquiry?”
227. Typical was the view of a lawyer in Hiroshima that by permitting a
lawyer to make inquiry, the New Code implies that an ethical obligation to
respond to the inquiry exists. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (W) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). However, this lawyer also noted that if
the response were harmful to the client, the lawyer should find a way to prevent such harm. Id.
228. One lawyer responded that he had an obligation to respond to inquiries
as an attorney, but that there was no ethical conflict because if the client tells
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tionale for failing to respond would be employed when such re229
sponse would damage a client’s position.
On the other hand, where the answer would eventually be
found in any event and disclosure at the time of response would
not damage the client, responding attorneys appeared willing to
230
Moreover, when circumstances make it
voluntarily respond.
impossible for opposing council to refuse to respond, inquiry
may prove useful. For example, when an employee is injured
due to an industrial accident, the employer is required to file a
231
report with the Ministry of Labor concerning the accident.
Inquiries such as whether a report was filed and requests for a
description of the report and its contents cannot be ignored because it is general knowledge that filing the report was a requirement. In such a case, inquiry can assist in producing the
232
report. However, where inquiry relates to internal documents
or undocumented events, it appears that responding counsel
need not and will not respond if to do so will adversely affect his
or her client. In short, the process was not very well used and

him not to respond he must follow the client’s wishes. Interview with lawyer
(K) in Hokkaido, Japan (on file with author).
229. The response of a lawyer in Kyoto was typical — he noted that a lawyer
should not say something that would disadvantage his client. Interview with
lawyer (B) in Kyoto, Japan (on file with author). Thus, if the answer would
hurt his client, he would either reply in an unresponsive way or would postpone answering at all. As this lawyer noted, since there was no sanction for
refusal to comply, non-response was preferable to hurting his client’s interest.
Id.
230. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (E), Saitama, Japan (on file with author) (explaining the voluntary production of evidence in regular cases).
231. See KAZUO SUGENO, JAPANESE LABOR LAW (1992).
232. A lawyer interviewed in Hokkaido described an experience where a
worker was killed on the job. The worker’s family did not know the facts of
the incident, but were concerned that the employer was at fault. Under Japanese Labor Law, the employer was required to make a report to the Ministry
of Labor. See SUGENO, supra note 231, at 39, 284–88 (1992). The worker’s
family sued, and the lawyer made inquiry as to the report filed with the Ministry. The company could not deny the existence of the report because of the
Labor Law’s reporting requirement. After receiving the admission about the
report, the lawyer requested that the court order the document produced and
the report was produced. In the lawyer’s opinion, once the existence of the
report was shown, the court was more willing to order its production than it
would have been under the previous Code. Interview with lawyer (K) in Hokkaido, Japan (on file with author).
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233

Furthermore, as a “discovwhen used, was not very helpful.
ery device,” the process was almost completely non-existent.
At this point in U.S. litigation practice, most lawyers recognize their client’s obligation to provide answers and evidence in
234
The rearesponse to opposing counsel’s discovery requests.
sons for this recognition of an obligation to produce (or its patronage within the legal community) are not completely clear.
235
The availability of court sanctions in the U.S. may play a role.
However, this reason may not be absolute or even substantial.
In addition to sanctions, the U.S. litigator has a reasonably
clear idea of clients’ and their own ethical and legal obligations
236
To the extent that a question of loyalties may
in discovery.
arise, the sanction mechanism (even if unused) indicates to the
lawyer his and the client’s primary obligations. Moreover, in
the U.S., the basic obligation to respond belongs to the client
possessing the requested information — not the lawyer who is
237
The willingness of U.S. judges
the conduit for transmission.
to sanction clients for failing to accurately respond defines the
role of lawyers and clients as well as influencing clients’ will238
ingness to respond in a timely and accurate manner.
233. Professor Koichi Miki reaches a similar conclusion. See generally Miki,
supra note 85. Professor Miki notes that:
A considerable number of people have pinned their hopes on [the inquiry procedure], although many others have doubted its effectiveness. Five years have passed since the New Code came into effect
and it has become clear that the latter view was correct. The number
of cases in which Party Inquiry is used has proven negligible.
Id. at 14.
234. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
789–90, 801 n.142. See also Wanderer v. Johnston, 910 F.2d 652 (9th Cir.
1990) (“severe” sanctions were imposed when defendants failed to appear at
depositions and produce requested documents).
235. See FED. R. CIV. P. 37.
236. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
786–787.
237. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 for the interrogatory analogue to Japan’s inquiry
process that requires all interrogatories be either answered or objected to.
Counsel signs objections whereas the “person” making the answer signs answers. This discloses that answers are to be made by a party, while lawyers
need to make the objections.
238. Lawyers are, of course, the major players in discovery responses and
have ethical obligations regarding searches for answers to interrogatories and
document production in the U.S. But, the interrogatory (for example) is di-
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Unlike the U.S., Japan has a non-compulsory process regarding disclosure of information. One reason for the nature of this
process is that the Japanese Bar objects to a compulsory proc239
However, a compulsory process may in fact be helpful to
ess.
the Bar by providing an airtight answer to complaining clients
who question why information must be disclosed to the other
side. Furthermore, by lifting the ethical dilemma from the
shoulders of lawyers, the compulsory process results in greater
use of disclosure methods by both sides and more efficient disclosure of relevant answers.
It is the author’s view that the Japanese judiciary’s objections
to a compulsory process may reflect its unwillingness to: (1) become involved in disputes that do not affect substantive decision-making; (2) make sanction decisions that might hurt a client when the lawyer may be at fault; and (3) exclude evidence
when production is conducive to substantive justice whereas
exclusion is not.
However, by making the process compulsory, the judge is relieved of the time-consuming task of dealing with preliminary
evidentiary and issue inquiries, and is thus able to devote more
time and energy to the substantive decision-making process.
Placing the inquiry process at the early stage of a case — even
prior to the first Preliminary Oral Hearing and surely before or
during the new Preparatory Proceedings for Oral hearing —
and making disclosure compulsory in certain areas will substantially advance the issue-determining process. Meanwhile,
240
the present process appears to have no significant effect. Further, the existence of a “sanctions regime” does not mean that
sanctions will be utilized on a frequent basis. The threat of
sanctions, backed up by their infrequent use, exerts pressure on
241
parties to comply.
Perhaps, the biggest obstacle to a sanctions regime is the
242
“distrust” between bengoshi and the judiciary. There appears
rected to the client who signs the response. The lawyer may assist in ferreting out the information and in drafting the response as well as by objecting to
over broad or otherwise improper interrogatories.
239. See Miki, supra note 85, at 6–7, 15. See generally Ota, supra note 9.
240. Miki, supra note 85, at 11–16.
241. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
801.
242. See infra Part III.F.
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to be a gap in understanding and collegiality between Japanese
bengoshi and Japanese judges that does not exist in the U.S.
243
legal system. Both history and present practice make the current Bar skeptical of a system that gives judges (as government
officials in a government bureaucracy) power over individual
244
Perhaps, a sanctions regime without U.S. remedies,
lawyers.
such as authority to fine or otherwise sanction attorneys, will
eventually arise in Japan. Japanese bengoshi appear to view
the inquiry process as lawyer-to-lawyer, creating a lawyer re245
sponse process in which the client is simply a minor player.
However, lawyers do not possess the first hand knowledge required to answer factual inquiries — only the client is in possession of such first-hand knowledge. Therefore, this objection
to a sanctions regime may be overcome by clarifying that the
duty to respond to inquiries lies with the party (i.e., the client)
— assisted by the lawyer — and thus, failure to respond properly results in imposing sanctions on the client.
The July 2003 reform adopts a “pre-lawsuit filing” inquiry
246
Under the new
process for obtaining factual information.
scheme, a party contemplating litigation must send the prospective defendant a somewhat detailed letter, notifying him or
her of the intent to file suit by a certain date and setting out the
reasons for the suit; however, not all of the evidentiary materi247
Once
als required in a formal complaint must be disclosed.
such a letter is sent, the potential plaintiff may make inquiries
248
similar to those made in the post-filing inquiry process. There
is even the possibility of receiving judicial assistance prior to
249
filing a complaint in order to assist in the inquiry process.
243. Id.
244. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
803, 806.
245. See Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan & Interview with lawyer (G) in Rockville, Maryland (U.S.) (on file with author).
246. See Act to Amend Civil Procedure Act and Other Relevant Acts, 15
Heisei (2003) Statute No. 108, adding articles 132–2 to 132–9 (Japan) (dealing
with the pre-litigation inquiry procedure). See also Interviews with lawyers
(Q & T) from Japan (on file with author).
247. Interviews with lawyers (Q & T) from Japan (on file with author).
248. Id.
249. Such assistance may come through filing a form of motion. The motion
practice would require the payment of a fee, but not as high a fee as the filing
fee for a complaint. Id.
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Inquiry prior to complaint is potentially very important in
Japan as the formal complaint requires significant factual in250
Unlike the U.S., Jaformation to be accepted by the court.
pan’s factual “discovery” cannot wait until after the complaint is
filed. Inquiry as a potentially limited form of discovery is thus
most important in the pre-filing stage, as it has the potential to
provide a prospective plaintiff with the facts needed to file a
251
formal complaint. Moreover, filing fees in Japan are high and
the new inquiry process may aid in resolving cases without the
need to file a formal complaint, thus saving the potential plain252
In turn, this early resolution may reduce
tiff some expenses.
the plaintiff’s settlement demand by the amount of the forgone
filing fee.
Unfortunately, the pre-filing inquiry process suffers from the
same lack of a sanctions regime (just as does the post-filing
253
Thus, the expectation is that the pre-filing process
process).
will not have the positive effect that reformers envisioned. On
the other hand, this process is a first step towards the discovery
of facts that make filing a valid complaint possible. Finally, if a
sanctions regime is later applied to such pre-filing inquiries, the
reform may have real significance.
2. Document Production

254

When a proper request has been made for a document, the
New Code permits the court to review the document in camera
250. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
801.
251. See id. at 789–90.
252. See id. at 791–92.
253. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 250 (discussing limitations on the court’s sanctioning powers where a third person
fails to produce a requested document).
254. Documents must be produced in four situations: (1) where a party in
possession of a document refers to that document during the litigation; (2)
where the party seeking the document is entitled to demand delivery or examination of it; (3) where the document was created for the benefit of the
party seeking it or was drawn up to evidence the legal relationship of the parties (such as a contract between the parties — a kind of mutual benefit document); and (4) a catch-all provision covering any other document that is not:
(a) self-incriminating, (b) privileged or containing privileged material, or (c) a
document created solely for the use of the person in possession of the document (a “self-use” document). MINSOHŌ, art. 220.
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255

In the U.S., an
to determine whether it should be produced.
in camera review permits the judicial officer to make a more
informed decision about production while simultaneously protecting the fact-finder from exposure to inadmissible evidence,
256
Howsince the fact-finder is usually the jury, not the judge.
ever, in Japan, the judge is the fact-finder, and thus exposure to
a contested document for in camera review may potentially
prejudice the producer of the documents by exposing an “inad257
Both in the U.S. and
missible” document to the fact-finder.
Japan, professional judges often operate on the assumption that
they can compartmentalize evidence so that an examined, in258
admissible document will not play a role in decision-making.
This fiction results in juries being warned not to consider the
answer to a question that has been ruled inadmissible after response. Nonetheless, common sense tells trial lawyers that the
damage is done when the evidence has been seen or heard because jurors are unlikely to completely forget what they have
255. Id. art. 223, para. 3. To obtain a document, a party must move for its
production. Article 221 of the Code provides that the motion for production
must contain: “(1) Indication of the document; (2) Gist of the document; (3)
The holder of the document; and (4) The fact to be proven; (5) The ground for
obligation for production of the document.” Id. art. 221, para. 1. The New
Code modifies the moving party’s obligation by loosening the duty to comply
with the first two requirements when
[i]t is extremely difficult to clarify the matter mentioned in (1) or (2)
of paragraph 1 of the preceding Article, at the time of the application
it shall be sufficient to clarify, as a substitute for such matter, the
matter which enables the holder of a document to distinguish the
document under application.
Id. at art. 222.
256. In the U.S., actions at common law seeking a recovery of twenty dollars
or more entitle the parties to jury trial and “no fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any court of the U.S., than according to the rules of
the common law.” U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
257. See Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
802 (stating that “the court that makes the in camera review is also the trier
of fact because there is no jury.”); ODA, supra note 1, at 73 (stating that “the
Japanese court system does not accommodate either a jury system or a system
of lay assessors.”).
258. Practicing lawyers know that in trying a case before a judge rather
than a jury, the rules of evidence are liberalized by the court and many documents that are inadmissible at a jury trial will come into evidence. Furthermore, the court will note that the evidence will be given such weight as it deserves, including the possibility of no weight, if deemed appropriate.
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heard or seen, and the same is likely true of judges. Accord259
ingly, in camera review by the fact-finder creates problems.
Regardless of the potential for improper exposure, all interview
subjects indicated that they had never been involved in a case
260
where the judge made an in camera review of a document.
However, some individuals had heard stories of cases with in
261
Like the inquiry procedure, this reform also
camera review.
262
appears not to have taken hold.
In general, respondents felt that the New Code made it procedurally easier to obtain the documents required to be pro263
Respondents found that judges were more willing to
duced.
“recommend” and “suggest” that parties voluntarily produce
264
Additiondocuments than had been the case pre-New Code.
ally, respondents felt that parties were more likely to follow
such suggestions than had been the case before the New Code.
On the whole, respondents felt that the creation of the New
Code led more documents to be produced than had ever oc259. A judge interviewed outside Tokyo noted that judges do not at all like
to use the in camera review process and will avoid doing so. Interview with
High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author). This judge noted that a
problem exists with in camera review because even if the judge could divorce
himself from using an improper document in his decision-making, the attorneys would object because the judge is the fact-finder. Id. Lawyers echoed
this view. Typical was the response of a lawyer in Kobe that because judges
find it difficult to forget what they have read, lawyers do not like the in camera review system. Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with
author).
260. A Hiroshima lawyer gave a typical response when he stated that he
had never experienced a situation where a judge either made an in camera
review or redacted a document for production. Interview with lawyer (M) in
Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author). But see MINSOHŌ, art. 223, para. 1
(noting that redaction is permitted).
261. See, e.g., Interview with bengoshi (C) in Sapporo, Japan (on file with
author).
262. Although not specifically addressed in the questionnaire, discussion
with interview subjects shows that the new “redacting” authority given to the
court is also rarely, if ever, utilized.
263. For example, a lawyer in Tokyo noted that courts are reluctant to order
a party to produce documents and may instead suggest production, but without sanction for failure to follow the suggestion. In any event, he did feel that
while the procedure for requesting documents from the other side was easier
under the New Code, actual production had not changed significantly. Interview with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).
264. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (L) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with
author).
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curred before. The view was also expressed that the government produced more documents under the New Code, especially
after the 2001 Amendment covering government documents,
since failure to do so would lead to unfavorable judicial decisions regarding the government’s position on document produc265
tion. Nonetheless, most respondents did not feel that the new
document provisions significantly aided plaintiffs. In other
words, significant documents that were “against a party[’s] interest” were still not being produced and remained unavailable
266
The self-use exception to document production
to plaintiffs.
requirements appeared to be the primary reason for the New
Code’s failure to significantly enhance the plaintiff’s ability to
267
obtain damaging documents from the defendant.
Although the New Code contains a “catch-all” document production requirement (as well as the very narrow specific requirements for categories of documents that should be produced
contained in the old Code), it also contains a list of “exceptions”
268
In addition to the type of trato the production requirement.
ditional exceptions found in the U.S. system (attorney-client
privileged materials, self-incriminating materials, etc.), the
New Code legislatively adopted the “self-use” document excep269
tion that prevailed under the old Code. Under this exception,
documents that are created solely for the use of the creator are
270
not subject to production. The rationale behind this exception
265. A lawyer in Kobe indicated that the government did not want the Supreme Court to take a case involving the question of production of self-use
documents by the government and thus, the government often voluntarily
produced such documents to avoid potential litigation about the issue. Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with author).
266. A lawyer interviewed in Tokyo noted that if a defendant tries hard to
hide a document’s existence, a plaintiff cannot find out that the defendant has
the document. Interview with lawyer (D) in Tokyo, Japan (on file with author).
267. See Goodman, The Somewhat less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
801–02; GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249.
268. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249.
269. MINSOHŌ, art. 220, para. 4(d) (noting that self-use document production
is part of the “catch-all” provision of Article 220 that permits production in
several instances, including when: “(4)…the document does not come under
any of the followings;…(d) [a] document to be offered only for the use of a
holder of a document…”).
270. Documents produced for the benefit of the party seeking production
(such as a receipt) and documents produced for the benefit of both parties
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is to permit the free flow of ideas within the preparing entity
without fear that the document will later become the object of
271
The exception can be quite broad in scope
public scrutiny.
and is likely to include the traditional “smoking gun,” that is,
the damaging documents that U.S. lawyers are always looking
272
Indeed, most
for in their discovery “fishing expeditions.”
damaging documents maintained by a company defendant
would likely be subject to the self-use exception. If given broad
interpretation, the exception will likely swallow the “catch-all”
nature of the New Code’s document production approach — in
fact, this breadth may have been one purpose for legislating the
self-use exception.
After the New Code’s adoption, the Supreme Court of Japan
had at least two opportunities to discuss the self-use excep273
In both cases, the Court broadly interpreted the exclution.
sionary character of the exception, and thus limited the nature
274
In the Fuji Bank case,
of the “catch-all” discovery provision.
the Court held that the self-use exception prevented the plaintiff, the family of a deceased borrower, from obtaining the loan
275
application files from the defendant, the lender. The plaintiff
argued that the files would prove that the bank officials were
aware of the deceased’s inability to make the loan payments,
and therefore, the lender should never have made the loan in
276
Accordingly, the plaintiff asserted that the
the first place.
lender was not entitled to recover payment of the loan from the
(such as a contract) were required to be produced under the old Code and are
still required to be produced under the New Code. MINSOHŌ, arts. 220–23.
271. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50
(discussing the rationale of the Supreme Court of Japan in the Fuji Bank case
(see infra note 273) “to require such documents to be produced would interfere
with the frank discussion of views within the bank”).
272. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50.
273. See Fuji Bank v. Maeda, Case No. 2 of 1999, 53 Minshu No. 8 at 1787
(Sup. Ct., Petty Bench, Nov. 12, 1999) (Japan), English translation available
at http://www.courtdomino2.courts/go.jp/home.nsf/ehome?OpenPage; Case No.
35 of 2000, 54 Minshu No. 9 at 2709 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000) (Japan), English
translation available at http://www.courtdomino2.courts.go.jp/home.nsf/ehom
e?OpenPage.
274. See GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 248–50.
275. Fuji Bank v. Maeda, Case No. 2 of 1999 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 12, 1999) (Japan). For a discussion of the Fuji Bank case and the “self-use” exception, see
GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50.
276. Fuji Bank, Case No. 2 of 1999, at para. 1.1.
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277

The Supreme Court found that loan offideceased’s estate.
cials were entitled to the free flow of information and ideas from
their subordinates and that to require the production of the file
278
Since the documents in the file
would inhibit that free flow.
were prepared solely to assist the bank officials in deciding
whether or not to make the loan, they were self-use documents
and thus not subject to production.
A year later, in a derivative action against bank directors, the
Supreme Court held that the self-use exception prevented the
derivative plaintiffs from obtaining certain bank files on the
grounds that the files were created for the self-use of the
279
As in the Fuji Bank case, the Court could have narbank.
280
rowly read the exception to permit discovery, holding that
since this derivative action was for the benefit of the bank and
the plaintiffs were standing in the bank’s shoes, the document
was created for the benefit of the plaintiff and thus should be
produced. The Court could have also held that since they were
separate from the Bank, the exception did not apply to the Directors because the documents were not created for the Directors’ benefit, let alone for their sole benefit. However, the subject of this Article is not whether the Court should or should not
have entered into a narrow interpretation of the exception;
rather, the point is that the Court has rendered a broad interpretation of the self-use exception, thus limiting the scope of
281
production by the lower courts.
277. See id.
278. Id. at para. 3.
279. Case No. 35 of 2000, 54 Minshu No. 9, 2709 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 14, 2000)
(Japan).
280. Some scholars suggest that Fuji Bank is a broad reading of the exception and a narrow reading of the production obligation. See GOODMAN, THE
RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 249–50. The Court could have logically found that making a “good loan” was in the interest of both borrower and
lender while rejecting a loan application where the hopeful borrower was unable to repay was also in the best interest of both parties. In such case, the
application file could be viewed as having been prepared for the benefit of both
parties and, thus, not subject to the self-use exception.
281. A High Court Judge interviewed outside Tokyo specifically referred to
the determination of the Supreme Court and noted that this case is considered
as the “basic case” for self-use documents and the lower courts must follow it.
Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author). This
Judge also noted that production of self-use documents could damage privacy
rights of the party in possession of the documents. Id.
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Interview subjects clearly indicated that the Fuji Bank case
and its limiting nature was well-known to both bengoshi and
judges, and furthermore, both were adhering to Fuji Bank. Interview subjects were asked:
Q: Do you believe that the self-use document exception
to production limits the ability of the plaintiff to obtain
significant documentary evidence adverse to the inter282
ests of defendants? The answer was generally “yes.”
Q: Would you like to see an amendment to the Code restricting the definition of self-use documents so as to allow for greater production of self-use documents? As
was to be expected, those respondents who substantively
responded to this inquiry did so based on their practice
283
preferences.
Thus, attorneys who represented both plaintiffs and respondents desired that the Code be amended and the self-use document exception narrowed. On the other hand, those who only
represented respondents felt that the provision was acceptable

282. The response of a lawyer in Nagoya was typical. He noted that the
self-use exception remains very broad and has not changed with adoption of
the New Code. Further, this lawyer noted that, due to the near impossibility
of proving the existence of a document and the ability of the defendant to
avoid admitting that a document exists (while the plaintiff must specify facts
about the content of the document), very little change was effected by the New
Code in most cases. Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with
author). This lawyer was of the view that change had been achieved in connection with medical malpractice cases where the existence of documents and
the subject matter of their contents were more readily available. Id. A lawyer
in Hokkaido responded that production of self-use documents would violate
the privacy rights of the party in possession. Interview with lawyer (K) in
Hokkaido, Japan (on file with author). A High Court Judge also made this
argument for privacy rights. Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan
(on file with author). Further, this rationale is used by the Supreme Court in
its broad reading of the self-use exception in the Fuji Bank case. See Fuji
Bank, Case No. 2 of 1999, at para. 3.
283. A lawyer in Nagoya who primarily represents corporate interests responded that, in his view, plaintiff’s lawyers wanted the doctrine to change
while defendant’s lawyers were opposed to change. Interview with lawyer (A)
in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author).
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as is. Some attorneys felt the question was irrelevant since
284
pressure from business interests rendered change impossible.
In general, the new document production provisions of the
Code were viewed as simplifying the procedure in order to obtain documents, but failing to significantly open up the opposing party’s records. In other words, although more documents
were being produced in response to the judges’ “requests,”
plaintiffs still had great difficulty obtaining defendants’ documents, particularly if the documents were adverse to the defendants’ interests.
C. Legislative Changes Limiting Damage Awards in Derivative
Cases
In the U.S., plaintiff’s counsel in class action and derivative
lawsuits typically receive contingent fee awards which are set
285
by the court after the case is resolved. Where the size of such
awards is tied to the monetary damages won (or computed as
won), the amount of damages that can be obtained in such cases
is a strong factor in determining whether such cases are
286
brought. Counsel has a strong incentive to sue if there is the
chance of a large recovery (i.e., large fee award) and less incentive if there is a small recovery. Thus, to the U.S. lawyer, the
Tokyo District Court’s decision in the Daiwa Bank case, where
huge damages were awarded against the company officials (in
favor of the company via the derivative plaintiffs), represented
284. Nonetheless, the question of change has been brought up in a legislative committee with responsibility for civil procedure matters. Discussion
with Professor Miki in Tokyo (on file with author). Such discussion does not
mean that change will be achieved or if it is, it will be in the near future.
285. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 550 (3d ed. 1992).
286. In some cases, plaintiffs actually receive no monetary recovery, but,
nonetheless, a substantial monetary recovery is computed for fee-setting purposes. Thus, where a settlement involves the use of “coupons” to be distributed to plaintiffs so as to grant them a discount on future purchases, no
money has actually changed hands but the damage award calculation for fee
purposes may include the total value of the coupons, even if no receiving party
ever uses a coupon for a future purchase. See generally Christopher R. Leslie,
A Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer
Class Action Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991 (2002) (criticizing the use of
coupon settlements in class action litigation); Geoffrey P. Miller & Lori S.
Singer, Nonpecuniary Class Action Settlements, 60 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 97
(1997).
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the possibility that derivative suits would dramatically increase
287
The Daiwa Bank case represented an interesting
in Japan.
example of lowered barriers leading to greater litigation, as the
case was brought after the Commercial Code reduced the filing
288
fee for derivative lawsuits.
Shortly after the lower court decision in Daiwa Bank, and
while the case was pending appeal, the Japanese Diet amended
the Commercial Code to limit the recovery against a director in
289
Previously, the Diet amended the envia derivative lawsuit.
ronmental laws to create administrative remedies. This charge
occurred after the courts rendered favorable decisions for plain290
Some scholars suggest
tiffs in the “Big Four” pollution cases.
that this legislative response was designed to take pollution
cases away from the judicial system and place pollution abatement responsibilities back in the hands of Japanese administra291
tive government officials. Thus, the question was raised as to
“whether this amendment [reducing damages against corporate
officials in derivative cases] will stifle the prophylactic effect of

287. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
798.
288. For a discussion of the Daiwa Bank case and the question of whether it
will lead to additional litigation, see Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant
Litigant, supra note 15, at 798.
289. For an English language synopsis of the amendment to the Japanese
Commercial Code, see Amendment to Limit Execs’ Liability, JAPAN TIMES
ONLINE, Nov. 30, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/get
article.pl?nb20011130q9.htm; Revised Code Limits Liability of Executives,
JAPAN TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 6, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.
co.jp/cgi-bin/getarticle.plg?nb200011206a3.htm. Under the amendment to the
Commercial Code referred to by the Japan Times, director liability may be
capped at the total employment benefits received by the director for a certain
number of years, depending on the responsibilities of the director and whether
he/she is an independent director. Id.
290. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN, supra note 70, at
35. The Big Four consist of Aoyama et al. v. Mitsui Kinzoku, Nagoya High
Court, Aug. 9, 1972, 674 Hanji 25 (Japan); Ono et al. v. Showa Denko, Niigata
District Court, Sept. 29, 1971, 22 Kakyu Minshu (Nos. 9–10) (Japan); Watanabe et al. v. Chisso, Kumamoto District Court, Aug. 9, 1972, 696 Hanji 15
(Japan); Shiono et al. v. Showa Yokkaichi Sekiyu, Tsu District Court, July 24,
1972, 672 Hanji 30 (Japan) (on file with author).
291. See generally UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY IN POSTWAR JAPAN, supra
note 70.
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292

derivative litigation in the future.” Accordingly, interviewees
were asked:
After the Daiwa Bank derivative lawsuit decision, the [Japanese] Diet enacted a law permitting the limitation of liability of
Directors in derivative cases. What effect do you think such legislation has had on the willingness of persons to file derivative
lawsuits? What do you think was the reason that the Diet
passed such a limitation of liability provision?
Typically, interviewees believed that the purpose of the legislation was to make it easier for companies to obtain directors
293
This rationale was, of course, used by the
willing to serve.
government in enacting the law. On the whole, bengoshi responded that they believed this to be the purpose of the law.
Indeed, there is reason to believe that such limited liability may
be necessary, especially as Japan’s corporate law moves from
boards composed solely of insiders to those on which outside
independent directors are expected to hold several positions.
While enacting the limited liability provision the Japanese Diet
was also shifting the corporate structure in Japan to a style
more similar to the U.S., with greater reliance on outside direc294
tors. However, if outside directors were subjected to the same
unlimited liability that was applied to the Daiwa Bank defendants, outsiders might refuse to serve. In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that in recent years U.S. Boards have experienced
a substantial turnover of outside directors due to candidates’
295
concerns over potential liability.

292. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN, supra note 19, at 198.
293. Typical was the response of a lawyer in Tokyo who commented that in
his opinion, the limit on damages would not affect the number of derivative
type cases brought since the end result sought was not monetary damages but
change in management actions. Interview with lawyer (S) in Tokyo, Japan
(on file with author). Id. In addition, he felt that the reason for the monetary
limitation was responsive to the need to obtain directors willing to serve as
such.
294. Corporate Government and Reform of Japan’s Commercial Code, J-IRIS
RESEARCH NEWSL. (Japan Investor Relations & Investor Support, Inc., Tokyo,
Japan), Nov. 10, 2003, at http://www.j-iris.com/newsletter/nl02.pdf.
295. “Corporate America is undergoing the largest turnover in corporate
boards of directors in several years as a result of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, representatives of an industry group representing directors
and several executive search firms told BNA in recent interviews.” BNA Corporate Law & Business, 34 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 47, Dec. 9, 2002, availa-
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Surprisingly, most bengoshi believed that the limitation provisions had no effect on plaintiffs’ decisions to file derivative
actions. Although the majority of bengoshi interviewed had
never been involved in derivative litigation, those who expressed an opinion believed that derivative plaintiffs filed suit
296
Since derivative suits were not
for non-monetary reasons.
viewed as “economically” motivated, the amount of the damage
award was of relatively little consequence. Moreover, some subjects believed that Japanese lawyers who filed derivative suits
297
were not paid based on the amount recovered in the case;
thus, the damage amount was not relevant to a lawyer’s decision to file a derivative case. Again, respondents were of the
view that factors other than economics lay behind the filing decision. To some extent, the responses were an echo of the cultural and societal arguments voiced by some scholars as to why
Japanese citizens appear to be more reluctant to file lawsuits
298
than U.S. citizens.
The statistical evidence available is too slim to make any conclusion as to whether the 2001 law has had any effect on litigation rates. While interesting, the decline in the number of de-

ble at http://corplawcenter.bna.com/pic2/clb.nsf/id/BNAP-5GJSW3?OpenDocu
ment.
296. Representative was the view of a lawyer in Nagoya that derivative type
cases were motivated by a desire to punish bad managers and not to provide
economic relief to plaintiffs or high fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers. Interview with
lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with author). For a thoughtful discussion
of the potential reasons for derivative litigation in Japan, see West, Why
Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 368–75. West suggests that there is little
direct benefit to shareholders from derivative litigation in Japan, lending
support to the idea that such litigation is fee driven. Id. However, he notes
that with the exception of a small number of cases brought by an “elite” shareholders litigation consortium most derivative litigation does not produce high
legal fees. Id. For such “non-elite” cases, motivation other than fees may be
at work and for some cases it is possible that Sokaiya have moved into the
litigation business. Id.
297. For a discussion of relationship between fees and recoveries in derivative cases, see West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 368–75.
298. For a discussion of the various theories (including cultural and societal
theory) supporting the evidence that Japanese file fewer lawsuits than U.S.
citizens, see Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15,
at 789–97.
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299

rivative cases initiated in 2001 is inconclusive, especially as it
300
301
mirrors the 1998 decline. The available data shows:
Derivative Cases Filed From 1996-2001
in the District and High Courts
Year
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

District Court
Newly Filed
Disposed
68
88
73
93
83
68

66
66
59
77
98
80

High Court
New Appeals
Disposed
12
11
17
15
32
28

13
9
18
11
30
25

Further study is required regarding derivative lawsuits, once
data for 2002 and 2003 is available.
D. Representative Actions
Unlike U.S. law, Japanese civil procedure does not provide for
302
class action suits.
In Japan, each allegedly injured party
303
must separately claim damages. However, Japanese law does
304
In a representative acrecognize the “representative action.”
305
From
tion suit, numerous parties are named as plaintiffs.
299. In 2001, a great deal of publicity was given to the government’s bill to
limit the liability of directors in derivative litigation, although the law did not
get passed until December 2001, and did not become effective until May 2002.
Corporate Government and Reform, supra note 294.
300. While interesting, it is noted that the drop in the number of derivative
cases between 2000 and 2001 is exactly the same (15 cases) as the drop between 1997 and 1998. See Derivative Cases Filed From 1996-2001 Chart.
301. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96. The data
provided by the Secretariat differs slightly from data reported by Professor
West for 1996–1999. See West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 356
(Table 1).
302. See J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J.
604, 631 (1985).
303. See id.
304. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 782–83.
305. See id.
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these plaintiffs, a small group is designated to represent the
306
In this fashion, one
entire plaintiff group in the litigation.
case can try the issues and facts common to all claims made by
the entire group of plaintiffs. Unlike the U.S. class action, however, all the plaintiffs must in fact be real plaintiffs who appear
in the case, and the plaintiffs do not represent others similarly
307
situated who did not join in the lawsuit.
The writers of the New Code of Civil Procedure were aware of
the U.S. style class action and were aware of the existing opin308
The idea
ion that Japanese law should permit class actions.
of permitting U.S. style class actions was rejected by the New
Code, but the “representative action” was modified to permit
parties to join the action after the complaint had already been
309
This joinder provision was seen as a step towards
filed.
greater access to the court process, placing the New Code
310
somewhere between the Old Code and the U.S. class action.
Bengoshi interviewees were also asked whether the new representative action provisions had significantly changed the role
of litigation in Japan (as class actions have significantly
changed the role of litigation in the U.S.). The response was
that the new change had made virtually no difference in litiga311
Respondents felt that while some new plaintiffs may
tion.
have joined suits, the New Code brought about no great
312
At the time the New Code was written, one issue
change.
raised was whether representative plaintiffs’ counsel should be
allowed to “advertise” the pending suit and invite others to join
313
the litigation. Interview subjects were asked:
306. See id.
307. See id.
308. See id. at 782.
309. ODA, supra note 1, at 395–98.
310. See Taniguchi, supra note 10, at 783.
311. For example, a lawyer interviewed in Kobe stated that he had not yet
seen a representative action brought in the Kobe District Court. Interview
with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with author).
312. Interview subjects were asked: “Have the provisions allowing for persons to join representative actions after the lawsuit has already been filed
resulted in significant numbers of persons joining such suits after they have
been filed?”
313. Kojima, supra note 15, at 719 n.208 (“Placing the burden on the plaintiffs to provide such notice would seem to undercut the potential effectiveness
of this device.”).
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Do you think [that] lawyers under [the] supervision of
the court should be allowed to place notices in the newspapers advising persons of the filing of a representative
suit and advising as to how persons may join such suits?
Responses varied greatly. Some bengoshi believed that they
already had the right to place such advertisements without
314
Some interviewees even felt that the court
court approval.
should have no say in what the bengoshi published, while others felt the court would want no role in this issue in order to
315
avoid responsibility for the advertisement. Additionally, some
bengoshi felt that such advertising would be bad for the Bar’s
public reputation, while others considered this issue as unim316
portant. Among the various rationales for this viewpoint was
the notion that lawyers already had the ability to advertise the
filing of such cases through newspaper interviews and other
devices, and therefore newspaper advertising was neither significant nor important. Another factor may very well be the
costs of such advertisements. Unlike in the U.S., where a lawyer’s contingent fee may be greatly enhanced by the size of the
plaintiff class and the value of the class claim, lawyer’s fees in
Japanese representative cases are not related to the number of
plaintiffs represented, although the “success” portion of the fee
317
Thus, a
may be related to the amount of damages recovered.
314. A bengoshi in Saitama noted that advertising was taking place in
connection with representative suits but also noted that he had recently seen
some advertisements and public relations (i.e., interviews with the press, announcements to lawyers groups) relating to consumer fraud cases. Interview
with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file with author).
315. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (U) in Kobe, Japan (on file with author).
316. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (V) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with
author); Interview with lawyer (W) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with author).
An interviewee bengoshi in Saitama noted that the image of U.S. lawyers in
Japan was not good and that such advertising might create a similar image
for Japanese bengoshi. Interview with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file
with author).
317. In Japan, it is customary for the Bar Association to prepare a chart of
lawyers fees for cases. The chart encompasses the “up-front” portion of the
fee, based on the recovery sought, and a “success” component, based on the
success in the case and typically represents a percentage recovery. Such
charts were regularly published at the front of address/note/memo books prepared by the Bar Association for its members. Recently such charts, such as
official guides to fees, have been moderated because of anti-trust arguments.
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lawyer placing an advertisement might not be able to recoup
the cost of preparing and printing such advertisements. In
sum, there did not appear to be great support among bengoshi
for an advertising option paid for by the plaintiff group.
E. Complicated Cases
In Japan, cases in which two or more witnesses testify are
318
In the Preparatory Proceeding
viewed as complicated cases.
for Oral Argument phase of a case, the judge will narrow the
number of issues and witnesses required to try those issues to
such a great extent that if two or more witnesses are needed to
319
Usresolve the issues the case is, by definition, complicated.
For an English language Japan Federation of Bar Associations retainer and
success fees schedule, see Yamanouchi & Cohen, supra note 28, at 448. See
also West, Why Shareholders Sue, supra note 71, at 365.
318. For example, when keeping statistical records, cases are categorized as
those involving only one witness and those in which two or more witnesses
appear. The number of cases where only one witness appears exceeds the total
of all other cases where two or more witnesses appear. See, e.g., Average
Number of Months from Filing of Complaint to Disposition Chart, supra Part
III.A.1.
319. The “narrowing of issues” by Japanese judges represents a significant
difference in the role of the court in the U.S. and Japanese systems. In Japan,
the Judge can “narrow” issues by preventing a party from raising an issue for
trial without rendering a decision or order as to the validity of the issue.
Moreover, a judge can use his/her narrowing of issues authority to refuse to
permit witness testimony. See MINSOHŌ, arts. 165(1), 170(6) & 177. See also
id. art. 181(1) (the court can decide whether evidence is required). Prior to the
Second World War Japanese civil procedure was such that the trial judge had
strong directive powers in the process of “fixing issues” and “proof taking.”
Tanabe, supra note 121, at 507–08. For example, the court assumed the leadership and responsibility for both fixing and narrowing the issues, as the court
would ‘clarify’ matters throughout the entire trial process. Id. Although in
form this procedure was changed by the occupation to a more adversarial procedure, the reality was that the role of the judge changed little. Id. at 517–25.
See also Kamiya, supra note 182, at 56. Kamiya explains:
After five decades, it appears that lawyers (and judges) still take it
for granted that the presiding judge will be in control, not only during
the trial…but also in case management.…In other words, the adversarial structure of the proceedings has not denied courts and presiding judges the opportunity to be paternalistic, or even meddle in
many aspects of the litigation.
Id. In the U.S., the court lacks such authority and as a consequence the parties are in control of the issues until the court makes a ruling that is a part of
the record and thus part of the record on appeal, on the validity or invalidity
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ing this methodology, the consolidated trial procedure is a useful method for dealing with testimony in complicated cases.
Further, both interview responses and statistics show that this
procedure is being used on an ever-growing basis. For purposes
of this discussion, however, complicated cases are considered to
be cases that involve complicated issues of fact — especially
those involving facts typically outside the experience of the
320
judge. Such cases usually need some form of expert advice.
For example, medical malpractice cases require technical medical expertise, construction cases may require technical engineering expertise, and intellectual property cases may require
technical expertise in any of a number of fields. In the U.S., on
direct and cross-examination, expert witnesses typically present
technical facts to either a judge or a jury, who usually lack such
321
Although U.S. judges have the right to
technical knowledge.
322
Additionally, when such
appoint experts, they rarely do so.
experts are appointed, their opinions may be subjected to cross323
examination and challenged by party witnesses.
Although the rate of litigation has not increased with adoption of the New Code, there is evidence that the number of complicated cases has increased. This increase, combined with the
need to further reduce the time necessary to resolve cases, is
creating additional stress in the Japanese judicial system. For
example, the number of medical malpractice cases brought in
the District Court has risen consistently from the adoption of
the New Code until today. The figures for medical malpractice
324
cases show:

of an issue. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 35. Thus, in the U.S., the court can
only narrow the issues in a case by resolving the issues raised by the parties.
320. See Tahirih V. Lee, Court-Appointed Experts and Judicial Reluctance:
A Proposal to Amend Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 480, 490–93 (1988).
321. See Geoffrey M. Howard & Elizabeth A. Ybarra, Court-Appointed Experts, 12 NO. 1 PRAC. LITIGATOR 55, 56 (2001).
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. See The Japanese Court System’s Statistics, supra note 96.
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Malpractice Cases
Year
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001

New Cases Filed
371
442
505
484
572
593
622
663
775
325
805

Backlog
1, 257
1,352
1,465
1,523
1,595
1,661
1,699
1,793
1,878
1,968

Bengoshi and others interviewed noted this increase in complicated cases (in this sense of the term) and the need to handle
such cases better than they are currently. Those interviewed
agreed that the consolidated hearing system embodied in the
New Code helped deal with the increase in complicated cases.
Since these cases involved the use of several witnesses, they
lend themselves to the consolidated hearing method. However,
there was a general feeling that more needed to be done in order to move these cases along to judgment faster. As of 2001,
statistical evidence showed that medical malpractice cases were
resolved in an average of 32.7 months, whereas in 1999 (the
year for which figures were used by the Judicial Reform Council) such cases were resolved in approximately 34.6 months at
the District Court level.
The Judicial Reform Council recognized this problem in its
report and made several recommendations to deal with these
lengthy resolutions. Among the recommendations were using

325. From a Rule of Law judicial system standpoint, the increase in medical
malpractice cases proves interesting and bodes well for the legal system as a
Rule of Law mechanism. It is not known why the number of malpractice cases
is increasing, but it is suggested that factors outside the New Code are responsible. Particularly important may be the public’s greater knowledge of
medical mistakes made by doctors and institutions such as hospitals, as well
as the developing substantive law concerning patient’s rights in Japan. See
Yutaka Tejima, Recent Developments in the Informed Consent Law in Japan
(I), 36 KOBE U. L. REV. 45 (2002).
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“expert commissioners to support judges,” improving the
“[c]ourt appointed expert witness system,” and strengthening
326
The judicial
the technical expertise of the legal profession.
system has recognized the challenge presented by these new
complicated cases and is attempting to find solutions. Since it
is recognized that both judges and lawyers lack technical
knowledge, one idea being considered is that the judicial system
should hire its own experts to work along side judges, as part of
the judicial system. Thus, physicians or engineers might be
hired as judicial research assistants to provide technical advice
to the judge. Such a system, mimicking the system in effect for
intellectual property cases, is seen as having the advantage of
accuracy, since the expert is assisting in the decision-making,
rather than a layperson. Expert assistance also expedites the
task of issue clarification. However, such a system may have
Rule of Law ramifications.
If experts are hired as a part of the court bureaucracy to advise judges in camera, parties will not have the opportunity to
challenge the expert opinion in front of the decision-maker.
Such a system may be seen as taking the decision out of the
327
Even if experts
public arena and placing it in a secret arena.
on the court payroll are required to present their findings in
open court, by denying parties the opportunity to challenge the
court expert (through cross examination and/or party hired experts), parties may feel that they are being denied a public and
fair process. Indeed, a system that does not permit open challenge to the expert opinion may undercut the objective of accuracy being sought. Whatever the shortcomings, the ability to
cross-examine an expert and to put on expert testimony in support of a party’s position does have the advantage of exposing
the experts’ views to public scrutiny and allowing challenges
326. Recommendations of a Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch.
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized Knowledge”).
327. In discussing use of technical experts as “expert [C]ommissioners to
support judges,” the Judicial Reform Council expressed concern that any such
system could “assur[e] the transparency of procedures” and raised questions
regarding whether expert commissioners “can be considered fair and neutral
from the standpoint of both patient and doctor, and whether expert commissioners might exert some hidden influence on the process whereby judges form
their decisions.” Id. These same concerns should apply to a new “expert employee” or “expert research assistant” system.
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that the expert may not have considered. Such examination
will aid the court in reaching a “correct” judgment.
Another alternative is for the court to create a list of “expert
Commissioners.” These Commissioners would not be full time
court employees. Instead, one such Commissioner would be
called upon by the court, on a case-by-case basis, to sit with the
judges hearing a case. The “expert Commissioner” would advise
the judge as to the expert testimony heard in the case. In effect, the “expert Commissioner” would be a “super expert,”
commenting on the validity of the opinions expressed in open
court by witnesses. However, if the court received the views of
the “expert Commissioner” in camera and without confrontation
or possibility of contradiction, severe due process and Rule of
Law questions could arise. Indeed, if taken as part of the
court’s deliberations and not as evidence, the views of the “expert Commissioner” would not be available for review by an appellate court.
Of course, requiring court-appointed experts, hired experts,
or expert Commissioners to give the parties copies of their opinions and subjecting them to cross-examination and/or opposing
expert views takes time. Nonetheless, some scholars find that
the increased fairness and perceptions of fairness among parties and the public, as well as greater accuracy, is worth the
328
While today’s bengoshi are not sufficiently eduextra time.
cated in medical or engineering matters to conduct a valuable
cross-examination, the legal education system is changing and
part of that change is allowing persons from faculties other
than the law faculty to become bengoshi (and hence judges as
329
This change may have the effect of opening the legal
well).
field up to persons with knowledge in these specialized fields.
Further, one of the objectives of the new law school system is
330
educating students on the practical aspects of lawyering.
With an education based on the Socratic method and challenge
to responses, tomorrow’s bengoshi may be better prepared for
such cross-examination than may be the case today. In an ef328. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch.
II, pt. 2. See also Lee, supra note 320, at 490–93.
329. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch.
III, pt. 2, § 2 (covering the Judicial Reform Council’s recommendations for law
schools).
330. Id.
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fort to bring more expertise in other fields to the legal and judicial practice, perhaps new law schools should exempt some limited number of licensed or otherwise accredited professionals in
specific non-law fields from the entrance exam requirements or
give such persons extra consideration. Such exemption might
be particularly useful where medical doctors or construction
engineers (two fields where complicated cases appear to be on
the rise) are law school applicants.
If cross-examination is deemed unnecessary for a civil law
331
then expert opinion, including the
non-adversary system,
views expressed by “expert Commissioners,” should, at a minimum, be made publicly available to the parties in advance of a
decision. With this notice, parties can submit conflicting expert
opinion or views to correct perceived errors in “expert Commissioner” advice. Additionally, this system would create a dialogue between experts and judges and might reveal areas of
inquiry not considered by court-retained experts as witnesses or
Commissioners. Giving the court the gatekeeper function of
determining whether a party should be allowed to submit an
332
expert to contradict a court employee expert is inadequate. A
judge is unlikely to permit such a contradicting witness because
to do so would both sanction a challenge to a colleague and take
additional time in the trial. Moreover, once the court has determined that expert advice is important in the case, failure to
allow the parties an opportunity to present their own expert
witness would be inconsistent with the objective of the new reforms to better train lawyers so that they can better prepare
and try cases. Further, denying a party’s request to present its
331. While retaining a “civil law” based substantive law system, the postwar procedure in Japan was modeled on the U.S. adversary system, and the
New Code retains the adversarial form of examination and cross-examination
of witnesses. ALFRED C. OPPLER, LAW REFORM IN OCCUPIED JAPAN 130–34
(1976). Under Rule 114 of the Japanese Rules of Civil Procedure, crossexamination is limited to matters brought out on direct examination or matters relevant thereto as well as credibility issues. MINJI SOSH-O KISOKU, art.
114.
332. A Japanese judge’s role in determining whether a party in such circumstance can present a witness is not similar to the role of the U.S. judge
under Daubert, since in the Japanese situation, through its actions in appointing an expert, the Court has impliedly decided that the expert advice sought
meets the reliability and professional standards set in Daubert. For a discussion of Daubert, see supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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own expert will likely lead to that party filing an appeal and
urging the appeals court to hear its witness. Even in the likelihood that the appeals court refuses to hear the witness, the appeal itself will take time and will add to the costs of the litigation system.
The July 2003 reform adopts a form of the “expert Commissioner” system but does not adopt the full time expert employee
333
Under the 2003 reform, the opinion of the expert
system.
Commissioner must be given in the presence of opposing counsel (or if given by phone, a record of the opinion must be made
and given to counsel); counsel then has an absolute right to pre334
sent an expert opinion of their own. The opinion of the expert
Commissioner will be a part of the record in the case and thus
335
will be available to a reviewing court. Since the court is compelled to hear an expert proffered by a party whose opinion differs from the expert Commissioner, the Commissioner’s opinion
is not conclusive. Nonetheless, the court is likely to give greater
weight to the opinion of the expert Commissioner than to that
of an expert presented by a party. There is nothing inherently
wrong with such a system because the expert Commissioner
may be viewed by the court as neutral, while a witness proffered by a party may be viewed as somewhat less neutral.
F. Relations between the Bench and the Bar
One of the more interesting serendipitous perceptions arising
from the interview process was the gap in thinking, understanding and respect between the Bench and the Bar. Among
Japanese lawyers, the perception existed that judges were ei333. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch.
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening the Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized
Knowledge”). In July of 2003 the Diet enacted a form of “Expert Commissioner” system to be used in complicated cases. See Act to Amend Civil Procedure Act and Other Relevant Acts, 15 Heisei (2003) Statute No. 108 (Japan)
(adding Articles 92–2 to 92–7 to Japan’s New Code of Civil Procedure).
334. It remains to be seen whether Japanese judges will use their gatekeeper authority to limit such expert opinion to written opinion or whether
they will permit the parties to present oral expert testimony. If limited to
written opinion, it can reasonably be assumed that the opinion of the party
expert will play little, if any, role in the determination of the case.
335. Recommendations of the Judicial Reform Council, supra note 19, at ch.
II, pt. 1, § 2 (“Strengthening the Handling of Cases Requiring Specialized
Knowledge”).
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ther unwilling or lacked the time to make difficult decisions
336
regarding the consideration evidence that could affect a case.
Yet, lawyers appeared to be unwilling or lacked the time to educate the court regarding the necessity of making decisions or
337
Lawyers instead wanted judges
allowing of certain evidence.
to prod opposing counsel to produce or find evidence and issues
338
They wanted judges to suggest settleto assist their client.
ments so that cases could be resolved, rather than lawyers be339
Judges, on the other
ing the vehicles for settlement talks.
hand, complained that lawyers were ill-prepared and unwilling
340
to do the work needed to move the cases along swiftly. Judges
341
felt the need to be paternalistic in their approach because so
many parties were either not represented or were (in the judge’s
342
view) inadequately represented.
In short, there appeared to be a significant divide between
these legal professionals. This divide is mirrored in the discus336. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (E) in Saitama, Japan (on file with
author).
337. Id.
338. A lawyer in Nagoya reasoned that the inquiry procedure was infrequently used because it was much better for the court to do the questioning
than for counsel. Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan (on file with
author).
339. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (M) in Hiroshima, Japan (on file with
author). A judge interviewed outside Tokyo expressed the view that settlement should be in the hands of the lawyers, but that lawyers were afraid to
raise settlement discussions for fear it would expose weaknesses in their case.
Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author). As a
result, lawyers want judges to raise settlement issues, remaining sensitive to
the lawyers’ need for the court to initiate such discussion for fear of exposing
individual case weaknesses. Id.
340. A judge interviewed outside Tokyo noted that due to problems with
lawyer preparation, judges had to be actively involved in the cases. Interview
with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author). Moreover, this
judge was of the view that lawyers in general had confidence in the government, including the judicial branch, and thus wanted judges involved. Id.
341. Miki, supra note 85, at 5 (“Japanese judges tend to be paternalistic and
support the weaker side….”).
342. Interview with High Court Judge (R) in Japan (on file with author).
Lawyers are aware of this feeling by judges. As one lawyer noted, judges have
a certain “arrogance” and look down on lawyers. Interview with lawyer (E) in
Saitama, Japan (on file with author). See Kamiya, supra note 182, at 70 (noting that the paternalistic attitude of courts “may be justified by the fact that
the Code allows litigation to be filed and conducted without legal counsel or
representatives”).
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sion regarding entrance requirements for new law schools that
will become operational at the beginning of 2004. To begin
with, issues arise regarding whether entrance exams for these
new law schools should be prepared by the Ministry of Educa343
tion (probably with some input by the Judicial Branch) or the
Bar Associations. The likelihood is that two different entrance
exams will be prepared and law schools will be allowed to
344
choose one or the other and, perhaps in some cases both. Similarly, with the advent of the new law schools, what will be the
345
role of the Judiciary’s Legal Training and Research Institute?

343. Although there is said to be a separation of powers in Japan, judges are
regularly assigned to the executive branch to assist and work alongside administrative officials. ODA, supra note 1, at 395–98. This assistance can include the representation of the government in litigation as well as opining on
the constitutionality of legislation throughout the legislative process. Id. The
former creates the specter of a judge as counsel for a party, and the latter
complicates the judicial function when an issue of constitutionality is raised in
a case or controversy due to the likelihood that, in a highly administrative
State such as Japan, their colleagues respect judges assigned to the executive
branch. See CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).
In the course of their long careers and as a step in their promotion,
the judges are sometimes appointed to a non-judicial task inside or
outside the judiciary….Outside the judiciary, the greatest number of
judges are assigned to various positions in the Ministry of Justice, as
legislative or administrative staff, or as government attorneys.…Generally speaking a judge’s career path is regarded highly
when it includes one or two of the above-mentioned special assignments.
Id. The fact that colleagues have approved of the court’s ability to challenge
the constitutionality of laws places a burden on courts which might have questions concerning the constitutionality of certain laws. This burden certainly
places the challenging party at a disadvantage.
344. In August of 2003, eighteen thousand persons took the exam for entrance to the New Law Schools administered by the Japanese Bar, i.e., the
Japan Law Foundation. However, another entrance test was administered on
August 31 by the National Center for University Entrance Exams. “It is up to
each graduate school to decide which tests to consider in evaluating applicants, but many graduate schools are expected to refer to both….” 18,000
Take Exams for New Law Schools, JAPAN TIMES, Aug. 4, 2003 at http://www.
japantimes.co/cgi-bin/getarticle.pl5?nn20030804a3.htm.
345. The likelihood is that the Institute will continue, although the time
required for attendance will be shortened from eighteen months to one year
and the reduction will be distributed among the various aspects of Institute
study, namely the classroom, intern program and final class sessions to incorporate what has been experienced in the intern program. Discussions with
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Should there be continuing legal education requirements and, if
so, is it appropriate for the judges to lecture at these CLE
courses? Would such lecture process be seen by the Bar as an
attempt by the judicial branch to control the Bar?
Some Japanese lawyers and professors interviewed did not
346
Others acsee this divide between bengoshi and judges.
knowledged the existence of such a divide, but contended that it
was small, at least in comparison to the past divisions between
347
Nonetheless, comments
the two branches of the profession.
by both the Bench and the Bar indicate that a significant divide
exists. In part, this gulf is historical, based on the Bar’s desire
to preserve its autonomy and viewing judicial involvement in
348
This concern is heightened by the
Bar matters with concern.
Judicial Secretariat and officials at the Institute in Tokyo Japan (on file with
author).
346. See generally Interview with lawyer (A) in Nagoya, Japan & Interview
with lawyer (I) in Osaka, Japan (on file with author) (noting that the personality of the judge primarily affects how bengoshi perceive the divide between
bengoshi and judges). But see Tanabe, supra note 121, at 553.
347. See Tanabe, supra note 121, at 553. See, e.g., Interview with lawyer (T)
from Japan (on file with author).
348. At one time, all judges were graduates of the Imperial Universities and
accordingly were highly respected. Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 70. At the
same time, the predecessor of the bengoshi, the kujishi and later the daigennin were not required to be graduates of any school and many had no professional training or qualifications. Id. at 71. In the early period of modern
Japanese law the reputation of daigennin was so bad “that a special term of
opprobrium, sambyaku daigen, a term which it has been suggested might best
be translated as ‘shyster’ or ‘pettifogger,’ gained currency.” Id. at 67. One
purpose of the Lawyers Law of 1933 was to raise the qualifications for bengoshi “to the same level as those of judges and procurators.” Id. at 75. As recently as 1974, Professor Tanaka could write:
[I]t must be said that the legal profession as a group still has a long
way to go in order to gain general social acceptance of the social
status it claims and of the role it plays. This is as much a question of
changing the way of thinking of the general public as it is a challenge
to the legal profession to improve its standing by its own efforts.
Tanaka, supra note 28, at 265; see also TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 8, at 550 (“Practicing attorneys were in a lower position socially as
well.”). Thus, the view that being a bengoshi was an “honorable” profession is
of relatively recent origin while the judge position was always viewed as a
highly regarded public servant. In a country where the bureaucracy is highly
respected, judges were (and remain) among the most highly regarded. Moreover, until the Post-war period the legal profession was under the control of
the Ministry of Justice. The profession had long chaffed under government
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fact that Japan’s Supreme Court is specifically given rule349
In
making authority for all matters relating to attorneys.
part, the divide represents a different experience with and outlook toward the litigation process.
The Judicial Reform Council recommended that the Bar be
350
Thus, the new law
more involved in judging and teaching.
schools are encouraged to use “adjunct professors” who are
351
members of the litigating Bar, and the judicial branch is en352
couraged to hire practicing lawyers as judges. Although technically eligible to become judges after entering the practice of
law, the reality is that “[j]udges are nearly always selected
from…assistant judges with 10 or more years of experience, because public prosecutors, lawyers and law professors with 10
years experience normally are not available for appointment to
353
These recommendations are likely to have
a Judgeship.”
muted success. Some law schools appear to have adopted a policy under which the “adjuncts” work full-time for a few years,
354
thus giving up their active practices and financial rewards.
This approach is unlikely to attract the “best” of the practicing
355
Similarly, the salary discrepancy between successful
Bar.
practicing lawyers and judges of similar age and experience
may prevent successful lawyers from seeking judicial positions.
regulation. The Post-war occupation did away with Ministerial control and
made the Bar mostly self-governing. Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 76–77, 80.
349. KENPŌ, art. 77 (“The Supreme Court is vested with the rule-making
power under which it determines the rules of procedure and of practice, and of
matters relating to attorneys, the internal discipline of the courts and the
administration of judicial affairs.”).
350. See generally Recommendations of a Judicial Reform Council, supra
note 19.
351. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(2).
352. Id.
353. See TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 8, at 552 (noting
that practicing attorneys are reluctant to accept the decrease in income that
inheres to entering the judiciary); Takahara, supra note 29.
354. Discussion with Professor Miki in Tokyo (on file with author).
355. The prospect for adjunct judges is better as new legislation permits
judges to continue to remain in their judicial positions while teaching at law
schools. Previously, judges who wanted to adjunct teach were required to take
time off from their judicial positions, while under the new law such teaching is
considered a judicial duty and can therefore be performed on “judicial time.”
See Act to Dispatch Judges, Prosecutors to National Civil Service Employees
to Law Schools, 15 Heisi (2003) Statute No. 40 (Japan).
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Moreover, there are currently few practicing lawyers in Ja356
pan. Transferring some of these practicing lawyers to judicial
positions will further reduce the number of lawyers available
for the public. A more radical approach to Bar and Bench relations may have to be considered if the gulf between them is to
be addressed.
In the U.S., the divide between the Bench and the Bar is not
357
One exnearly as broad as appears to be the case in Japan.
planation is that federal U.S. judges are typically appointed
after a successful (and profitable) career in the private prac358
In any event, even the thought of a District Court judge
tice.
appointment without any litigation experience is bizarre. Many
U.S. judges were leaders in Bar Associations before joining the
Bench and many continue to be actively involved in Bar Asso359
The fact is that U.S.
ciation activities after appointment.
356. For a discussion of the practical effects of the scarcity of lawyers in
Japan, see Joseph Gurnee, Practical Aspects of Litigating in Japan: an American Lawyer’s Perspective, at http://www.intl-lawyers.com/articles/jplaw/ (last
visited Oct. 30, 2003).
357. In the U.S., the failure of Congress to raise the salaries of federal
judges and bring them closer to the salaries of lawyers in major firms has
created something of a gulf between the Bar and federal judges. The Need for
Judicial Pay Reform, Statement of the American Bar Association President,
submitted to The National Commission on the Public Service, available at
http://www.abanet.org (last visited Nov. 16, 2003). The Bar responded by
supporting the judicial branch’s efforts to get pay relief. Independence of the
Judiciary: Judicial Compensation, 2002 A.B.A. Legis. & Gov’t Priorities,
available at http://www.abanet.org/poladv/priorities/judcom.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2003), which states:
The ABA supports legislative action to increase judicial compensation
and ensure regular cost-of-living increases for federal, state, and territorial judges and the administrative judiciary, and urges Congress
to de-link Congressional pay from judicial pay. The ABA also recommends periodic, systematic review of the adequacy of federal judicial
pay (along with the adequacy of pay for other top-level government
officials) in order to provide our judges with adequate and fair compensation.
Id.
358. Marcus, supra note 35, at 28 (“U.S. Judges, too, were distinctive.
Rather than emerging from professional training directed toward service in
the judiciary, they came usually from the practicing Bar, and also had limited
formal education.”).
359. The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations is composed of local Bar
Associations and “all individual lawyers…members of the bench or procuracy
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360

Judges
judges are members of both the Bench and the Bar.
understand the challenges and frustrations of the private practice because they experienced them themselves. Furthermore,
lawyers tend to be more understanding of the pressures placed
on the Bench because there is open dialogue about these issues.
Both the Bench and Bar participate in legal education activities
as adjunct professors, while actively employed outside the academic world. In short, there is a commonality of experience and
interests between U.S. lawyers and judges.
Meanwhile, Japanese judges are part of a career civil service
361
system and are exposed to the practice of law during their
362
All
tenure at the Legal Training and Research Institute.
trainees are required to intern in the field at law offices, prose363
Through these training
cutor’s offices and judge’s chambers.
internships, trainees are educated to respect, and at times de364
However,
fer, to the other branches of the legal profession.
this exposure is only for a relatively short period at the beginning of a career and does not provide the in-depth exposure to
the practice of law that comes from dealing with clients and
client-related issues on a daily basis.
On the other hand, U.S. judges are not moved from location to
location but are appointed to the circuit or district where they
365
serve. As a consequence, U.S. judges have a close relationship
with the communities where they live and work. That relationcannot be members of the Federation.” CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED,
supra note 8, at § 205(2).
360. Bureau of Labor and Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2002-2003 Edition, Judges, Magistrates, and Other
Judicial Workers, available at http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos272.htm (last visited
Nov. 4, 2003).
361. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).
362. Id.
363. LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, supra note 76, at 7.
364. Id. at 11–12. The Legal Training and Research Institute notes that:
During the field training term, legal apprentices are assigned to the
district courts, the district public prosecutors’ offices, and the local attorney’s associations throughout the country. The field training lasts
twelve months and is subdivided into three-month rotational assignments at each of the civil trial, criminal trial, public prosecution, and
private practice of law.
Id.
365. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133.
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ship extends to others who have similar training, experience
and backgrounds — in other words local lawyers. Unlike Japanese judges, U.S. judges do not live together in compounds cre366
Judges may have
ated or funded by a judicial bureaucracy.
friends among their colleagues, but they also have friends
among their former colleagues at the Bar and among the general community.
Most significantly, U.S. judges are not career judges who
start their professional life as judges and seek to prosper within
367
They are not “inbred,” learning
the judicial bureaucracy.
their craft from the judges who came before them. Instead, they
bring new experiences and new ideas from outside the Bench to
the courtroom. However, this discrepancy can lead to unfortunate consequences in individual cases; for example, judges may
be unprepared to sit on the Bench, may not understand how to
work within the judicial system, or may be appointed because
their brother went to school with a U.S. Senator rather than
368
because of their ability. Whatever the shortcomings, the U.S.
system does provide a commonality of experience between
judges and lawyers, as well as, a greater understanding and
appreciation of each other’s experiences. Additionally, the
knowledge and experience that judges with previous litigation
experience may have in representing and understanding client
issues is important from the judicial standpoint.
Still, convincing bengoshi to give up their lucrative practices
and lifestyles in communities where they have ties and are respected only to move into the bureaucratic world of the travel369
However, something
ing Japanese judge may prove difficult.

366. See Sabrina Shizue McKenna, Japanese Judicial Reform: Proposal for
Judicial Reform in Japan: An Overview, 2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 121, 140
(2001) (noting that the Japanese system of separating judges from the rest of
the community by providing them with government housing is meant to prevent judicial favoritism towards acquaintances). See also 28 U.S.C. § 44 (stating that U.S. judges shall be residents of the circuit for which appointed).
367. Marcus, supra note 35, at 28 (“[U.S. judges] surely did not rise through
a judicial bureaucracy.”).
368. See generally American Bar Association, supra note 111 (noting that
the U.S. judiciary is becoming increasingly politicized, creating public doubt
as to whether judges make decisions on matters of fact and law or based on
political pressure and special interests).
369. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(4).
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Perhaps
short of such a dramatic change may prove useful.
aspiring judges, who choose the judicial life when in school or at
the Legal Training and Research Institute, may be required to
spend five years in the active private practice before they can be
appointed as judges in training. Such a requirement would assure that judges have some practical experience before ascend371
This requirement would also make them
ing to the Bench.
active members of the Bar community before becoming judges
and might help to bridge the gap between the Bench and Bar in
372
Additionally, practicing bengoshi recruited for the
Japan.
370. One bengoshi interviewed stated that if she could change one thing
about the civil justice system she would abolish the career judge system and
require that all judges be appointed from among practicing lawyers. Interview with lawyer (E) from Saitama in Washington, D.C., U.S.A. (on file with
author).
371. In the past, the Japanese judicial system has opposed such a suggestion. See Supreme Court Accepts Advisory Panel on Judges, JAPAN TIMES
ONLINE, Feb. 20, 2001, available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/get
article.pl5?nn20010220a3.htm (Supreme Court of Japan accepted a panel to
assist on Judicial selection but rejected the Bar Associations suggestion that
all new judges first “work as lawyers or prosecutors for five years to broaden
their experience.”). However, in light of changing attitudes towards Judicial
Reform, it may be well to rethink this opposition and take a more global attitude that encompasses both the staffing needs of the judiciary and the judiciary’s need for a broader base of experience in the corps of judges. See Rabinowitz, supra note 8, at 77 for a discussion of the Bar’s attempts, as early as
1956 — the date of the Rabinowitz article — to achieve professional “integration,” meaning “selection of members of the judiciary from the Bar rather than
directly from among graduates of the Judicial Research and Training Institute.” Id.
372. Similarly, Japanese prosecutors tend to be career prosecutors who have
never represented criminally accused clients. LEGAL TRAINING AND RESEARCH
INSTITUTE OF JAPAN, supra note 76, at 12–14 (“Upon successful completion of
the final qualifying examination, a legal apprentice may choose to be an assistant judge, a public prosecutor, or a practicing attorney.”). Japanese defense
lawyers, on the other hand, have rarely been prosecutors as such service entails also a career in civil service. As a consequence neither truly understands
the position of the other. Whatever the shortcomings of the U.S. criminal law
system, distance in experience between prosecuting attorneys and defense
attorneys is not one of them. Generally, most U.S. prosecutors have spent at
least some time as defense attorneys and most defense attorneys have worked
as prosecutors. There exists a real revolving door between the prosecution
and defense Bar. As a consequence, while the prosecutors and defense lawyers may sharply disagree on issues, they each understand the position of the
other — having been the other and perhaps considering being the other in the
future. Japan may wish to explore whether it is helpful to the criminal law
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Bench can be exempted from the transfer requirements, under
which judges are moved around the country on an average
three-year cycle. Having established ties in a particular locality, these bengoshi may be given the option of remaining in that
locality during their service as a judge. Apparently, the Japanese Supreme Court has already decided to exempt such law373
More problematic,
yers from the travel rotation system.
though, is determining how to deal with the practice that a bengoshi judicial candidate has built up over the years. Not only
must the financial value of that practice be resolved, but the
goodwill created over the years must be up-kept and the clients
losing a trusted counselor must be protected.
Another problem in carrying out the Reform Council’s recommendation that more bengoshi become judges relates to the
pay scale of judges — not simply where to place previously successful bengoshi judges without judicial experience on the pay
scale, but also how to ensure that such judges receive appropri374
ate pay consideration in the future. The likelihood is that any
bureaucracy — including a judicial bureaucracy — will look
more favorably on experience within its ranks than on outside
experience. However, if bengoshi are to be recruited as judges,
they must be assured as to future pay and responsibility equal
to those who are their contemporaries in age and total professional experience. At the same time, if paid on the basis of experience and age alone, unsuccessful bengoshi may seek judicial
appointment as a good alternative to unsuccessful practice.
Yet, these individuals are not the bengoshi that the Reform
Council envisions as future judges. In this regard, the practicing Bar also has a screening responsibility.
Another issue is that regarding retirement. Judges (except for
Supreme Court Justices and Summary Court Judges) must resystem and the public perception of that system to have defense and prosecutorial lawyers who have had some experience on the other side of the aisle.
Having judges who were at one time defense lawyers would likely affect the
decision-making in criminal cases.
373. Toshiko Takenaka, Comparison of U.S. and Japanese Court Systems
for Patent Litigation: A Special Court or Special Divisions in a General Court?,
STREAMLINING INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY NO.5, 47, 48 (2000), available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number5/pub5atcl6.pdf
(last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
374. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
807.
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Thus, a career judge who serves forty
tire at age sixty-five.
years as a judge has a significant retirement benefit. But, for a
bengoshi becoming a judge after twenty years of experience, the
retirement benefits received at sixty-five will be substantially
less. Moreover, such a “bengoshi-turned-judge” may not wish to
attempt to re-start a law practice after retirement, having already created a practice once before. Thus, such a bengoshi
may be at a substantial disadvantage in retirement. To recruit
successful, middle-aged bengoshi, the retirement rules may require modification. Perhaps, the law should be modified to allow “bengoshi-turned-judge” personnel to work until a later age
or even be given retirement credit for some, if not all, of their
years of active bengoshi practice. In any event, if the goal is to
recruit successful bengoshi, some mechanism must be found to
ameliorate the economic disadvantage that face bengoshi who
376
wish to become a judge.
Further, rather than providing government subsidized housing where young judges are clustered together, consideration
might be given to providing newly appointed judges with a
housing allowance that would enable and encourage them to
live among the people whom they serve. This housing will give
judges more access to the lives of the people whose cases they

375. The compulsory retirement age of lower court judges is sixty-five, except for Summary Court Judges, who retire at 70. CIVIL PROCEDURE IN JAPAN
REVISED, supra note 8, at § 3.02(2).
376. Goodman, The Somewhat Less Reluctant Litigant, supra note 15, at
807. Without some accommodation regarding the economic disadvantage of
moving from bengoshi to judge, the likelihood is that only unsuccessful bengoshi will elect to become judges — but this is not the quality of judge that the
system should be attempting to recruit. Of course, bengoshi who are so committed to the legal reforms may sacrifice themselves for the legal system and
elect to become judges. However, such bengoshi should not be compelled to
make this personal sacrifice and it will be difficult to find large numbers of
such committed bengoshi. For example, in 1992, only a handful of practicing
bengoshi actually became judges. In 1992, the National Bar Federation introduced a system in which they make recommendations to the Supreme Court
regarding lawyers seeking judgeships. Although thirty-seven lawyers have
made the change to the bench since the system was introduced, enthusiasm
for the opportunity has been minimal. The change usually involves accepting
a lower salary, giving up established clients and often a transfer to courts in
remote areas. Takahara, supra note 29.
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decide and give the public greater access to judges as real peo377
ple at an early stage in their professional life.
IV. CONCLUSION
One objective of the New Code of Civil Procedure, and a goal
of the Judicial Reform Council, was to strengthen the judicial
system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism. A few
steps towards this goal were making the system more readily
accessible to the public and strengthening the mechanisms of
decision-making, such as quickening the pace of resolution and
expanding the discovery of evidence, so that the public would in
378
To make
fact utilize the legal system for dispute resolution.
the system more accessible, the New Code expanded the jurisdiction of the Summary Court and introduced a new one-day
379
small claims dispute resolution mechanism. The small claims
jurisdiction of the court appears to have had the desired effect
as the number of small claims cases has increased on an annual
basis at a rate that far exceeds that of new case filings in the
judicial system on the whole. With respect to increasing the use
of the judicial system in general, the New Code does not appear
to have achieved its desired goal. The fact of the matter is that
when the new small claim cases are factored out of the system,
the number of new cases filed has barely changed since the New
380
Code’s adoption.
While the general use of the judicial system has not increased
(with the exception of the small claims cases mentioned above),
the pace of litigation has quickened so that on average new
cases filed in the District Court are resolved relatively

377. See generally McKenna, supra note 366, at 140 (noting that judges are
subject to transfer to different geographical locations and are provided with
housing in the same area as other judges). More experienced judges, who
have saved sufficient funds to purchase their own residence and who can contemplate transfers within a relatively close geographic area, already purchase
their own residences and many live among the general public. Id. However, in
their early years these judges tend to live in small, old and very inexpensive
housing complexes that the Judicial Secretariat provides to them. Id.
378. Id. at 135–37.
379. MINSOHŌ, art. 370 (concerning the principles of a one-day trial).
380. See Hayashi, supra note 143 and accompanying text (the table demonstrates that when small claims cases factored out, the increase in new cases
filed in District and Summary Courts was negligible).

File: GoodmanMacro.doc

610

Created on: 2/17/2004 5:47 PM

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

Last Printed: 4/21/2004 1:27 PM

[Vol. 29:2

381

This increase may be due to the “legalized” procequickly.
dures in the New Code or due to the fact that judges are permitting fewer witnesses to testify in open court than was the case
382
One question to be considered is why the
in earlier years.
number of new cases filed has not increased significantly since
the adoption of the New Code. Undoubtedly, many other factors not considered in this study also have an effect on the
number of new cases filed, such as the comparatively small size
of Japanese damage awards, the continued high cost of litigation, the difficulties of collecting on a judgment, the time lag for
the new bengoshi reforms and legal education systems to take
effect, and cultural factors. But, some of the factors considered
herein may also be relevant.
Although the time to resolve an average case has significantly
declined since adoption of the New Code, the fact remains that
high profile cases continue to take several years for resolution
at the District Court level and appeals of such cases take years
383
Due to the previous slow pace of
at the High Court level.
resolution, the Japanese legal system needs to overcome the
public perception that the system operates at a “snail’s pace.”
The fact that some high profile cases take many years for resolution only furthers that perception. Similarly, the perception
of the public is influenced by news reports that focus not on the
improvements made in the time required to resolve the average
litigation, but rather on the time delays in cases of public interest, both civil and criminal.
In addition, the failure to make greater use of the judicial
system to resolve legal issues may be related to the way in
which the system operates. Thus, the present system’s focus on
“narrowing,” rather than resolving, issues presented in a case
may have an effect on the system’s use. In approximately 85%
of cases in the present system, no witnesses are heard, and in
384
cases where witnesses are heard, the number keeps declining.
Cases are resolved based on written materials or a form of trial
381. See Average Number of Months from Filing of Complaint to Disposition
– District Court Chart, supra Part III.A.1.
382. See Trials to be Expedited, supra note 18.
383. See Percentage of Judgment Cases Decided in One and Two Years
Chart, supra Part III.A.1.
384. See Witnesses at District Court (First Instance) Chart, supra Part
III.A.4.
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by dossier. Additionally, in many cases, there may only be a
question of law which can be decided without evidence (rather
than factual issues), and in others, a party may default. Even
considering the dismissal of these cases, the high percentage of
cases without witnesses and the declining number of witnesses
in cases with oral testimony are likely to result in appeals, primarily based on procedural justice for the appellant, rather
than substantive issues. To be an adequate dispute resolution
system, the judicial system must not only do justice but must be
perceived by the legal community as doing justice. A system in
which the litigating parties rarely have an opportunity to personally state their case in front of the decision-maker in the
formal setting of a trial or Oral Hearing is likely to be looked at
as “removed” from the parties and failing to provide a “day in
court.” Issues exist as to whether the cost of efficiency — the
accelerating trend of not hearing live testimony — is too high.
Just as a minority of high profile, slow moving cases leads to
the incorrect perception that all cases proceed slowly (when in
fact the average case in Japan moves rather quickly), so too the
lack of witness testimony may present a “perception” problem.
“Paternalistic” Japanese judges are concerned with providing
“substantive justice.” Judges want to issue a substantively correct decision to ensure that the party that should win does in
fact win. Such judges are more concerned with a correct decision than with the procedural niceties surrounding the proc385
U.S. judges, on the other hand, are more concerned with
ess.
procedural niceties and less concerned with whether substantive justice is achieved, as demonstrated by the relatively few
386
jury awards that are set aside by the trial court. Yet, the possibility exists that some Japanese citizens do not use the legal
system because they feel that the system does not provide them
with justice, while many U.S. citizens use the system because
they feel they can attain justice. If such is the case, perception
(as distinct from reality) may have an impact on the judicial
system as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism.

385. See Tanabe, supra note 121, at 520–22.
386. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. at 568 (noting
that only when an award is “grossly excessive” in relation to the State’s legitimate punishment and deterrence interests does it violate due process).
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Further, the New Code reforms aim to make trials more reliable, efficient, and speedy, through the new inquiry procedure,
the expanded document production language of the New Code
and the new tools available to judges dealing with document
387
Howproduction requests (in camera review and redacting).
ever, these goals appear not to have been realized in practice.
Thus, in camera review and redaction are virtually never used
and the new inquiry procedure is similarly moribund. The inquiry procedure is not used to discover evidence, nor does it appear to narrow the issues to be tried or speed up the judicial
process. Whether the reason for the failure of the inquiry system lies in the system itself — i.e., the fact that there are no
sanctions for failing to respond or responding accurately — or
elsewhere is a matter that should be further studied. One clear
conclusion is that lawyers are not using the system as the New
Code intended and in this regard, the system is not achieving
its objective.
Similarly, while leading to the greater production of documents through the use of court suggestions, new document procedures do not appear to lead to the greater production of significant documents, at least in cases between private parties.
Whether the reason for this problem is the reluctance of courts
to punish individuals for failing to respond, or the substantive
rules surrounding production requirements (i.e., the self-use
document exception), it appears that the New Code’s catch-all
document provision has not had a significant effect on making
truly relevant documents available. According to bengoshi interviewed, the New Code’s “discovery” provisions do not make it
easier for a righteous plaintiff to obtain judicial relief.
Although most bengoshi interviewed were not prepared to
suggest that litigation today be instituted because it may be
resolved at any higher rate than in the past, in certain areas
the pace of new filings has increased. These cases generally
consist of more complicated cases, such as malpractice. Here,
the reasons for increased filings may be related to factors other
than the New Code and new judicial activism to speed up resolution of cases. In the malpractice field, the substantive law
seems to be changing, placing a greater burden on doctors to be
more open with their patients and to more closely consider their
387. See Ota, supra note 9, at 568–70.
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patient’s wishes. Perhaps, more malpractice cases are instituted today due to the combination of this higher burden on
doctors and greater public awareness of medical matters
(through availability of information on the World Wide Web and
otherwise). Complicated malpractice cases take longer to resolve than simple litigations. Thus, although methods to enhance the efficiency of such cases should be pursued, restricting
a party’s ability to challenge the expert opinion of a courtemployed expert may be counter-productive to obtaining a “correct” decision and to enhancing the public’s perception of the
judicial system as a Rule of Law system wherein justice can be
obtained.
Based on the fact that the greatest rise in new cases is in the
area of complicated cases and the average case is disposed of
quicker than in the past, the conclusion can be reached that on
the whole, cases are actually disposed of at a faster rate than
the average figures would show. On one hand, the figures are
skewed because all cases, even default cases, require at least
two months for resolution if for no other reason than to allow
for an answer and to determine whether there has been a default. On the other, the figures are skewed because nonaverage cases are the more complicated cases. Accordingly, the
new procedures of the New Code designed to speed up litigation
appear to be working. It matters not whether the reason is the
“Code” itself, the judges’ perceived new inclination to expedite
litigation, or the “legitimization” of the pre-Code reforms by the
New Code. Average cases are resolved quicker than before the
New Code’s adoption, and “non-average” cases are also disposed
of more quickly. The fact that this improvement has not led to
greater litigant use of the judicial system should be further explored if the objective of strengthening the judicial system in
Japan as a Rule of Law dispute resolution mechanism is to be
realized.
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APPENDIX A
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

1. Have the preliminary procedure provisions speeded
up the pace of litigation? Has the procedure resulted in
significantly narrowing the issues to be tried?
2. Has the procedure allowing inquiries to be made of
the other side resulted in significant discovery of facts
not already known to the inquiring party?
3. As the attorney for a party to whom an inquiry has
been made, do you feel an obligation to provide answers
even if the answer is harmful to your client’s position? If
the could be harmful to your client’s position, do you feel
an ethical obligation to a) answer or b) refuse to answer
the inquiry?
4. As a Professor of Civil Procedure Law do you believe
that a lawyer who has been asked an inquiry has an obligation to provide an answer even if the answer is harmful to his client’s position? If the answer could be harmful to his client’s position do you feel a lawyer has an
ethical obligation to a) answer or b) refuse to answer the
inquiry?
5. Has the procedure for inquiry resulted in the identification and ultimate production of documents detrimental to the position of the answering party and helpful to
the inquiring party?
6. Has the procedure for making inquiry of the other
side resulted in significant changes in document production by one party to another? If so, how would you describe such changes?
7. Have the new document production provisions, such
as the court’s in camera review, the redacting of documents so that portions of a document may be produced
and portions not produced, the new “catch-all” provision
of the document production section CCP220(iv) had a
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significant effect resulting in the production of relevant
documents not obtainable under the prior code?
8. Have the new document production provisions made it
easier for a potential plaintiff to be successful in litigation?
9. Have the new document production provisions resulted in more and more important documents being
produced by defendants in the aid of a plaintiff’s case?
10. Since the adoption of the new Code of Civil Procedure, have you observed any change in the Court’s attitude toward the production of self-use documents?
11. Have you observed any change in the Court’s attitude toward what the Court would consider to be a selfuse document? If so, what change: a greater willingness
to allow production; or less of a willingness to allow production?
12. Do you believe that the self-use document exception
to production limits the ability of the plaintiff to obtain
significant documentary evidence adverse to the interest
of defendants?
13. Would you like to see an amendment of the Code restricting the definition of self-use documents so as to allow for greater production of self-use documents? Why?
14. What effect, if any, do you think liberalization of the
self-use document exception so as to allow for production
of self-use documents when the document is directly
relevant to the issue of whether a party knew of should
have known that its actions were improper, would have
on litigation rates in Japan? Would such a change result
in more litigation or would it have no meaningful effect
on the number of cases that might be brought? As a litigating lawyer do you think such a change would result
in your recommending that client’s sue in more cases
than you recommend today? Can you think of any situations in which you recommend that a client NOT sue
where you would have recommended that a client sue
had there been no self-use exception to the document
production rule?
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15. After the Daiwa Bank derivative lawsuit decision
the Diet enacted a law permitting the limitation of liability of Directors in derivative cases. What effect do you
think such legislation has had on the willingness of persons to file derivative lawsuits? What do you think was
the reason that the Diet passed such a limitation of liability provision?
16. Have the provisions allowing for persons to join representative actions after the lawsuit has already been
filed resulted in significant numbers of persons joining
such suits after they have been filed? Do you think lawyers under supervision of the Court should be allowed to
place notices in the newspapers advising persons of the
filing of a representative suit and advising as to how
persons may join such suits? Why?
17. Has the New Code of Civil Procedure affected how
the judge acts during litigation in the District Court? If
so, in what way? For example, is the judge more or less
active (or the same) in examining witnesses or proposing
settlements?
18. Do you think more or less (or the same number of)
cases are referred to conciliation under the new Code
than were referred under the Old Code?
19. In view of the changes made by the New Code of
Civil Procedure, are you more likely to recommend that
clients file civil cases in the District Court than you were
under the Old Code?
20. In view of the changes made by the New Code of
Civil Procedure, are you more likely to recommend that
clients file civil cases in the Summary Court than you
were under the Old Code?

